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ABSTRACT: This dissertation lays the initial groundwork for theorizing closet film as a 
literary genre.  Though closet drama––poetry written in playscript form––has received attention 
from a wide variety of critics in literary, performance and cultural studies, no such body of work 
exists for thinking about closet film––fiction written in the form of the screenplay.  Aside from 
the self-published work of independent scholar Quimby Melton––with whom I have collaborated 
on his ongoing project to form an online bibliography of what he terms the closet screenplay––
there exists quite literally no field of study, nor any initial attempt to theorize the limits and 
potentialities of the genre.  This project offers a theorization of closet film informed by the 
philosophy of Giorgio Agamben, especially his focus on potentiality, which I argue helps 
describe closet film’s tenuous stance toward production––closet film is a genre organized around 
the potential-not-to produce.  Studying closet film also helps us rewrite the boundaries of what is 
considered possible in terms of literary and visual realism, and the “closet” itself constitutes an 
excellent new paradigm for understanding the space between film and the novel, opening up 
discussions of texts that have been largely overlooked or marginalized and enabling us to 
encounter old ones afresh.  This project thus completely revamps our understanding of the novel 
and its relation to cinema, realism, ontology, and aesthetics. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
WHAT CLOSET FILM IS 
 
It is a weird and wonderful feeling to write a booklet about something that does 
not in fact exist. 
–Eisenstein 
 
Closet film is a literary genre defined in part by an absence: the films themselves do not 
exist.  Instead, what we have a is a unique kind of literary text: one rendered in screenplay 
format, but for which actual film production is neither intended nor, in some cases, even 
possible. This absence is in some ways even more stark than closet film’s antecedent genre, 
closet drama, literary (often poetic) works rendered in playscript format.  Whereas closet dramas 
have historically most often simply been read and occasionally performed in private and coterie 
settings, closet film, for various reasons discussed below, is perhaps even more literary in the 
sense that closet film production has been and probably will continue to be even less likely than 
closet drama performance.  For example, Percy Bysshe Shelley’s 1819 closet drama, The Cenci, 
A Tragedy, in Five Acts, a paradigmatic closet drama, was conceived of as unstageable for 
decades––until it received its first public performances in the late nineteenth century (Catherine 
Burroughs 217), and later a notable attempt by Antonin Artaud in 1935 (see below).  No such 
record of attempted film production accompanies closet film (yet).   
In fact, closet film, as a genre, though absolutely parallel to closet drama in several 
intuitively obvious ways, is itself radically absent in a way closet drama most certainly isn’t.  
Closet drama bears a long history of scholarly study, and continues to this day to engender a 
strong critical interest.  But no such record exists with closet film, a literary genre which remains 
almost wholly undiscovered.  Not only is the present study the first booklength examination of 
closet film, but the existing field is constituted solely by a few essays by independent scholar 
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Quimby Melton, whose ongoing online bibliography of closet film constitutes the sole attempt at 
understanding closet film as such in the English language.  But even Melton’s interest in closet 
film is merely a subset of his more general interest in screenplays and script culture itself, and to 
that end Melton focuses on what he has termed the “closet screenplay” (more on this 
terminology below).  What seems most striking is not simply that so few critics in film and 
literature have studied closet film, but that so few have even asked the question in the very first 
place.  Given the history and sustained interest in poetry written as if it were a play, should not 
there be a corresponding genre of fiction written as if it were a screenplay?  Since the screenplay 
at the formal level constitutes in a direct lineage the cultural offspring of the playscript, is it not 
the case that we might presume the existence of closet film?  Is it not the case that we should 
expect to be surprised if closet film did not exist? 
And yet attention to the question of whether there even is a genre of closet film has itself 
remained marginal.  A rare example comes from Nick Salvato’s excellent book on closet drama, 
Uncloseting Drama: American Modernism and Queer Performance (2010), which ends with a 
brief discussion of William Burroughs’s The Last Words of Dutch Schultz (1970) as a kind of 
modern closet film.  The novel is a fever dream based on the historical last words of the dying 
gangster Dutch Schultz, rendered in a vague kind of screenplay formatting, though pastiched 
throughout with photographs and drawings of film negatives.  It turns out that Burroughs’s 
formal experiment is not a totally singular one.  There are, as one might expect, other closet 
films.  But while critics have certainly noted the formal idiosyncrasies of several of the works 
discussed below, to date Melton’s is the sole attempt to group together the entire body of such 
texts under the rubric that they are screenplays not intended to be filmed, or are otherwise 
unfilmable.  Melton has thus begun the important work of collecting these texts as a semi-
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coherent whole, and this dissertation takes the next logical step: a more fully fleshed out account 
of the limits and potentialities of closet film as a genre, with an extended study of several of the 
most notable closet films to have emerged in the radically different temporal and geographic 
situations that seem to have engendered the form: from Tokyo and Paris in the 1920s, to New 
York and Los Angeles in the 1990s.  The boldest way to put the underlying contention of this 
project is that closet film constitutes one of the most magnificently under-recognized literary 
subgenres in twentieth-century fiction.  My aim here is simply to demonstrate that this thing 
exists, and, perhaps most importantly, that it is worth paying attention to. 
 
 
 
 
 
Closet Film as Genre of Potentiality 
 Heard melodies are sweet, but those unheard 
 Are sweeter; therefore, ye soft pipes, play on;  
––Keats, Ode on a Grecian Urn (11-12) 
 
Let us now approach with some specificity what exactly this thing is by claiming that 
closet film is itself a literary genre, as opposed to something like a literary mode.  One seeming 
advantage to the latter is that it would allow us to take account of a group of texts that are 
intensely varied in form and publication history.  No matter how you slice it, there are very few 
texts that are totally or purely closet films in the sense that they are entirely written in true 
screenplay form and which were not intended to be produced as films and/or are unproduceable.  
Consequently, the few closet film texts we must necessarily look to exist in very different 
settings, and are read in very different ways, and the extent to which they represent themselves as 
properly cinematic also differs a great deal.  Understanding closet film as a mode would allow 
for reading texts as closet-filmic; a novel could partake of closet film, rather than simply having 
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to be or not be a closet film.  For example, Nick Salvato views closet drama as an elastic mode, 
rather than a more or less fixed, stable genre, which allows him to take a more fully developed 
accounting of the complexities of closet drama as it manifested in Modernist queer performance 
practice in the first half of the twentieth century.  On the other hand, there is a great deal of value 
in understanding closet film as a genre, as something somewhat stable or fixed along a set of 
formal properties, or those pertaining to a given text’s material production.  Since, with the sole 
exception of Quimby Melton’s work, closet films have literally never been brought together 
along any kind of set of properties, fixed or not, it seems high time a lengthy study aimed to do 
precisely that: establish closet film as a kind of fixed thing.  While the definition of what 
constitutes “film” varies tremendously between the different historical, linguistic, and geographic 
locales where closet films have been written, the genre is united around the fact of a certain 
tenuous and ambiguous stance towards film.  The cinema of Ryunosuke Akutagawa’s mid-
twenties Tokyo shares little in common with Mark Leyner’s mid-nineties Hollywood, but there is 
a unique continuity regarding the space these texts occupy between literature and the filmic – 
even if the specific language of cinema is different in both cases.   
Jonathan Culler has recently argued along similar lines for understanding the Lyric as a 
kind of genre.  In “Why Lyric?” (2008), Culler argues:  
New lyric studies, of the sort instantiated by Virginia Jackson and Yopie Prins’s 
manifesto “Lyrical Studies,” appear to share [René] Wellek’s skepticism about 
the possibility of the lyric as a transhistorical category… But if we are to 
encourage the study and teaching of poetry, the historical study of different poetic 
practices should be joined to a revival of the idea of the lyric as a poetic activity 
that has persisted since the days of Sappho, despite lyric’s different social 
functions and manifestations. (202) 
 
Critics like Wellek mistake a narrow generic conception of the lyric for a problem with generic 
conception altogether.  On the contrary, Culler Argues, it makes a good deal of sense to 
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understand the Lyric as something that is both fixed and historical.  Culler expands dramatically 
on this in “Lyric, History, and Genre” (2009), where he is more explicit about the importance of 
genre in understanding literary history: “If literature is more than a succession of individual 
works, it may be at the level of genre (the modifications of genres, the rise of new genres, and 
the eclipse of the old), that literature has a history” (879).  In the article, Culler praises NLH’s 
founder and director of forty years, Ralph Cohen, for supporting a broad interest in what Culler 
describes as an “unpopular topic” (879).  He quotes Cohen: “Genre study is more than another 
approach to literature or to social institutions or scientific practices; it analyzes our procedures 
for acquiring and accumulating knowledge, including the changes that knowledge undergoes” 
(qtd. in Culler 880).  Culler’s theorization is also useful in considering the lack of a historical 
theorization of closet film.  Arguing the unproductivity of distinguishing genres either on the 
basis of theoretical or historical conceits, Culler insists we intertwine the two:  
If one avoids the temptation to separate generic categories into the theoretical and 
the empirical but insists that genres are always historical yet based on some sort 
of theoretical rationale, they are more defensible as critical categories, essential to 
the understanding both of literature as a social institution and of the individual 
works that take on meaning through their relations to generic categories. (881) 
 
Closet film, correspondingly, is inherently both a theoretical and a historical construct.  This 
dissertation focuses on the history of this genre, even as the genre itself has never been theorized 
as such.  In this way closet film literally has and also has not existed.  We can trace the 
genealogy of its appearance throughout twentieth century literature, but its delimitation as a 
totality is a purely retrospective and theoretical one.  Likewise, the theoretical delimitation of the 
closet film as a genre is not hampered by quibbles surrounding the lack of historical continuity.  
It is unclear which later practitioners of the closet film were even aware of its prior iterations, but 
that is not essential to a study of closet film as a kind of dynamic totality.  Culler stresses that 
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“conceptions of genres are not just accounts of what people of a particular period thought; it is 
crucial to the notion of genre as model that people might have been wrong about them, unaware 
of affinities or ignoring continuities in favor of more striking novelties, or recognizing only an 
attenuated version of a larger tradition” (883).  With Culler, we might understand a genre as both 
dynamic and fixed, such that closet film constituted a certain kind of genre within the larger field 
of literary history despite the dearth of historical examples, as well as the near-total absence of 
critical recognition.   
Culler’s theoretically motivated defense of genre study is thus quite useful in thinking 
about the importance of genre in general, but perhaps more directly to the point are Catherine 
Burroughs’s remarks about closet film’s most immediate generic predecessor, closet drama.  
Burroughs offers an overview of the history of closet film as a literary genre that has persisted 
since classical times.  Though not in these precise terms, Burroughs in effect emphasizes the 
literariness of the genre over its theatricality.  While certainly the period before 1900 includes a 
great deal of “unperformed drama” in which plays might be concerned closeted by virtue of their 
subjects or topics, Burroughs is more interested in “consciously constructed closet play[s]” 
(215).  She argues that “there are significant dramaturgical differences between a play that has 
been ‘unperformed’––for whatever reasons––and a play written solely to be read” (215).  The 
same maintains for screenplays.  Unproduced films constitute a broad range of textual artifacts, 
but the focus of the present study is the consciously constructed closet film, a narrower category 
defined by its own range of unique formal, literary, and cinematic characteristics.    
Genre, for Burroughs, is the essential term that categorically divides “plays written for 
reading” from “those that have never been staged” (216).  The generic conception of closet 
drama thus stands against a conception of closet drama as a “mode of reception” (216) which 
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encompasses both––generically distinct––types of works.  Burroughs further distinguishes 
consciously written to be read “closet plays” from “chamber plays,” written for private stagings, 
as well as plays dealing with the subject matter of sexual closeting.   Identifying closet drama as 
a genre in its maximum specificity is thus, for Burroughs, the first step in parsing its 
dramaturgical properties.  Likewise, identifying and isolating true closet film––as a genre––from 
Quimby Melton’s more general conception of the “closet screenplay” (see below) is the present 
study’s necessary key focus.  Burroughs offers a good summary of the need for establishing a 
narrower conception of closet drama that precisely parallels my focus here on delimiting closet 
film its greatest specificity: 
The move to make the genre of closet drama more inclusive is tempting because it 
allows us to ignore the circumstances of a play’s creation as well as to bypass the 
issue of ‘intent’––the author’s perception of her own process. The result, 
however, is that not enough attention is paid to the fascinating tradition of 
deliberately crafting a play written for readers only. Moreover, if we expand the 
term ‘closet drama’ to include those plays that were never staged or never 
produced until many years after composition (for reasons ranging from public to 
self-censorship), we bleed the term into another category––that of ‘the historically 
closeted’ or, to use John Galt’s phrase from the periodical he briefly edited in 
1814, ‘the rejected theatre.’ (217) 
 
As this dissertation will show, there exists a body of texts which possess a great number of 
affinities and continuity, such that they certainly form a coherent single genre, but whose formal 
idiosyncrasy has been repeatedly marginalized by critics (if they have not ignored the work 
altogether).  And, to be sure, Burroughs demonstrates that formal and structural features, and not 
only intention, inform the genre of the closet:  
Are closet plays ‘closet’ because their authors say they are? Of course not. And 
yet, while a broad swathe of twentieth-century theory would have us ignore 
intentionality, when playwrights telegraph that their dramas have been crafted for 
the closet (or for the stage), they not only acknowledge that certain formal 
traditions and generic expectations lie behind their choices but they also indicate a 
willingness to engage with the specific structural demands dictated by that choice.  
It is this consciousness that can trigger us to pay more attention to the 
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discoverable formal features that may align particular playscripts with the closet. 
(218) 
 
While intention thus can serve as a helpful tool in beginning to formulate a canon of closet film, 
it is clearly only the tip of the generic iceberg, an indicator of where to look for the myriad 
formal and structural features that constitute closet film as an individual genre.  It is therefore the 
contention of this project to institutionalize closet film as a genre that has persisted in the 
margins of twentieth-century literature, so that from now on we might be able to read closet 
films as closet films, placing them in their proper tradition and taking a full accounting of their 
unique formal potentialities.   
 The specific kind of genre I see as defining closet film is best termed a genre of 
potentiality, since the film in “closet film” constitutes a genre defined precisely by its potential, 
or ironically its impotential (its potential not-to) to be filmed.  What do I mean then, specifically, 
by this key term of “potential cinema” and closet film as a “genre of potentiality?”  For, if one 
were to take as one’s object of critical study that body of filmic works which do not exist as 
such, there would be, ostensibly, a range of approaches one could take, and correspondingly a 
range of terms one could use to label this field.  What does one call this cinema?  “Potential,” I 
should be clear up front, is a choice distilled from a range of options, and certainly not the only 
way to conceptualize a study of this sort.  One motivation for this ontologically leaning 
terminology is to distinguish potential cinema from studies of cinematic adaptation.  Whereas 
adaptation studies (broadly defined, inclusive of cross-appropriation of filmic/literary form and 
technique as well as adaptation of content) focus on the differences and similarities between 
media, potential cinema emphasizes the way cinema always already adheres within literature, 
and vice versa.  Potential here helps us emphasize the different modes of being within a text.  It 
makes possible the reification as a work of things that do not actually exist.  Potential cinema 
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does not refer to hypothetical cinema; it refers to a kind of cinematic object that exists in a 
potential mode of being.   
 That being said, certainly I am arguing for a conception of closet film and potential 
cinema in terms that are much more specific and complex than the colloquial definition of 
“potentiality.”  In a moment I will turn to contemporary Italian biopolitical philosopher Giorgio 
Agamben, who has spent his career developing a theory of potentiality which will help us 
understand the unique, complicated relationship closet film tenuously holds between film and the 
literary.  But before that, I want to briefly explore alternative terminologies that one might 
consider as offering alternative philosophical foundations for approaching the study of closet 
film.  In part, potential cinema borrows and departs from Christian Metz’s seminal arguments 
regarding the integral relationship between cinema and the imaginary.  One could well envision 
a more psychoanalytically focused study closet film, comprising the same field of works, which 
might well be termed imaginary cinema rather than potential cinema.  Metz argues that cinema is 
already imaginary in multiple ways, both in the “ordinary” (3) and “Lacanian” senses (4), as a 
kind of “prosthesis for our primally dislocated limbs” (4).  If cinema, for Metz, is always already 
imaginary, then one could hypothesize that in the case of potential cinema––where there is no 
actual film––one would be dealing with a doubly imaginary cinema: no longer a prosthesis, but 
perhaps rather a ghost limb.  For, as Metz articulates, cinema is already an internalized function, 
a kind of extended human organ.  Metz argues that “the cinematic institution is not just the 
cinema industry (which works to fill cinemas, not to empty them), it is also the mental 
machinery––another industry––which spectators ‘accustomed to the cinema’ have internalized 
historically and which has adapted them to the consumption of films” (7).  The term imaginary 
cinema is thus perhaps best suited to discussions of the cinematic function we already have 
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within us.   
 Another alternative to potential cinema can be found in Derrida’s later work.  In Specters 
of Marx (1993), Derrida takes seriously (also playfully) the possibility of a scholar who “deals 
with ghosts” and “all that could be called the virtual space of spectrality” (11).  What would it 
mean then to imagine a spectral cinema?  For one thing, it absolutely reverses the order of 
temporality from potential cinema: where a potential work is defined specifically as such 
because it does not actually exist but might exist in the future, something which is spectral seems 
to be so by cause of its being an echo or trace of something which actually existed in the past.  
Spectral cinema, it would then seem, is by definition even more abstract than potential cinema.  
But what is perhaps most notable in Derrida’s account of spectrality is the quasi-Utopian way 
that he suggests that the specter resides beyond the very binarisms which his previous work so 
often seeks to deconstruct (in this way, as we shall see shortly, it parallels the gesture/gestural in 
Agamben): “Marcellus [in Hamlet] was perhaps anticipating the coming, one day, one night, 
several centuries later, of another ‘scholar.’  The latter would finally be capable, beyond the 
opposition between presence and non-presence, actuality and inactuality, life and non-life, of 
thinking the possibility of the specter, the specter as possibility” (12).   
 It may be worth pausing here to point out just how interrelated these sets of terms are.  I 
used “ghost limb” as an apt analogy in my discussion of “imaginary” cinema, and now even 
spectrality begins to shade into potentiality.  All of these terms seem to coalesce in a 
dissatisfying account of textual objects as always only occurring as autonomous, concrete, 
unchanging, etc.  Though these established categories have been subject to the radical critique of 
poststructuralist thought and have been repeatedly demonstrated to be untenable, they maintain a 
stranglehold on academic study.  How many articles have been recently published about a text 
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that cannot be definitively said to actually exist?  And yet, as far back in the history of cinematic 
theory as Eisenstein, we can locate a certain fascination with precisely that which does not.  Can 
we understand Derrida’s injunction for an anticipated future scholar, who is capable of thinking 
the specter as possibility, as, like Eisenstein, attempting to study spectral textual objects, as well?  
If we are haunted by the specter of Marx, are we not also always haunted by the specter of 
cinema?  Does not cinema have its own hauntology as well? 
In one of his last books, the filmed interviews with Bernard Steigler published as 
Echographies of Television (2002), Derrida continues his thinking of the specter and its 
relationship to visual media: 
What has, dare I say, constantly haunted me in this logic of the specter is that it 
regularly exceeds all the oppositions between visible and invisible, sensible and 
insensible.  A specter is both visible and invisible, both phenomenal and 
nonphenomenal: a trace that marks the present with its absence in advance.  The 
spectral logic is de facto a deconstructive logic.  It is in the lament of haunting 
that deconstruction finds the place most hospitable to it, at the heart of the living 
present, in the quickest heartbeat of the philosophical.  Like the work of 
mourning, in a sense, which produces spectrality, and like all work produces 
spectrality. (117) 
 
What potential cinema borrows most distinctly from Derrida’s thinking of the spectral is this 
attention to things that are at once “phenomenal and nonphenomenal.”  And inasmuch as cinema 
studies are never truly complete with an accounting of their relation to psychoanalytic theory, 
what would a study of potential cinema look like without an acknowledgement of its structural 
correspondence to trauma, castration, the anxiety of a marked absence, etc.?  Perhaps, if nothing 
else, the more clinically ontological term potential helps limit the scope of the current study to 
the “phenomenal” side of the spectral equation.  For, as much as potential films do not actually 
exist, the whole point here is that they do exist, potentially. 
 Before turning to potentiality itself, we should examine one last alternative, the one 
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perhaps most closely aligned with potential cinema (though again not without a certain paranoia-
inducing tug back towards the realm of the unconscious and our accounting to Freud and Lacan).  
I am thinking here of virtual cinema.  I mean “virtual” less in the sense of Brian Massumi’s 
notable recent work, Parables for the Virtual (2002), than that of Slavoj Zizek recent film theory.  
In his 2004 documentary, Slavoj Zizek: The Reality of the Virtual, Zizek lectures at length about 
a distinction he draws between a superficial reality of the film-text and a deeper truth he calls the 
film’s virtual texture.  Very loosely, the former refers to content and subject matter, whereas as 
the latter refers to form, representational politics, etc.  Zizek’s illustrative example is The Sound 
of Music (dir. Robert Wise, 1965), in which the superficial texture or plot of the film concerns 
good freedom-loving folk oppressed by fascist Nazis.  But on the level of the film’s virtual 
texture, Zizek says, the oppressed folk are represented as typical idyllic Aryans, and the Nazis 
are bureaucrats, not soldiers: mustachioed stereotypes of the Cosmopolitan Jew.  The virtual film 
of The Sound of Music thus adheres in between the lines of the film itself.  The distinction is 
perhaps simply one of grammatical mood: virtual texture/cinema is the truth of what cinema is, 
whereas potential cinema is the truth of what cinema could be.  And it is precisely this sense of 
subjunctivity that underlines the project of potential cinema.   
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Agamben’s Potential 
 
There is something that all people, whether they admit it or not, know in their 
heart of hearts: that things could have been different, that that would have been 
possible.  They could not only live without hunger and also probably without fear, 
but also freely.  And yet at the same time––and all over the world––the social 
apparatus has become so hardened that what lies before them as a means of 
possible fulfillment presents itself as radically impossible. 
––Adorno  
 
Leland de la Durantaye, in his recent critical study of contemporary Italian philosopher 
Giorgio Agamben, fittingly calls attention to this striking passage of Adorno’s and suggests it 
helps to articulate the central position of Agamben’s thought: 
Adorno’s expression of the difficulty of grasping the means for radical change is 
echoed in Agamben’s writing, and a similar imperative motivates the extreme 
positions he adopts.  Whatever their differences, a fundamental idea they share is 
that the heart of the philosopher’s vocation is found in the fact that so much that 
presents itself as ‘radically impossible’ is not––and must not continue to be 
accepted as such. (16) 
 
As de la Durantaye notes, “no idea is so important for [Agamben’s] thought as potentiality” (14-
15) and the connection between potentiality and power (in Italian potenza and potere).  The work 
of philosophy, then, is to seek an experience of pure potentiality, to render potential that thinking 
which seems “radically impossible,” not so much only to imagine how it might have been, but to 
conceive of a new mode of thinking altogether, one that is purely potential; that is, outside of any 
relation to the actual.  As Kevin Attell explains in “Potentiality, Actuality, Constituent Power,” 
the interplay between Aristotle’s concepts of dunamis and energeia, potentiality and act, appears 
in Agamben’s earliest works and later becomes his “signal concept” (37).   
 While Agamben is perhaps best known today as, along with Antonio Negri, the most 
influential figure in biopolitics, recent Italian thought’s most dominant field (Attell, “Potentiality, 
Actuality, Constituent Power,” 35), this work hinges upon the ontological arguments of his 
earlier works.  Since Homo Sacer (1995) Agamben has for the most part focused on overtly 
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political themes, such as sovereign power, the state of exception, and the concentration camp as 
biopolitical paradigm.  But even in the manifestly political Homo Sacer, Agamben emphasizes 
the importance of the philosophical grounding in his earlier theories involving an ontology that 
asserts the primacy of potentiality over actuality.  This ontology of potentiality, or potentiology, 
as Kevin Attell has called it (“Potentiality/Impotentiality,” 162) constitutes the first philosophical 
foundation underlying the later more overtly political work.  As Attell puts it, “The centrality of 
this doctrine of potentiality for Agamben’s thought can hardly be overstated, as it constitutes the 
ontological underpinning of virtually all of his work from the mid-1980s on, especially that 
concerning sovereignty” (162).  In Homo Sacer Agamben explicitly claims that his politics 
always comes back to and turn upon potentiality:  
And only if it is possible to think the relation between potentiality and actuality 
differently––and even to think beyond this relation––will it be possible to think a 
constituting power wholly released from the sovereign ban.  Until a new and 
coherent ontology of potentiality (beyond the steps that have been made in this 
direction by Spinoza, Schelling, Nietzsche, and Heidegger) has replaced the 
ontology founded on the primacy of actuality and its relation to potentiality, a 
political theory free from the aporias of sovereignty remains unthinkable. (44) 
 
Throughout his career, Agamben has developed this ontology of potentiality out of a lineage 
which traces its history to Aristotle’s Metaphysics.  In Book Theta, Aristotle outlines the 
relationship of potentiality and actuality, and in a somewhat surprising gesture argues that––a it 
is commonly understood––actuality is ontologically prior to potentiality.  Agamben, however, 
makes a series of surprising claims here.  The first is that the primacy of actuality is actually 
ambiguous in Aristotle, and that “it is never clear, to a reader freed from the prejudices of 
tradition, whether book Theta of the Metaphysics in fact gives primacy to actuality or to 
potentiality” (47).  On this point Attell explains, “Whether or not this is indeed unclear in 
Aristotle, it nevertheless is clear that Agamben wants not only to call this hierarchy into question 
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but also to tilt the balance distinctly toward potentiality” (41).  Agamben makes this clear in his 
focused study on a single pivotal line of Book Theta, his idiosyncratic translation of which 
comes to form the fulcrum of his ontology.  Indeed, Attell argues, “It would not be an 
exaggeration to suggest that Agamben’s entire argument hinges on his reading of this last phrase 
of Aristotle’s opaque sentence” (42).  The sentence reads, “Esti de dynaton touto, hoi ean 
hyperarxi hé energeia ou legetai ekhein tén dymanén, ouden estai adynaton” (1047a, 24-26).  
The crux of the translation, for Agamben, concerns the last word here.  Attell explains this 
pivotal detail:  
The majority of Aristotle’s translators and commentators understand the alpha-
privative as indicating the negation or opposite of dunamis  (whether as 
possibility or as capacity) and thus read adunamia as meaning either impossibility 
or incapacity/impotence.  Agamben, however, offers a very different reading: not 
impossibility or incapacity, but “potentiality not to,” “capacity not to,” or in his 
distinctive usage, “impotentiality” [impotenza]. (41) 
 
Agamben thus translates the sentence as, “A thing is said to be potential if, when the act of which 
it is said to be potential is realized, there will be nothing impotential” (Potentialities 183) where 
impotentiality refers not to inability, but to the potential-not-to.  Another term for this in English 
might be a “contrary possibility” (Attell, “Potentiality, Actuality, Constituent Power” 41).   
It is this notion of impotentiality, or the potentiality not-to, that crucially frames 
Agamben’s entire ontology, and which makes this particular conception of potentiality––as 
opposed to a colloquial understanding of the term––so apt to describe closet film as a kind of 
potential cinema that exercises its filmic impotentiality, the potential not-to make a film.  In fact 
the genre of closet film is most precisely described as a playful withholding of cinematic 
production.  For even more so than the playscript, the film script is generally seen as a 
production document, a kind of blueprint with a set of specific purposes that serve production 
functions.  Conserved throughout this document of potentiality, then, we find everywhere the 
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impotentiality––the potential not to––produce.  If the film is the actual, realized work, then the 
closet film can be understood as a work of pure potentiality.  Two key terms for Agamben help 
specify precisely how we could imagine closet film functioning in this regard: play and 
désœuvrement.  Catherine Mills’s The Philosophy of Agamben, which like de la Durantaye’s and 
Attell’s studies places the central focus of Agamben’s work on the key term potentiality, offers 
an excellent summary of the interrelation of these two key terms as they play out in several of 
Agamben’s major works, principally Homo Sacer, The Time That Remains, Infancy and History, 
and The Coming Community: 
The notion of inoperativity and the closely related concept of désœuvrement or the 
unworked are central to Agamben’s theorization of political liberation.  However, 
this is not to suggest that he simply reiterates a political theology or politics of 
faith.  Instead, he emphasizes the necessity of a politics that renders the current 
biopolitical machine inoperative through play and profanation.  That is, he 
highlights the power of a relation to things, concepts and ultimately law itself that 
desacralizes and plays with things as a child does with toys (123). 
 
Mills’s adroit summation helpfully distills the interrelation across Agamben’s career of 
potentiality, play, and désœuvrement.  While it may first seem an unlikely case study for such 
thinking, closet film, however, emerges as a kind of supreme genre of Agambenian 
impotentiality in light of this distillation.  Its relation to the world of cinematic production maps 
on quite exactly to Agamben’s conception of the unworked––as an unworked film that profanes 
cinematic law.  The deep sense of irony, self-mockery, and acerbic resentment of the cinema 
industry that characterize closet film’s most notable works––Darius James’ Negrophobia and 
Mark Leyner’s Tetherballs of Bougainville––underscore the degree to which closet film, perhaps 
out of necessity, attains a playful stance from the world of cinematic production, one that neither 
outright denies it, nor fully embraces it.  Closet film is an exploration of the limits and blurred 
lines between literary and cinematic production and representation.  But perhaps the most 
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important aspect of play in Agamben’s sense of the term, for our purposes here, is emphasis on 
the denial of use-value characterized by the child’s experience of a toy.  As Mills summarizes 
Agamben’s thinking in Infancy and History, “play preserves profane objects and behaviours that 
otherwise no longer exist, evident in the use that children make of objects that have outlasted 
their functional use-value but are still taken up as toys” (124).  Against the common 
understanding of a film script as an object of pure use-value (see below regarding arguments for 
appreciating the literariness of actual, uncloseted film scripts by Melton, Boon, and others), 
closet film appropriates the prefilmic objects for other purposes which are inherently more 
playful in the sense that they are literary, experimental, and decidedly less motivated by the 
desire to profit economically––even within the literary world, closet films are less saleable 
commodities than novels.  Closet films can thus be conceived of as toy scripts, screenplays 
playfully deprived of their use-value.  In that sense, closet film is thus the genre of 
(im)potentiality par excellence, defined thoroughly by its playful unworking of the film object 
toward which it ostensibly points.   
 Claire Colebrook’s recent article, “Agamben: Aesthetics, Potentiality, and Life,” offers 
an account of very different methods regarding how to bring Agamben’s theories to bear on art 
and literature, but which ultimately points us in the direction of a similar conclusion: that 
cinema, and particularly cinema that does not actually exist, might be the perfect expression of 
an Agambenian art form.  She argues, “Agamben's seemingly metaphysical concerns, such as his 
writings on the different senses of potentiality in Aristotle, are motivated by a historical project 
of retrieving and restoring the emergence of a distinction or difference from life” (108).  
Strikingly, Colebrook claims that, for Agamben, it is precisely “art” that can do this.  “It is 
Agamben's commitment to a concept of potentiality,” Colebrook asserts, “that explains the 
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crucial status of the work of art in his politics” (111).  Art, she argues, has a potential disclosive 
function in Agamben’s thought, one which has been lost and which Agamben seeks to recapture: 
“What renders the world of the human and art possible, and if such a world emerges from a 
potential, what other worlds and other modes of the human are possible?  For Agamben it is the 
work of art that should disclose this pure potentiality.  Today, however, our notion of art as 
nothing more than the object created by a will precludes us from recognizing art as disclosive of 
potentiality” (108).  She elaborates, “Art today either is mere potential for enjoyment or is 
valuable only insofar as it is the product of an irreducible will” (108), and, therefore, “Art 
functions for Agamben, then, as a site of loss (for art is now a mere product rather than a 
revelatory act) and as a site of redemption (for only art can reveal what politics has covered 
over)” (108).  So modern art (in the broadest sense), is both closed off, but also loaded with the 
potentiality of opening up precisely pure potentiality itself.  Colebrook claims Agamben sees “art 
as the possibility of reopening the world” (109), and that it “should be the revelation of pure 
potentiality” (110).  In other words, Agamben is interested in critiquing “a history of Western 
culture that has all too readily accepted the human as a being and not as one who must bring 
himself into being (and must do so properly and openly in the work of art)… Agamben finds the 
proper image of potentiality in the artwork” (116), and, “It is the work of art, here, that 
represents humanity not as situated within relations but as opening up relations” (116).  We 
might say that for Agamben (according to Colebrook), the content of art represents precisely its 
lost potential, that “modern art has lost poiesis, or a genuine bringing forth” (116).  It is for this 
reason, Colebrook asserts, referencing Agamben’s work in The Man Without Content, that 
“[t]here is, then, for Agamben, a need to destroy the aesthetic, to get away from an art that is 
seen as the product of some action or the work of an artist (MC, 47) and instead think of art 
  
19 
poetically as the disclosure of presence, the opening of space in general” (117).  Notably, for 
Colebrook, art does not resolve the dichotomy between poetry and philosophy, but poetry and 
politics: “For Agamben the political is properly poetic, and the poetic is properly political” (118).  
Suggestively, Colebrook’s article posits that this potentiality might be latent within modern art, 
and that, hypothetically, certain modes of art might be able to open this potentiality.  I say open 
rather than actualize, since the goal here is to unfold or amplify potentialities, not to reduce them 
to realized actualities.  Where might we look for this art?  What sort of art is preoccupied with 
this specific task? 
 This question has largely not been asked, and Agamben, popular as his political 
philosophy might be, goes largely unheeded in literary studies.  When Agamben’s theories have 
been put into the service of literary analysis, the results have been underwhelming.  Take, for 
example, William McClellan’s 2005 article “ ‘Ful Pale Face’: Agamben's Biopolitical Theory 
and the Sovereign Subject in Chaucer's Clerk's Tale.”  Here, the mapping of Agambenian politics 
onto one of the Canterbury Tales is relatively straightforward, simplistic, and ultimately 
reductive.  Which is not to say that McClellan isn’t more-or-less right: the Clerk’s is, after all, 
one of the more opaque of the Tales, and has resisted most attempts at straightforward 
interpretation.  McClellan makes a good case for thinking about it in terms of biopolitical 
sovereignty.  If we understand the text as a “political allegory” (110, 132) about the paradoxes of 
sovereignty and bare life, then Agamben does help us finally “get” Chaucer (134).  McClellan 
makes a strong case for understanding the political potential of the tale in its exposure of the true 
despair of sovereign power’s paradoxical relation to subjecthood.  But ultimately it is not clear 
that specifically Agambenian political thought is necessary to understand this relatively simple 
political allegory, and the wider implications of Agamben’s philosophy are not brought to bear.   
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 Perhaps Chaucer simply is not the best target.  What sorts of texts might offer more 
fertile ground for this kind of thought?  William Watkin, in his study The Literary Agamben, 
which only nominally relates Agamben’s thought to literature, briefly gestures towards 
something like a potential literature:  
Writer's block is a phenomenon best explained by the ontology of potentiality, as 
it the writing of pure inspiration.  There are the great books that were never 
written, and the great works never created: Mallarmé's Livre, Agamben's La voca 
umana, the late Rimbaud, Duchamp, DeChirico.  These works did not come into 
being because they were not possessed of genius.  The author attempted to merely 
will them into existence.  They are the art of pure character.  Then there are the 
great works that were written purely through genius: 'Kubla Khan,' The Magnetic 
Fields, On the Road, As I Lay Dying, Kenneth Koch's When the Sun Tries to Go 
On.  Here the author seemingly had little or nothing to do with writing.  Writer's 
block and pure, inspired flow are two sides of an imbalance of writerly 
potentiality, too much character in one and overabundance of genius in the other. 
(67-68) 
 
Here, however ephemerally, the literary comes into full fold in Watkin’s study.  But, teasingly, 
instead of developing this thread, he closes the chapter thus: “The pen that grazes the page, the 
brush as it is lifted from the canvas not when it is applied, fulfill, for Agamben, the powerful 
unfulfillment of true potential being” (68).  Later he will once again briefly address this question, 
only to leave it hanging as a provocative site for further work: “To paint absence is one thing, but 
surely the greatest works of modernism are those which were never created: Lautréamont’s third 
book, Bruno Schultz’s first novel, the final version of Le Livre, Nietzsche’s Will to Power?” 
(106).  What are we to do with this (rhetorical?) question?  What is the status of the surely 
Watkin employs here?  And to what extent is Watkin suggesting that he himself thinks (maybe) 
these are the “greatest works of modernism,” or that Agamben himself would think so?  
 On a note that is not quite so different as it may at first seem, cinema in particular might 
be a good direction to turn for Agambenian literary studies.  Taking into account Agamben’s 
works specifically on cinema, Benjamin Noys argues that “Agamben has developed a new theory 
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of ‘gestural cinema,’ in which we might understand cinema as one sphere, tied to philosophy, in 
which we might find a messianic recuperation of the originary potentialities of language and the 
human” (np).  Noys argues, “What philosophy and cinema exhibit, according to Agamben, is this 
pure mediality or pure gesturality” (np).  And, “Therefore philosophy and cinema converge on 
the gesture, on the loss of the gesture, and on recovering the gesture as the realm of both the 
ethical and the political” (np).  “Agamben,” Noys thus suggests, “redeems cinema as a site of the 
messianic promise contained in the image” (np).  Noys’ appraisal of cinema as of particular 
worth to thinking about Agamben’s relation to art and the literary is based on two essays of 
Agamben’s, “Notes on Gesture” and “Difference and Repetition,” to which I would suggest we 
might also add “The Six Most Beautiful Minutes in the History of Cinema,” a piece as short as it 
is cryptic, that offers a brief leading summary of Orson Welles’ unfinished film version of Don 
Quixote.  But to be sure, Noys does not claim that this is true of cinema generally for Agamben, 
but for a much more specific body of filmic works: “Certainly Agamben is hostile to narrative 
cinema and applauds an avant-garde cinema that can reveal the cinematic medium as such.”  
Setting aside the validity of this sweeping claim, Agamben’s attention to Guy Debord and his 
short ruminations, at the end of Profanation, “The Six Most Beautiful Minutes…” certainly 
suggest a leaning towards non-traditional and potentially non-narrative modes of cinema as those 
which most directly approach the “gestural.”  And a cinema of pure potentiality, or “potential 
cinema” for short, might be one way to conceptualize what form a gestural cinema might take.  
Indeed, we might even conceive of closet film, in its playful gesture of unworking the actual film 
itself,  as performing the work of gestural cinema better than any of the actual films discussed by 
Noys or even Agamben himself.   
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What Closet Film is Not and What It is Like 
 
Before turning towards delineating a specific accounting of what constitutes closet film 
as a genre, let us briefly step back and survey the wider critical landscape concerning the broader 
field of the relationship between film and literature, in order to eventually spiral in and carve out 
the specific sphere of the closet film.  The entire critical discussion of the relationship between 
film and the novel––from Sergei Eisenstein through Claude-Edmonde Magny to today––has 
been overwhelmingly circumscribed by what are presented as the twin rubrics of adaptation and 
appropriation: adaptation meaning the translation of a given work from one medium to another, 
and appropriation referring to the related phenomenon of translating formal techniques from one 
medium to another.  While many critics treat studies of formal appropriation as if they followed 
a wholly different paradigm from studies of textual adaptation, it is my contention that we can 
just as easily describe this critical history as having been invested all along in only a single 
paradigm.  Formal appropriation is simply another way of talking about adaptation: adaptation of 
form, rather than content.  The use of techniques in the novel that parallel filmic crosscutting, for 
example, might be understood as an adaptation of formal practice, akin to the adaptation of 
single works or texts from literature to film, or vice versa.  Both appropriation of form and 
adaptation of content are basically ways of comparing and contrasting two media, and inevitably 
only account for a fraction of the total complexity of the relationship between film and literature.  
A general conception of adaptation—adaption of both form and content—appears to be the only 
available critical mode for understanding the relationship between film and literature.   
 This dissertation is part of a larger project that aims to change that, which I am calling 
potential cinema, a study of films that, strictly speaking, do not exist as such.  Potential cinema 
examines overlooked literary spaces between film and the novel for new ways of articulating 
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their relationship.  The closet constitutes one excellent new alternative paradigm for productively 
understanding the space between film and the novel, opening up discussions of texts that have 
been largely overlooked or marginalized by criticism, as well as putting these in dialogue with 
majors works and authors.  The result is a completely revamped and revitalized way of 
understanding the novel and its relationship to cinema, realism, ontology, and aesthetics.  But 
there are other paradigms, besides the closet, through which we might grasp a more thorough 
conception of this relationship.  I call these paradigms variously impotential cinema, weirdly 
filmic novels and cinematic notional ekphrasis.    
 On the very outside of what constitutes potential cinema we find impotential cinema.  
These are films which have been conceived, but which do not exist as films.  While that could 
mean literally anything, this field can be productively limited to unfilmed films that have found 
life in some other textual way.  They have left a kind of trace, and this trace can be studied.  But 
the theoretical problematics of how to approach the study of a text which does not exist have not 
been properly spelled out.  I will take up precisely this question below, but for now, let me 
simply offer two brief examples.  In early March 2013, the entertainment world became briefly 
dominated by the news that Steven Spielberg intends to adapt Stanley Kubrick’s uncompleted 
Napoleon project into a television mini-series.  An article in The Independent announced, “The 
film that defeated Kubrick: Spielberg to turn Napoleon, the greatest movie never made, into a 
TV mini-series.”  Kubrick’s Napoleon has long fascinated cinema lovers, but until now hadn’t 
caught the public’s attention.  Kubrick had set out with a very lofty vision, boldly stating, “I 
expect to make the best movie ever made” (qtd. in Webster 1).  Though he worked extensively in 
the late 1960s on the project, developing a script and substantial notes regarding everything from 
equipment to costumes to locations, the film fell apart and Kubrick shifted his attention to 
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Clockwork Orange (1971).  In 2009 Taschen published a massive volume, collecting all the 
existing research and preproduction material into one consolidated archive.  Initially available 
only as a super-hard-to-find and ferociously expensive collector’s edition, Stanley Kubrick’s 
Napoleon: The Greatest Movie Never Made is now widely available (and affordable).  But what 
would we even call a critical study of this volume?  Is it possible to conceive of a study of 
Napoleon that isn’t invested in an author-centric critique of Kubrick’s production methods, his 
biography, etc.?  Could we study Napoleon as itself a text?  To do so would require a 
theorization of something like potential cinema. 
 A second example is Alejandro Jodorowsky’s Dune, a film that does not exist, but about 
which there now exists a documentary, an article by Jodorowsky himself, and innumerable blogs 
and comics by fans.  In his article, “The Film You Will Never See,” Jodorowsky outlines a story 
of a film almost too good to be true, a film that even rivals Napoleon’s claim to the title of 
“greatest movie never made.”  He opens the piece: 
There is a Hebraic legend which says: “the Messiah will not be a man but one 
day: the day when all the human beings will be illuminated.”  Kabbalistes speak 
about a conscience collective, cosmic, a species of méta-Universe. And here are 
what for me all the DUNE project was. (np, all typos Jodorowsky’s) 
 
Jodorowsky represents his Dune project as swathed in just such an incredible aura.  He expounds 
at length upon this mythmaking:  
There is an artist, only one in the medium of a million other artists, which only 
once in his life, by a species of divine grace, receives an immortal topic, a 
MYTH... I say “receives” and not “creates” because the works of art its received 
in a state of mediumnity directly of the unconscious collective. (np) 
 
It is difficult not to quote the entire article, since Jodorowsky’s plans for the film are almost 
literally unbelievable: 
In my version of Dune, the Emperor of the galaxy is insane. He lives on an 
artificial gold planet, in a gold palace built according to not-laws of antilogical. 
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He lives in symbiosis with a robot identical to him. The resemblance is so perfect 
that the citizens never know if they are opposite the man or the machine... In my 
version, the spice is a blue drug with spongy consistency filled with a vegetable-
animal life endowed with consciousness, the highest level of consciousness. It 
does not stop taking all kinds of forms, while stirring up unceasingly. The spice 
continuously produces the creation of the innumerable universes.  The Baron 
Harkonnen is an immense man of 300 kilogrammes. he is so fatty and heavy that, 
to move, he must make continuous use of antigravitational bubbles attached at his 
limbs... His delusion of grandeur does not have limits: he lives in a palace built 
like a portrait of itself... This immense sculpture is drawn up on a sordid and 
marshy planet... To enter the palace, one must wait until the colossus opens the 
mouth and draws a tongue from steel (landing strip...). (np) 
 
But the only thing more incredible than Jodorowsky’s vision for the film is the simply 
preposterous wealth of talent he was able to assemble for its production.  Though relegated to a 
campy cult figure in today’s cinematic consciousness, Jodorowsky was, in the seventies, 
potentially a hot commodity.  Famously, George Harrison and John Lennon fell in love with his 
earlier film El Topo (1970), and despite the financial failure of his radically noncommercial 
follow-up The Holy Mountain (1973), Jodorowsky was ostensibly still in a position to put 
together quite a team for his proposed Dune project.   
 The story of how this project came into being begins thus: 
Once, the Divinity agreed to say to me in a lucid dream: “Your next film must be 
Dune.” I had not read the novel.  I lifted myself to a height of six o’clock in the 
morning and as an alcoholic who awaits the opening of the bar, I waited until 
someone opens the bookshop to buy the book.  I read it of a feature without me 
stopping for drinking or eating.  At midnight exactly, the very same day, I finish 
the reading.  At one minute pass midnight I called from New York, Michel 
Seydoux in Paris... He would be the first of the seven samurai that it was 
necessary for me to have for the immense project.  Michel was for me a young 
man (26 years) without experience in the cinema, but his company Camera One 
had bought the rights for the Holy Mountain, my last film and had distributed very 
well it... He had said to me: “I will want to produce a film with you”.  I did not 
know much about him but by an intuition which today surprises me, by seeing it, 
in spite of his youth, I see in him the largest producer of the time... Why?  
Mystery... And I was not mistaken.  When I say to him that I wanted that he buys 
the rights for Dune and that the film should be international because it would 
exceed the ten million dollars (fabulous sum for the time: even Hollywood did not 
believe in science fiction films, 2001 would be unique and unpassable), he did not 
stumble: “OK. We'll be in Los Angeles in two days to buy the rights”. (np) 
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Jodorowsky would go on to put together an art team that included famed French artist Moebius, 
Christopher Foss, H.R. Geiger, and Dan O’Bannon.  For the cast, he intended his son Brontis to 
play the lead, opposite David Carradine.  For the Emperor of the Universe, he engaged in 
extensive negotiations with Salvador Dali, whom he agreed to pay $100,000/hour, thinking he 
would shoot him for one day and use plastic doubles the rest of the time.  For the giant evil 
Baron, Jodorowsky is rumored to have no less a personage than Orson Welles formally attached.  
Perhaps most amazing of all––and depressing in the light of the film falling apart and David 
Lynch being tapped to direct what is arguably Lynch’s worst film—is that Jodorowsky’s Dune 
would have been scored by an entirely original double-album by Pink Floyd, fresh off recording 
The Wall in 1979.  
The entry points into analyzing Dune itself are difficult to pin down.  Much of the 
artwork and production design from the project found a new recycled life in Jodorowsky’s 
graphic novels, mostly notably his Incal series.  It was for allegedly plagiarizing The Incal 
comics that Jodorowsky would later sue Luc Besson, claiming that he stole elements of the story 
and design for his much more well-known and celebrated film, The Fifth Element (1997).  
Jodorowsky later dropped the lawsuit, claiming that stories do not belong to any individual but 
are merely channeled through artists by the divinity.  Nevertheless, this raises important 
questions about how to approach a critical study of something like Jodorowsky’s Dune.  With 
Napoleon, there is a more clearly delineated archive, though even in that case we could 
hypothetically include Barry Lyndon (1975) in our discussion, since much of Kubrick’s research 
and design for Napoleon ended up recycled into that later project.  With Dune, however, the 
borders of its ghostly archive are even more diffuse.  This is especially true when you note that 
the team assembled to make this science-fiction wet dream in Jodorowsky’s insane blend of 
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psychoshamanism and alchemy went on in the years immediately following to instead create and 
design the sci-fi worlds of the Alien (1980) franchise.  To what extent do those worlds constitute 
elements touched by Jodorowsky’s Dune?  And if they don’t, how can we look to the imaginary 
what-if world of science fiction cinema that would have existed if its most brilliant and 
influential minds had been working for Jodorowsky instead of Ridley Scott?  It is this very 
productive ambiguity that makes impotential cinema such a fascinating and generative cite for 
further work.  
 Let us now turn to actual published novels that have an interesting relationship to film.  
To be clear, I am certainly not referring to literary genres whose content speaks to cinema, such 
as the “Hollywood Novel.”  Though we might understand it as another kind of conceivable 
relationship between film and literature that exists outside the adaptation paradigm, the 
Hollywood Novel is manifestly not interesting for my purposes here, and I therefore am not 
considering it part of the project of potential cinema.  Nancy Brooker-Bowers defines the 
Hollywood Novel as “an American regional fictional [sic] genre that features characters who 
work in the film industry either in Hollywood or with a Hollywood production company on 
location” (ix).  Here we have a genre that takes cinematic production as its subject or setting.  In 
neither Brooker-Bowers’s nor Anthony Slides’s annotated bibliographies of Hollywood Novels 
are any closet films included––there is no mention of Baldwin or Burroughs or Darius James, for 
the clear reason that formal appropriation of cinematic production is not the issue here.  What is 
interesting about the Hollywood Novel is that in fact there is one way in which it is more closely 
related to closet film than it might seem at first.  For, if the majority of critical attention has 
focused on novels that appropriate either the form or content of films themselves, the Hollywood 
Novel appropriates cinematic production at the level of content.  In a similar way, the closet 
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film, in taking the form of the screenplay, which is after all essentially a production document, 
appropriates cinematic production at the level of form.  What really interests me––from the 
perspective of the project of potential cinema––are novels that more obliquely adhere in the 
nebulous space between film and literature.  If closet film constitutes a more-or-less cut-and-dry 
case of cinematic production’s formal appropriation akin to the Hollywood Novel’s 
appropriation of the content of cinematic production, then we must also take account of novels 
that do not fit neatly into either camp.  There is no perfect term for these novels, because the 
various ways in which they are shaped by their relationship to cinema are unique and difficult to 
fix.  For this reason, I call these novels weirdly filmic.  A proper analysis of such novels would 
require a dissertation of its own.  In the space I have here, I wish merely to point out a few 
examples as they begin to gesture more closely towards the terrain of the closet film.   
 Cinema has become the dominant metaphor for ontological play in the contemporary 
novel.  One way long narratives, such as novels, keep their readers engaged is to shift the ground 
of the relationship between reader and text.  I am here gesturing towards a theory of ontological 
dynamics, in which narratives are successfully engaging inasmuch as they playful alter the 
ontological status of text itself as part of the diegetic world(s) the novel constructs.  The principle 
here is relatively simple.  For a very superficial example, consider a novel which reveals that a 
previous chapter somehow was itself a dream, or at least that what happened in that chapter was 
a description of a dream.  More generally, one could see instances of playing with the boundaries 
of fiction and nonfiction, with framed narration and metalepsis, with questions of metafiction, 
etc., as instances of ontological dynamics.  It is my sense––the breadth of knowledge of 
contemporary literature it would take to strongly make this claim far surpasses me––that, 
increasingly, cinema has become the primary metaphor through which ontological dynamics 
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operate in the contemporary novel.  Let us briefly look at a handful of such novels––all written in 
the last thirty years by extremely notable authors––before turning to an extended analysis of the 
way this works in David Foster Wallace’s magnum opus, Infinite Jest, to get a handle on what 
I’m talking about here.  
In Steve Erikson’s Zeroville (2007), the cinema-obsessed and maybe-autistic (he is called 
at one point “cineautistic”) protagonist Isaac “Ike/Vikar” Jerome moves to Hollywood in 1969 to 
pursue a career in the movies.  The novel is organized into short, numbered sections that seem 
vaguely correlated to shots or scenes, which increase in number to 227 and then decrease back to 
zero, ostensibly referencing Genesis 22:7, the pivotal moment where Abraham tells Isaac not to 
worry about why there is no lamb to offer.  The novel’s central concern is the relationship 
between cinema and violence, and between fiction and reality, boundaries which become 
increasingly indistinct in the novel’s last fifty-or-so pages, in which Vikar embarks on a quest to 
discover the hidden film within all films, one that exists as a single frame in each of the prints of 
all extant films.  The narrative becomes increasingly disjointed, variously dreamlike and vaguely 
cinematic.  What does it do for us as readers to involve ourselves in this multiply-nested 
framework of cinema, novel, and dream?  What are the several ways we have to imagine how the 
action transpires here, and what is the effect of that multiplicity?  How do we conceive of the 
“reality” or “world” that this otherwise fairly naturalistic novel constructs for us, and how is this 
modified or indeed determined by the fact of its being always already an ambiguously cinematic 
construction? 
Don DeLillo’s Point Omega (2010) is another novel about films.  Pointedly, the novel is 
structured around the relationship between a mutated form of a film that does actually exist, and 
the impotentiality of another, fictive film that does not, and perhaps cannot exist.  The brief 
  
30 
opening and closing sections detail an eccentric nameless character mesmerized by a museum 
installation of Douglas Gordon’s 24 Hour Psycho, a (real) video work in which Hitchcock’s film 
is slowed down so that it takes exactly twenty-four hours to run.  The longer main narrative in 
the middle of Point Omega concerns an aspiring avant-garde documentarian’s attempts to 
convince an aging academic and former political consultant to participate in a conceptual project 
of “pure cinema.”  This provocative and puzzling short novel pushes the limits of representing 
cinema in prose in interesting ways.  The central formal question of the novel is how the slowing 
down of Psycho relates to the existential and ontological debates raised in the main narrative.  
The novel offers no easy answers, but its success hinges on the reader’s asking a range of 
questions about the temporality of cinematic and novelistic representation. 
 But perhaps the most concise and fascinating example of such cinematic ontological 
dynamics comes from the same nation that produced the world’s first closet film.  Haruki 
Murakami’s Hard-Boiled Wonderland and the End of the World (1985) is a novel with a split 
structure in which we get, ostensibly (it is ambiguous), the conscious and unconscious minds of 
the protagonist.  We find out halfway through the novel that the eccentric scientist who operated 
on the protagonist’s brain in order to prime his mind for storing encrypted data (the ‘conscious’ 
half of the novel takes place in a futuristic alternate mid-eighties Tokyo plagued by infowars and 
data-theft) was, before World War II, a film editor, and that this radical brain surgery basically 
involved “editing” the protagonist’s unconscious into a more linearly organized narrative: in 
other words, a narrative film.  To complicate matters, this seems to have only worked on the 
protagonist (it killed every one of the experimental procedure’s twenty-six other participants) 
because his unconscious mind was already organized cinematically.  In other words, in the End 
of the World half of the narrative, what we seem to be encountering is a rendering of the 
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unconscious mind of the protagonist, which has been re-organized into a narrative film even 
though it was already basically cinematic.  Half this novel, it would seem, is itself a written film 
that somehow is the cinematic unconscious of the protagonist as he exists in the other half of the 
novel (Hard-Boiled Wonderland).  Somewhat like Burroughs’ Blade Runner, a Movie (1979), 
Murakami’s novel offers a provocative rendering of what it would mean for a novel not simply 
to refer to film, but to somehow be that film (see Chapter One for an extensive close reading that 
fully exfoliates the novel’s complication of the neat division between the literary and the filmic).   
Steven Hall’s The Raw Shark Texts (2007) follows Murakami’s novel in many of these 
formal and thematic interests.  Hall even makes the debt clear by including an epigraph to 
Section Three from Murakami himself, a quote from one of Murakami’s most celebrated novels, 
The Wind-Up Bird Chronicle (1995).  But like Murakami’s lesser known early novel, Hard-
Boiled Wonderland and the End of the World, Hall’s The Raw Shark Texts involves both a 
conscious and unconscious rendering of a watery underworld and a protagonist with a fractured 
mind, and, like in Murakami, film is used as a metaphor for this fracturing.  The themes of 
cryptography, memory, and imaginary animals (the unicorn in Murakami, the conceptual shark 
in Hall) adhere strongly throughout both novels.  Both of the protagonists are attracted to yet are 
ultimately unsatisfied by a perfunctorily ordered lifestyle.  Hall’s protagonist, Eric Sanderson, 
describes his life early on as “perfect and pointless” (31), which would just as aptly describe 
Murakami’s unnamed protagonist. 
Though Hall’s text doesn’t hinge as centrally as Murakami’s on new ways of thinking the 
relationship between film and literature (see Chapter One below for a lengthy analysis of this 
issue in Murakami), Raw Shark Texts does begin to tackle this terrain and offers an excellent 
recent example of the trend in the contemporary novel towards mobilizing cinema in new literary 
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ways.  The first part of the novel concerns a protagonist named Eric Sanderson suffering from 
recurring bouts of amnesia who receives messages from his past self aimed at coaching him 
through the problem.  His doctor suggests he seems to have developed a “ ‘circuit breaker for the 
brain’ ” to “ ‘block out memories which are too painful or difficult for the mind to deal with’ ” 
(11).  Through a series of suggestive fragments, we piece together that his wife Clio was killed 
by a shark while vacationing in Greece (though much later it is revealed that she actually just 
drowned, no shark involved (411-412)), and that Eric is now haunted by a conceptual shark that 
fragments his mind.  His past self tells him: “The animal hunting you is a Ludovician.  It is an 
example of one of the many species of purely conceptual fish which swim in the flows of human 
interaction and the tides of cause and effect” (64).   
 Notably, film is one of the primary mechanisms both through which Eric operates and 
which Hall mobilizes to express this scenario.  When Doctor Randle first explains Eric’s 
situation to him, she asks him to say a line from Casablanca.  Eric is able to produce the line, as 
well as the character who speaks it and several other details from the film itself, but he is not able 
to remember himself having seen it.  He can’t say when the last time he watched Casablanca 
was.  Doctor Randle explains: “ ‘All that seems missing, Eric, is you’ ” (13).  The first real 
message Eric gets from his past self is a videotape (35), and in the accompanying textual 
fragments his past self narrates, among other things, a dream of his dead wife in which they 
communicate using film and television as a helpful intermediary.  He writes, “I stared at my feet 
with as serious an expression as I could manage and answered in my gruff, B-movie samurai 
voice” (48), and she responds “ ‘Good… Now tell me what’s happening in East Enders’ ” (49).  
She is visiting him from the dead and her main concern, ostensibly, is a popular British soap 
opera.  When Eric is first attacked by the conceptual shark, it seems, hallucinogenically, to come 
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out of the television itself like something out of Cronenberg (60).  When he finally learns (from 
the previous Eric’s notes) how to keep the conceptual shark from attacking again, it is an 
immensely complicated process that involves playing multiple audio feedbacks to prevent his 
own mind from bringing the shark into being.  He finds throughout past Eric’s writings a self 
imbued with cinema.  For example, when Clio buys an underwater camera, he says it reminds 
him of Toy Story’s Buzz Lightyear (116), and then they discuss her fearlessness of the sea versus 
his terror via Jaws (117).  With the underwater camera sitting on the table and Eric growing 
especially fond of it, Clio has to remind him that it is hers, to which he responds that he “winked 
at the camera in a knowing way” (118).  This serves as both a literal description of him winking 
at the camera on the table in farcical cahoots, but also reads like a scene direction in which the 
character is breaking the fourth wall and winking directly at us.   
 The bulk of the narrative concerns Eric’s descent into the dreamlike “un-space” in search 
of the mysterious Trey Fidorous, a cryptic figure his past self assures him has answers, and might 
even be able to help him be free of the conceptual shark.  The novel turns into a surrealistic 
adventure-odyssey to conquer the conceptual shark in which dream, textuality, and memory all 
blur together as a kind of cyberpunk parody of Jaws.  Eric eventually finds himself aboard Trey 
Fidorous’s conceptual boat, the Orpheus, made of feedback loops from streaming data, along 
with Scout, a girl he becomes romantically involved with who also uses him because she needs 
his conceptual shark to attack Mycroft Ward, the conglomerate self that is after her just like the 
shark is after him.  The novel itself offers a stunning breadth of formal play, and is filled with 
concrete poetry and other variations on textual representations of visual and conceptual imagery 
that frequently gesture toward the filmic.  One particularly stand-out passage is the shark 
approaching the Orpheus, literally animated in text, constituted by a flip-book that makes it 
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appear as if it is swimming towards us until it attacks (328-379).  Hall’s website suggests that for 
every chapter in the book, a “negative” chapter exists or will exist, fragmented from the book, 
and many are “hiding” on the internet.  Ultimately, The Raw Shark Texts gestures towards the 
range of formal literary innovations that constitute an important mode of potential cinema. 
Novels like Point Omega and Zeroville, and to a lesser extent Hardboiled Wonderland 
and the End of the World, point towards a trend in the contemporary novel towards an increasing 
reliance on filmic notional ekphrasis.  Defined by James Heffernan as “the verbal representation 
of graphic representation,” ekphrasis constitutes a parallel paradigm to the closet for approaching 
novels’ relations to films.  Notional ekphrasis simply denotes that the verbal representation 
pertains to a graphic representation of something that does not exist in reality.  While ekphrasis 
and the closet might at first seem markedly distinct, both involve the way different media 
variously represent each other and the real.  Both describe written modes that gesture towards 
non-verbal modes of expression.  Both techniques are therefore decidedly written, but also 
intermediary.  In fact both terms are strikingly parallel: the closet is reserved for written works 
whose form gestures towards live performance (or the recording of live performance), and 
ekphrasis describes writing that seeks to represent a visual media through literary description.  
These twin ideas, of writing that either gestures outside writing by appropriating the schematic 
blueprint of performative media (the closet), and writing that simply describes a visual work 
(ekphrasis), have had a lasting interest in the arts and critical theory for thousands of years.    
The oldest known closet dramas in the western tradition are attributed to Seneca the 
Younger (4BC-65AD), and the most heavily cited example of classic ekphrasis remains Homer’s 
extended description of Achilles’s shield in Book 18 of the Iliad.  The two concepts have had 
pervasive critical histories in the last few millennia far too complex to outline here.  Rather, the 
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point I wish to make is that given the historical import and longevity of both terms, it seems 
quite striking that neither has been extensively employed in understanding the relationship––so 
often discussed in the last century––between film and the novel.  They seem well-suited for the 
task, especially when looking at the postmodern American novel’s typically experimental modes 
that seek to gesture outside of writing, to play on questions of media and the representation of 
realities.  Closeted and ekphrastic cinemas, couched in prose, constitute distinct and almost 
entirely untapped paradigms for understanding the novel and its relationship to film.  What is at 
stake here are questions resulting from writing that represents itself as something else, something 
other-than-writing (and, consequently, films that are somehow also not films).  In a closet film, 
there is no actual cinema.  In a notionally ekphrastic description of a film that exists only in the 
world of the novel in which we encounter that description, there is also no actual film.  But that 
is different from saying there is no film, period.  Rather, there are films to talk about here, but 
not actual ones.  Instead, there are potential films.  They exist, but in a different ontological 
mode.  How then, are we to talk about films that exist only in novels?  Or about writing that 
presents itself as film?  Or about novels and short stories that take the form of the screenplay?  
And what, finally, are the consequences that the answers to these questions will have for our 
understanding of the novel and its relation to film in general? 
For that is what is truly at stake here: questions of Reality and of Being, and the ways the 
novel since about World War II has attempted to represent those things.  Especially if we are to 
accept Brian McHale’s famous and well-formulated schematic that postmodern novels are 
defined by a prioritization of ontological questions over epistemological ones, as in modernism, 
(Politics of Postmodernism xii and 58-60; see also Constructing Postmodernism 247), then one 
immediate consequence would be to look at how those novels complicate the very fabric of what 
  
36 
they are.  The related modes of the closet and the ekphrastic have been fundamental tools in the 
novel’s exploration of this terrain, though they’ve been mostly overlooked.  For this reason, a 
study of the closet film form would not be complete without at least a brief discussion of filmic 
ekphrasis in the contemporary novel.  There is one novel that does this better and more fully than 
any other, and that is David Foster Wallace’s Infinite Jest.   
We should pause to note that in the classic example of ekphrasis, Homer’s description of 
the shield of Achilles, the attention is focused more on how the shield was made than on what is 
depicted on the shield itself.  We might see an echo here of the way that the Hollywood Novel 
appropriates cinematic production at the level of content; in this case, Homer appropriates 
material production (of the shield) at the level of its content.  In Infinite Jest, Wallace goes one 
step further, blurring the boundaries between the literary appropriation of cinematic form and 
content entirely.  The whole novel centers around a missing film “cartridge,” as it is called in the 
dystopic near-future North America of Infinite Jest, directed by one of the novel’s characters––
James O. Incandenza––whose oeuvre serves as the connective tissue that ties this sprawling book 
together.  Infinite Jest is a novel about film, and it makes sense to conceptualize that film as a 
kind of potential cinema.  The centrality of film in the plot gradually unfolds as it becomes clear 
that one particular film, aptly titled Infinite Jest (V?), turns out to be the ultimate Entertainment, 
a missing cartridge which is sought by a Quebecois separatist terrorist group, called the 
Wheelchair Assassins, for its power to kill anyone who views it via an overload of pleasure.  
This film was directed by James O. Incandenza, the father of the protagonist Hal and his two 
brothers Orin and Mario.  Several passages throughout the novel seem ambiguously to either 
describe short films from Incandenza’s oeuvre or to narrate the actual events or memories from 
Incandenza’s youth that would later inform his films.  These sections establish a complex nesting 
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of multiple potentialities: passages that potentially describe films that potentially exist within the 
fictive world of the novel, which itself occupies a fictive relationship to any actuality.  It is in this 
way that the purely potential status of cinema in the novel informs its structure at its very core: 
film here is both infinite in its proliferation of endless possibilities, as well as jesting in the 
absurdity of its radical impotentiality.  
The main narrative of Infinite Jest is fragmented by the use of endnotes, which interrupt 
frequently and serve various ambiguous purposes: occasionally clarifying, correcting, 
analogizing, simply adding, etc.  Most are short, but some are very long.  Endnote Twenty-Four, 
which comes sixty-four pages into the novel, is itself eight pages long.  The note comes on the 
heels of a twenty-three-line-long sentence describing the life and work of James O. Incandenza, 
who is mostly frequently referred to as “Himself” by his family.  He is the founder of the Enfield 
Tennis Academy, where much of the novel takes place, as well as an impossibly brilliant and 
prolific scientist in the field of applied geometrical optics.  He is the inventor of multiple 
technologies leading to advances in something called “annular fusion,” and in software, weapons 
systems, lighting and film equipment, as well.  He is also a raging alcoholic, and, finally, 
especially towards the end of his life, an accomplished experimental filmmaker.  
Endnote Twenty-Four is comprised of a seventy-eight-entry-long filmography of James 
O. Incandenza, a subnote to the heading of which presents a bibliographic citation of the work 
(invented by Wallace of course) from which we are to believe this filmography comes: 
From Comstock, Posner, and Duquette, ‘The Laughing Pathologists: Exemplary 
Works of the Anticonfluential Après Garde: Some Analyses of the Movement 
Toward Stasis in North American Conceptual Film (w/ Beth B., Vivienne Dick, 
James O. Incandenza, Vigdis Simpson, E. and K. Snow).’  ONANite Film and 
Cartridge Studies Annual, vol. 8, nos. 1-3 (Year of D.P. from the A.H.), pp. 44-
117. 
 
Some of these references are to real artists, others not.  Comstock, Posner and Duquette appear to 
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be Wallace’s creations, but several of the filmmakers listed are definitely real: Beth B. is real, 
and Vivienne Dick is an actual well-known contemporary Irish experimental and documentary 
filmmaker.  Vigdis Simpson is created, and with the incompletely named E. and K. Snow it is 
hard to be totally sure.1  In any case, the reliability of Comstock, Posner and Duquette as 
archivists is clearly to be called into question.  The description of Wave Bye-Bye to the 
Bureaucrat (“a harried commuter is mistaken for Christ by a child he knocks over” (990)) seems 
woefully inadequate in comparison to the much longer description we get in the novel’s main 
narrative.  Also, multiple entries contain suggestions that other scholars and archivists have 
categorized things differently, under different years or as unfinished or not. 
The filmography is preceded by a lengthy overview of Incandenza’s oeuvre and 
explanation of the format: 
The following listing is as complete as we are able to make it.  Because the twelve 
years of Incandenza’s directorial activity also coincided with large shifts in film 
venue––from public art cinemas, to VCR-capable magnetic recordings, to 
InterLace TelEntertainment laser dissemination and reviewable storage disk laser 
cartridges––and because Incandenza’s output itself comprises industrial, 
documentary, conceptual, advertorial, technical, parodic, dramatic 
noncommercial, nondramatic (‘anti-confluential’) noncommercial, nondramatic 
commercial, and dramatic commercial works, this filmmaker’s career presents 
substantive archival challenges.  These challenges are also compounded by the 
facts that, first, for conceptual reasons, Incandenza eschewed both L. of C. 
registration and formal dating until the advent of Subsidized Time, secondly, that 
his output increased steadily until during the last years of his life Incandenza often 
had several works in production at the same time, thirdly, that his production 
company was privately owned and underwent at least four different changes of 
corporate name, and lastly that certain of his high-conceptual projects’ agendas 
required that they be titled and subjected to critique but never filmed, making 
their status as film subject to controversy.   
                                                
1 Later references include real historical personages such as D.W. Griffith and Taka Iimura, a contemporary 
Japanese video and new media artist.  Ironically, the latter apparently appears in a 1997 documentary about mid-
century avant-garde cinema entitled Birth of a Nation.  Sidney Peterson and his 1947 classic The Cage (subnote b to 
endnote 24, page 986) are also real.  Godbout is I think real, but I don’t know about Vodriard.  Hollis Frampton (24, 
988) is real.  Woititz and Shulgin, and their “poststructural antidocumentaries” (24, 988) seem to be fictive 
filmmakers, but both are names of actual people who have written about or are otherwise related to issues of 
addiction and drug dependency: Janet G. Woititz wrote the book Adult Children of Alcoholics and Alex Shulgin is a 
Berkeley chemist and pharmacologist who basically invented ecstasy.  
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 Accordingly, though the works are here listed in what is considered by 
archivists to be their probably order of completion, we wish to say that the list’s 
order and completeness are, at this point in time, not definitive. 
 Each work’s title is followed: by either its year of completion, or by ‘B.S.’ 
designating undated completion before Subsidization; by the production 
company; by the major players, if credited; by the storage medium’s (‘film’ ’s) 
gauge or gauges; by the length of the work to the nearest minute; by an indication 
of whether the work is in black and white or color or both; by an indication of 
whether the film is silent or in sound or both; by (if possible) a brief synopsis or 
critical overview; and by an indication of whether the work is mediated by 
celluloid film, magnetic video, InterLace Spontaneous Dissemination, TP-
compatible InterLace cartridge, or private distribution by Incandenza’s own 
company(ies).  The designation UNRELEASED is used for those works which 
never saw distribution and are now publicly unavailable or lost.  (24, 985-986) 
 
The list that follows describes a body of work that we might call a kind of purely potential 
cinema.  Wallace goes about as far as possible to foreground their lack of concrete actuality and 
the spiraling expounding of their potentialities.  In addition to the repeated emphasis on 
unreleased and unfinished films, many of even those ostensibly most realized do not seem like 
actual films at all.  Some of the films’ descriptions read more like a joke or an anecdote than as 
an actual synopsis or “critical overview.”  For example: 
Cage 3 –– Free Show.  B.S.  Lactrodectus Matrans Productions/Infernatron 
Animation Concepts, Canada.  Cosgrove Watt, P.A. Heaven, Everard Maynell, 
Pam Heath; partial animation; 35 mm.; 65 minutes; black and white; sound.  The 
figure of Death (Heath) presides over the front entrance of a carnival sideshow 
whose spectators watch performers undergo unspeakable degradations so 
grotesquely compelling that the spectators’ eyes become larger and larger until 
the spectators themselves are transformed into gigantic eyeballs in chairs, while 
on the other side of the sideshow tent the figure of Life (Heaven) uses a 
megaphone to invite fairgoers to an exhibition in which, if the fairgoers consent to 
undergo unspeakable degradations, they can witness ordinary persons gradually 
turn into gigantic eyeballs.  INTERLACE TELENT FEATURE CARTRIDGE # 
357-65-65. (note 24, IJ 988) 
 
It is easier to imagine this as a clever idea for a potential film rather than as an actual description 
of an actual film.  Once we read the synopsis, there is almost no need to actually watch the film.  
It less points at an imaginary citation than appropriates the formal features of filmography for 
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ends that are basically comic.  But at other moments the medium of the “film” is clearly 
foregrounded, even when that medium is arguably more like performance art or a happening: 
The Joke.  B.S.  Latrodectus Mactans Productions.  Audience as reflexive cast; 35 
mm. X 2 cameras; variable length; black and white; silent.  Parody of Hollis 
Frampton’s ‘audience-specific events,’ two Ikegami EC-35 video cameras in 
theater record the ‘film’s’ audience and project the resultant raster onto screen––
the theater audience watching itself watch itself get the obvious ‘joke’ and 
become increasingly self-conscious and uncomfortable and hostile supposedly 
comprises the film’s involuted “antinarrative’ flow.  Incandenza’s first truly 
controversial project, Film & Kartridge Kultcher’s Sperber credited it with 
‘unwittingly sounding the death-knell of post-poststructural film in terms of sheer 
annoyance.’  NONRECORDED MAGENTIC VIDEO SCREENABLE IN 
THEATER VENUE ONLY, NOW UNREALEASED. (24, 988-9) 
 
Other entries describe works whose status as “film” are even more questionable, the works they 
describe even more opaque.  Aside from the multiple interspersed entries that simply read 
“Untitled.  Unfinished.  UNRELEASED,” there are also series such as:  
Found Drama I. 
Found Drama II. 
Found Drama III. … conceptual, conceptually unfilmable.  UNRELEASED. (24, 
989)2 
 
It might be worth pausing here to compare and contrast this filmography with one of its obvious 
principle antecedents: Jorge Luis Borges’s short piece “Pierre Menard, Author of the Quixote,” 
in which an ostensible archivist presents a list of the complete works of Pierre Menard (before 
discussing at length his greatest (though unfinished) achievement, to write Don Quixote).  The 
bibliography itself bears many striking resemblances to Incandenza’s filmography (certainly 
enough that, if one so desired, the argument could easily be made that Wallace definitely had 
Borges on his mind when he was composing it––that and the other obvious antecedent of a 
fictive unreliable compiler of an another fictive artist’s works: Charles Kinbote in Nabokov’s 
Pale Fire): for example, the meshing of fictional characters with historical figures from the arts 
                                                
2 A little lower we get V and VI, same thing, but never a IV.  Then later a IX, X, and XI (990), without a VII or VIII. 
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(Menard, we are to believe, was good friends with Paul Valéry), the repeated calling into 
question of the reliability of the archivist (Borges’ narrator admits early on, “I am aware that it is 
quite easy to challenge my slight authority”) and, notably, the brief anecdotal joke-structure of 
many of the entries, such as: 
e) A technical article on the possibility of improving the game of chess by 
eliminating one of the rook’s pawns. Menard proposes, recommends, discusses 
and finally rejects this innovation. 
 
And, as in Wallace’s work, many of the entries form jokes only when placed in dialogue with 
each other.  At one point in Borges, for example, the way one entry serves as the punch line for 
the previous one seems to threaten to undermine the formal conceit altogether: 
I) An examination of the essential metric laws of French prose, illustrated with 
examples taken from Saint-Simon (Revue des langues romanes, Montpellier, 
October 1909).  
 
j) A reply to Luc Durtain (who had denied the existence of such laws), illustrated 
with examples from Luc Durtain (Revue des langues romanes, Montpellier, 
December 1909). 
 
The recalling of “such laws” in entry J from the previous entry reminds us we are reading a 
narrative with only the jocular gambit of a list with any pretensions to being actual.  What makes 
Incandenza’s filmography so distinct from Menard’s is the way it goes so much further and 
deeper.  While it certainly partakes of the anecdotal structure of Menard’s bibliography, in which 
entries usually exist as autonomous nodes of humor, it also manically encourages connections 
not only between the entries, but throughout the giant sprawling narrative of Infinite Jest.  With 
Borges, the bibliography of an invented archive is calculated for immediate comedic payoff.  
Wallace, however, with his playful interweaving of entries into a giant thing approaching a kind 
of totality, replete with unending, seemingly-trivial, paranoia-inducing details and endless 
opaque and nebulous resonances throughout the novel, is playing with the idea of an invented 
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film archive in a different way: it makes us paranoid, and it simultaneously holds out and 
undercuts the absurd promise of totality or completeness to which archives always aspire. 
In several cases the filmography’s entries aren’t simply gags, and the ontological status of 
the films they describe proves central to the narrative.  The most obvious example is 
Incandenza’s final film, a cartridge that proves to be so entertaining that its viewer 
instantaneously becomes hopelessly addicted to the pleasure of watching it, immediately and 
totality losing all interest in everything else, until he or she starves to death or dies of thirst.  It is 
the Master Copy of this Entertainment that The Wheelchair Assassins are searching for, and all 
of the action of the novel in some way revolves around this search.  The entry reads:  
Infinite Jest (V?).  Year of the Trial-Size Dove Bar.  Poor Yorick Entertainment 
Unlimited.  ‘Madame Psychosis’; no other definitive data.  Thorny problem for 
archivists.  Incandenza’s last film, Incandenza’s death occurring during its post-
production.  Most archival authorities list as unfinished, unseen.  Some list as 
completion of Infinite Jest (IV), for which Incandenza had also used ‘Psychosis,’ 
thus list the film under Incandenza’s output for Y.T.M.P.  Though no scholarly 
synopsis or report of viewing exists, two short essays in different issues of 
Cartridge Quarterly East refer to the film as ‘extraordinary’d and ‘far and away 
[James O. Incandenza’s] most entertaining and compelling work’e.  West Coast 
archivists list the film’s gauge as ’16…78…n mm.,’ basing the gauge on critical 
allusionsf to ‘radical experiments in viewers’ optical perspective and context’ as IJ 
(V?)’s distinctive feature.  Though Canadian archivist Tête-Bêche lists the film as 
completed and privately distributed by P.Y.E.U. through posthumous provisions 
in the filmmaker’s will, all other comprehensive filmographies have the film 
either unfinished or UNRELEASED, its Master cartridge either destroyed or 
vaulted sui testator. 
____________ 
d. E. Duquette, ‘Beholden to Vision: Optics and Desire in Four Après Garde 
Films,’ Cartridge Quarterly East, vol. 4 no. 2, Y.W.-Q.-M.D., pp. 35-39. 
e. Anonymous, ‘Seeing v. Believing,’ Cartridge Quarterly East, vol. 4 no. 4, 
Y.W.-Q.M.D., pp. 93-95. 
f. Ibid. (note 24, IJ 993)  
 
I am quoting at length here because it is important to get a sense of the breadth of different 
ontological relationships established between the entries in the filmography and the filmic works 
they describe: that is, in what sense are we to imagine they “actually” exist?  My argument is that 
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Wallace’s virtuoso manipulation of this ontological ambiguity constitutes the central structural 
driving force of the novel.  This is evident in three key entries in the filmography: Valuable 
Coupon Has Been Removed, As of Yore, and It Was a Great Marvel That He Was in the Father 
Without Knowing Him, all three of which describe ostensible films the plots of which we 
encounter in the main narrative of Infinite Jest, though it is radically unclear whether the longer 
passages in the main narrative are renderings of the actual events that the films were based on, or 
Himself’s memories of those events, or the films themselves.  And if it is the latter, it is unclear 
whether we are getting film treatments or synopses of the films, or if we are getting the prose-
version-rendering of the films themselves.  As I will shortly delineate, the text compounds and 
complicates at every turn our attempts to understand the ontological relationship between the 
main narrative and the filmography. 
About halfway through Infinite Jest we get a rather long digression (491-503) that, 
without the help of handy endnote (note 208) would likely be even more puzzling than it is.  The 
passage is introduced with a heading: “WINTER, B.S. 1963, SEPULVEDA CA” (491), and 
begins in the first person (rare for this novel): “I remember208 I was eating lunch and reading 
something dull by Bazin when my father came into the kitchen and made himself a tomato juice 
beverage and said that as soon as I was finished he and my mother needed my help in their 
bedroom” (491).  Endnote 208 usefully reads: 
From Ch. 16, ‘The Awakening of My Interest in Annular Systems,’ in The Chill 
of Inspiration: Spontaneous Reminiscences by Seventeen Pioneers of DT-Cycle 
Lithiumized Annular Fusion, ed. Prof. Dr. Günther Sperber, Institut für 
Neutronenphysik and Reaktortechnik, Kernforshungszentrum Karlsruhe, U.R.G., 
available in English in ferociously expensive hardcover only, © Y.T.M.P from 
Springer-Verlag Wien NNY. (note 208, IJ 1034) 
 
The reader quickly pieces together that the author/narrator here is James O. Incandenza himself, 
though it is odd that the endnoted citation does not actually name him.  Also puzzlingly, while 
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The Chill of Inspiration is published by an actual German publisher, it seems to have come from 
Wien, New New York.  We might read this as calling into question the authenticity of the 
endnotes and the authority of whomever we are to imagine is compiling them, or as simply one 
of the many idiosyncrasies of Wallace’s quasi-dystopic sci-fi-future North America.  In any case, 
we are given an unusually clear indication of this passage’s ontological status within the novel: it 
comes from another book.  Curiously, in Incandenza’s filmography we find an intriguing entry 
from the very same year3: 
Valuable Coupon Has Been Removed.  Year of the Tucks Medicated Pad.  Poor 
Yorick Entertainment Unlimited.  Cosgrove Watt, Phillip T. Smothergill, Diane 
Saltoon; 16 mm.; 52 minutes; color; silent.  Possible Scandinavian-psychodrama 
parody, a boy helps his alcoholic-delusional father and disassociated mother 
dismantle their bed to search for rodents, and later he intuits the future feasibility 
of D.T.-cycle lithiumized annular fusion.  CELLULOID (UNRELEASED).  (note 
24, IJ 990-1)  
 
It thus seems that this film came out of Incandenza’s own putting into writing his memory from 
his youth.  Or, that the written version was simply a byproduct of his working on the film.  We 
have both the long version from his published written account, but much earlier in the novel we 
have already gotten (as part of an endnote that appears on page sixty-four) the information that 
that same year he also completed an unreleased film depicting more-or-less the same incident.  
This raises a rather odd set of questions: to what extent does the written account inform our 
knowledge of the potential film here (since we can never actually see the film)?  And just how 
much can we assume about the films when the longer accounts of the events they depict 
represent them so differently in the luridly fleshed-out narrative tangents? 
 These questions, and our reading of the previous passage in general, are further 
complicated by other similar passages and their quasi-corresponding filmography entries.  Take 
                                                
3 Though I am not totally sure about what it suggests, in 1963 James O. Incandenza would be about the same age 
(possibly slightly older) that his son Hal is in Y.T.M.P.  Hal, we know, would turn 11 that year, and his father seems 
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for example the lengthy (157-169) rambling and increasingly incoherent monologue ostensibly 
spoken by James O. Incandenza’s father (Hal’s grandfather) to James under the heading 
“WINTER B.S. 1960 –– TUCSON AZ” (157).  In the filmography, we get: 
As of Yore.  Year of the Tucks Medicated Pad.  Poor Yorick Entertainment 
Unlimited.  Cosgrove Watt, Marlon Bain; 17/78 mm.; 181 minutes; black and 
white/color; sound.  A middle-aged tennis instructor, preparing to instruct his son 
in tennis, becomes intoxicated in the family’s garage and subjects his son to a 
rambling monologue while the son weeps and perspires.  INTERLACE TELENT 
CARTRIDGE # 357-16-09.  (note 24, IJ 991)  
 
There are at least four explanations of the relation between the Tucson 1960 section of the novel 
and the Y.T.M.P feature film.  First, the former could be a rendering of Himself’s memory of the 
actual event––specifically, in the form of his memory of his father’s words.  Second, it could be 
a transcription of the actual event itself, not from anyone’s perspective in particular, just the 
actual words spoken.  Third, it could be the monologue from the film As of Yore, simply 
transcribed here for us.4  Fourth, it could be a description, like a treatment, of the content of the 
film, but not an exact transcription of the monologue from the film.  We could speculate further, 
and of course it could possibly be almost anything (a transcription of the sounds coming from the 
video-room at the Enfield Tennis Academy where Hal often watches his father’s films, for 
example, doesn’t seem out of the realm of possibility, though there is little to support this reading 
here specifically), but these four options are each rendered totally potential.  The crucial 
ambiguity is whether the Tucson 1960 passage is a description of an event within the world of 
the novel or of a film within the novel.   
 This is the same ambiguity at play in another episode––this one even more problematic.  
                                                                                                                                                       
to have been born sometime in the early 50s.   
4 If this were the case, the fact that it likely takes many fewer than 181 minutes to recite this monologue could easily 
be explained by the experimental nature of Incandenza’s films.  The fact that it is shot in multiple gauges of 
filmstock as well as shifting between color and black and white suggests that any number of silent or non-dialogue 
minutes could elapse. 
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In the filmography: 
It Was a Great Marvel That He Was in the Father Without Knowing Him.  Year 
of the Trial-Size Dove Bar.  Poor Yorick Entertainment Unlimited.  Cosgrove 
Watt, Phillip T. Smothergill; 16 mm.; 5 minutes; black and white; silent/ sound.  
A father (Watt), suffering from the delusion that his etymologically precocious 
son (Smothergill) is pretending to be mute, poses as a ‘professional 
conversationalist’ in order to draw the boy out.  RELEASED IN INTERLACE 
TELENT’S ‘HOWL’S FROM THE MARGIN’ UNDERGROUND FILM 
SERIES –– MARCH/ Y.T.-S.D.B. –– AND INTERLACE TELENT 
CARTRIDGE #357-75-50.  (note 24, IJ 992-3) 
 
In the novel, at the beginning of the chapter marked “1 APRIL––YEAR OF THE TUCKS 
MEDICATED PAD” (27), there is a five-page episode that closely matches the description of 
this film.  The date marks it as exactly one year before Himself’s suicide.  The film (Great 
Marvel), completed eleven months later, is clearly one of his last.  What is not clear is whether 
the date establishes the time of actual action or the time setting of a film.  To compound matters, 
it seems difficult to fathom how James could make a film that represents himself as the sufferer 
of the delusion here: if he really were delusional, it seems odd he is able to make a film that 
represents the situation so clearly.  If he’s not delusional about Hal’s inability to communicate 
(we have, after all, just seen him spectacularly fail to do so in the opening chapter, where his 
attempts at articulate speech are discernable to us as readers of his interior dialogue, but come 
out as wild flailing incoherent mad-man ravings to everyone else (3-17)), then it is also odd for 
him to make a film in which, as in the longer narrative version (27-31), his father seems so 
clearly to be the crazy one. 
 Other details in the main narrative’s version of the episode (27-31) suggest that it might 
not simply be a rendering of the event (or Hal’s or James’ memory of the event), but might 
indeed bear a more direct relationship to the film listed in the filmography.  For one thing, the 
father-son dynamic established in the other films is played out here very similarly, except in this 
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case Himself is the father-figure, instead of the son.  Nevertheless, Hal here is apparently 
wearing a bow tie (28), which we know was an idiosyncrasy of Himself.  The other key formal 
note here is that the whole scene is rendered purely in dialogue.  The result is a passage that is 
impossible to pin down as describing an event, a memory, or a film produced as a result of the 
memory of that event.   
 Infinite Jest thus goes about as far as any novel can in the way of blurring boundaries 
between verbal and graphic representations.  Perhaps more than any other novel, it complicates 
our conception of the ontological status of the narrative along the lines of cinema and reality (as 
event/memory).  And by appropriating the formal structure of cinematic scholarship in the 
Filmography, it stands as the closest generic cousin to closet film, which appropriates the formal 
structure of cinematic production (the screenplay).  At the very least, it stands as a testament to 
the overwhelming fact of the primary importance of film and new visual media as the dominant 
metaphor for gesturing, in writing, outside of writing.  Whereas here that metaphor operates 
through ekphrasis, the rest of this project will tackle the specific question of the paradigm of the 
closet.   
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What Closet Film Is 
 
Readers will readily discern, too, that The Dynasts is intended simply for mental 
performance, and not for the stage. Some critics have averred that to declare a 
drama as being not for the stage is to make an announcement whose subject and 
predicate cancel each other. The question seems to be an unimportant matter of 
terminology. Compositions cast in this shape were, without doubt, originally 
written for the stage only, and as a consequence their nomenclature of “Act,” 
“Scene,” and the like, was drawn directly from the vehicle of representation. But 
in the course of time such a shape would reveal itself to be an eminently readable 
one; moreover, by dispensing with the theatre altogether, a freedom of treatment 
was attainable in this form that was denied where the material possibilities of 
stagery had to be rigorously remembered. With the careless mechanicism of 
human speech, the technicalities of practical mumming were retained in these 
productions when they had ceased to be concerned with the stage at all. … 
Whether mental performance alone may not eventually be the fate of all drama 
other than that of contemporary or frivolous life, is a kindred question not without 
interest. 
––Thomas Hardy, preface to The Dynasts 
 
Our conceptualization of closet film owes much to the more fully documented history of 
the genre’s most proximate literary ancestor, the closet drama.  Dating as far back as the works 
of the ancient Roman writer Seneca, tracing a trajectory through Milton’s Samson Agonistes––
which, along with The Cenci, argues Catherine Burroughs, continues to stand as the most famous 
example of the genre (217)––witnessing a revival amongst Romantic playwrights in the 
nineteenth century (Goethe, Byron, Shelley, etc.), the mode’s popularity has ebbed and flowed, 
but its legacy has been enduring.  What defines the genre is fairly straightforward: texts written 
in the form of playscripts that are variously either never intended to be performed on stage, 
and/or are, for technical (and occasionally sociopolitical reasons) unstageable.  In the early 
twentieth century––around the time a few brave souls in Paris and Tokyo were first starting to 
experiment with silent film scenario form in poetry and prose––a number of modernist authors’ 
interest in the closet drama resurged, and their efforts continue to draw critical attention.  One 
recent example is Martin Puchner’s Stage Fright, a study of the modernist upswell of interest in 
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closet drama, arguing that a certain antitheatricalism was central to modernist theatrical practice.  
Puchner points to “a variety of attitudes through which the theater is being kept at arm's length” 
(2), and suggests that “a suspicion of the theater plays a constitutive role in the period of 
modernism, especially in modernist theater and drama” (1).  Ultimately, Puchner asserts, 
“Central aesthetic values dominant in the period of modernism stem from a resistance to the 
theater” (9). 
 Puchner argues that this antitheatricalism, this keeping-at-arm’s-length of the theater, 
stems from newly available modes of critiquing realism that become possible during the 
modernist period: 
What they [modernist critics of the theater] tend to object to is a particular form of 
mimesis at work in the theater, a mimesis caused by the theater’s uneasy position 
between the performing and the mimetic arts. As a performing art like music or 
ballet, the theater depends on the artistry of live human performers on stage. As a 
mimetic art like painting or cinema, however, it must utilize these human 
performers as signifying material in the service of a mimetic project. Once the 
nature of mimesis is subject to scrutiny and attacks, as it is in modernism, this 
double affiliation of the theater becomes a problem because, unlike painting or 
cinema, the theater remains tied to human performers, no matter how estranged 
their acting might be. The theater thus comes to be fundamentally at odds with a 
more widespread critique, or complication, of mimesis because this critique 
requires that the material used in the artwork be capable of abstraction and 
estrangement. (5) 
 
The theater, in other words, with its reliance on human presence, chafed against predominant 
views regarding mimesis and the representation of the real.  This context in the history of art 
marks the modernist closet drama as distinct from earlier forms and illuminates the “uneasy 
position” of the theater in modernism.  A reciprocal gesture occurs during postmodernism, where 
the terrain of the context shifts from theater to the cinema.  For where Puchner’s formulation 
collapses painting and cinema together as both purely mimetic arts, where the postmodern period 
is concerned it makes more sense to linger on the distinct specificities that mark cinema’s 
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relationship to mimesis as distinct from both theater and painting, and, more notably, from prose 
fiction, since the closet film adheres perhaps most visibly in the space between cinema and 
fiction.  If, as Puchner argues, modernist closet drama derives from the uneasy problematics of 
theater’s relation to mimesis, then the postmodernist closet film, we might posit, arises from a 
related set of uneasinesses regarding realism and the representation of the real that appear later in 
the twentieth century.  Specifically, we might chart the growth of the genre against the rise and 
fall of the prevailing understanding (and later rejection of that understanding) of Bazin’s 
theorization of the cinema as occupying a singular relationship to realist representation.  
Philip Rosen has recently articulated the overly reactionary character of 1970s antirealist 
film theorists’ attacks on Bazin for his alleged belief in a naïve realism, suggesting that Bazin 
certainly understood realism as always already illusionistic, as “the perfect aesthetic illusion of 
reality” (qtd. in Rosen 13, italics original), and that Bazin’s understanding of realism was 
universally misinterpreted as a simplified and reductive account of the idea that cinema 
objectively and faithfully reproduces the real.  Nevertheless, the (quasi-)Bazinian position of 
understanding film as being particularly suited to realist purposes has historically dominated the 
critical landscape ever since.  Though many have been quick to reject Bazin, naïve realism is still 
the overwhelmingly dominant paradigm through which we first understand film, whether we like 
to admit it or not (and the novel as well––see Conclusion below).  The closet film, like the closet 
drama, is a genre especially preoccupied with formal concerns regarding mimesis that potentially 
annoy its current dominant understanding in the culture.  But it would be rather imprudent, for 
two reasons, to suggest that closet film and anticinematics is constitutive of postmodernism in 
the same way that Puchner asserts closet drama and antitheatricalism constitute the primary 
aesthetics of modernism.  The first problem with this formulation is that there simply are not 
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enough closet films to argue that they are “constitutive” of postmodernist literary or cinematic 
practice.  The second is that we must be more careful with what we mean by “anticinematic” 
than Puchner has to be with “antitheatrical.”  Where Puchner’s term clearly denotes sentiments 
stemming from problematics regarding live performance versus symbolic abstraction, the 
question of “What is cinema?” is, from the get-go here, more fraught than its corollary with 
drama.   
 Two questions are immediately raised by positing closet film in relation to Puchner’s 
formulation of closet drama’s specific antitheatricalism in relation to mimesis.  On one hand, we 
need to map out the convoluted terrain of the vexed relationship between film and the novel as 
they variously push the limits of realistic representation in the postmodern period, and the closet 
film serves as an excellent case study positioned at the fulcrum of this relation.  The second 
question is why closet film has not garnered the same interest as closet drama.  The fault here 
does not seem to fall totally on film and literary critics ignoring the genre, because we must 
admit that there are very few works that fall into this category to begin with.  What mechanisms, 
then, are responsible for hindering the growth of an otherwise viable mode of literary 
expression?  Surely, theoretically, it would make sense, given the immediate literary ancestor in 
the closet drama, given the climate of literary experimentation that overruns the period in 
question, given the often tendentious relationship between film and the novel, and given the fact 
that writers and filmmakers (which categories obviously overlap tremendously) often appropriate 
formal properties from each other’s medium already––given all this, we should perhaps expect to 
find a plethora of writers exploring the limits and potentialities of this intriguing form.  That we 
do not requires an explanation that is likely quite complicated, encompassing factors both in the 
sphere of finance, publication, and dissemination on the one hand, as well as aesthetics, form and 
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genre, and the directions taken by avant-garde filmic and literary movements across the twentieth 
century on the other.  
 But the first point in question demands that examine exactly what we mean by “closet” 
when we say “closet film.”  Building on Puchner’s arguments, Nick Salvato convincingly argues 
that closet drama is defined by a certain undecidability between writing and performance (5), and 
that “the queer potential of closet drama, treated only in passing in Stage Fright, belongs 
prominently among the reasons for its modernist renewal and for its distinction on the spectrum 
of modern drama” (8).  Notably, though Salvato’s discussion is dedicated entirely to closet 
drama, he both opens and closes his project with gestures towards the cinema (and we should 
note that Puchner, as well, opens Stage Fright with an illuminative example drawn not from 
theater, but from film).  Salvato ends his study by briefly gesturing towards William S. 
Burroughs’ The Last Words of Dutch Schultz, which he describes as a “closet film” (185), noting 
that John F. Keener has pointed out that “Burroughs intends [it] to be read explicitly as a form of 
proto-filmscript" (qtd in Salvato 185).  Salvato offers a provocative reading of the work’s queer 
potential, and argues, “As one inheritor and transmuter of the modernist closet drama's energies 
and attitudes vis-à-vis the theater, the postmodern closet film simultaneously courts and resists 
contemporaneous filmmaking conventions and parameters” (185).  Burroughs’s courtship and 
resistance here, to use Salvato’s terms, is a complex one that warrants further study, especially in 
regards to the what we might understand as the formal queerness of The Last Words, a text that 
seems to describe a film, but in its incorporation of archival photos and its idiosyncratic outlay of 
dialogue and action, is not exactly a “screenplay” either.   
We should also note that Salvato’s formulation, of closet film’s ambivalent stance 
towards cinematic practice, understands the genre as one executed primarily from the perspective 
  
53 
of the literary world in relation to film.  The closet film, in other words, is foremost a mode 
undertaken by novelists like Burroughs.  This is the approach to the genre that makes the most 
sense.  Understanding the closet film as a subgenre of the novel (or, more loosely, of prose 
fiction, especially in the case of filmic short stories, for example) is more generative than the 
inverse (looking at the literary value of artists who are primarily screenwriters, as Kevin Boon 
argues for in Script Culture and the American Screenplay––see below), mostly because much of 
the best and most exciting examples of the genre, such as Burroughs’s Last Words or Darius 
James’s Negrophobia, are clearly as much “experimental novels” as they are “closet films,” and 
their value is essentially literary rather than filmic, but also because the archive of simply 
unfilmed screenplays is too unwieldy to analyze, and besides, it primarily opens up questions 
about film production and the culture of the film industry rather than ones about form and 
aesthetic practice.  That said, it remains important that we take into account works that fall 
further to the filmic end of the spectrum.  Quimby Melton, in a recent article outlining the history 
of the closet screenplay, understands the potentiality of the genre foremost as a tool for 
screenwriters: 
And along with increased publishing opportunities for all scripts, the closet 
screenplay is perhaps the screenwriter’s most powerful weapon for parrying 
attacks against, and launching vigorous ripostes in the interest of furthering, his 
literary bona fides and his text's literary value. (“Production’s Dubious 
Advantage,” n.p.) 
 
Melton is not alone in advocating an approach that looks at the current potential of the genre 
from the perspective of screenwriters.  Kevin Boon’s Script Culture and the American 
Screenplay (2008) sets about arguing for the study of screenplays themselves.  But throughout 
his study, Boon underplays the way that the cinema industry, and the majority of artists within 
that industry, have themselves understood the screenplay as precisely non-literary, as merely one 
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element in the collaborative production of a film.  Just as we likely wouldn’t study the costumes 
of a particular film as autonomous from the context of the film itself, studying the screenplay as 
removed from the film is equally fraught: implicitly, it presumes a priori a superiority of the 
literary and the written, the legitimate authoritative word of the genius, over the collaborate and 
often industrial product of the film.  Studying a given screenplay as an autonomous literary work 
therefore does not make as much sense, as, say, studying a closet film, since most regular 
screenplays are considered by both readers and writers alike as necessarily instrumental parts of 
works, not whole works.  One problem with studying script culture, in other words, is that there 
isn’t one, as such.  Closet films, on the other hand, do constitute something like a distinct genre, 
between the literary and the filmic, and are therefore clearly in need of immediate attention. 
If “closet drama” describes a genre of poetry which utilizes playscript form, then it makes 
sense to call a prose work in film-scenario or film-script form a “closet film.”  The term “closet 
screenplay” we should reserve for the broader category described by Melton with explicit 
reference to the Japanese term “Lesescenario” (or “Rezeshinario,” depending on how you 
Westernize the characters––and also by Brian Norman and others (see Chapter Three).  A 
plethora of other options also exist (bookfilm, closet cinema, read film, etc.), but it makes the 
most sense to understand the genre in a term that parallels its obvious literary predecessor.  On a 
more fundamental level, we could say that it is the film, and not its screenplay, which is in fact 
the thing that is closeted.  This distinction is more important than at first it seems.  The term 
closet screenplay gestures towards actual screenplays that are meant to serve as components of 
film production, but which are for whatever reason not realized in film form and published.  In 
this case, we have a screenplay that ends up in a kind of “closeted” state.  In other words, closet 
screenplays could potentially include all unproduced film scripts ever written.  Closet film, on 
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the other hand, gestures towards the more specific category of film-scriptic works written for the 
page in the tradition of the closet drama. 
There is a pragmatic function of this distinction then: to identify as the object of critical 
study the entire body of unrealized and/or unpublished screenplays would be for obvious reasons 
an impossible task.  Plus, focusing on such texts would open an entirely distinct set of critical 
questions from the ones most pressingly at hand here.  By using the term closet film then, I want 
to deemphasize the role of actual cinema and of actual screenplays, and place the focus more 
pointedly at prose fiction’s, and especially the novel’s, appropriation of screenplay form to 
execute effects the are “cinematic” in a very different sense from how that term has traditionally 
been used to describe literary techniques.  For closet film is not about the appropriation of 
cinematic technique; it is about the appropriation of techniques drawn from one component of 
cinematic production, and that is a pivotal distinction.  Instead of examining the “literary 
equivalent” or “formal translation” of cross-cutting or montage, closet film borrows from another 
written form: it is the novel appropriating from the screenplay, and film itself is only secondarily 
referenced.  The relationship of the closet film to actual film is thus indexed more so by 
ontological questions related to the textual representation of visual anterior realities than it is by 
questions of formal appropriation.  A closet film does not conceal its filmic nature; it announces 
it.  It says to its reader, first and foremost: do not imagine this as reality, imagine it as film.  And 
yet it goes one step further than that even, for it does not give us a direct representation of the 
film itself, but of a single component of the production of the hypothetical film.  Closet film is 
thus first and foremost about multiple levels of remove from any anterior reality represented by 
the text.  It says to its reader: take what you read here and imagine that it could theoretically be 
made into a film.  And, as we shall see, in some cases the film obliquely evoked by the script 
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threatens to not even be theoretically filmable. 
Closet film developed independently in Paris and Tokyo in the 1920s.  In Paris, the 
French Surrealists, lead by Andre Breton, were pioneering new experimental forms of writing 
that sought to incorporate film and the filmic.  The Surrealists, as has been extensively 
documented, were very interested in the cinema and its potential uses for their own ends, 
especially in regards to its ability to reflect and affect the unconscious mind.  A few members of 
the inner circle of Surrealists even managed to make some actual films, though not very many 
(see Chapter Two).  But several members of the group were content to explore cinematic form in 
poetry and in prose, and some even wrote screenplays.  Their group left a vast and diverse body 
of work that we could classify as cinematic writing and as unfulfilled screenplays, and it is in the 
cracks between these works that we come across some early instances of what we can now term 
closet films, especially in the weird and relatively unstudied film oeuvre of Antonin Artaud and 
the more-or-less unknown-in-wider-circles Benjamin Fondane (both of whom will be discussed 
at length in Chapter Two).  Meanwhile, in Japan, a number of young writers negotiating the 
shifting terrain of Japanese Modernism and its own inherent conflicts, and experimenting 
especially with Western forms, began also to explore filmic form in their writing.  The most 
notable among them was Ryunosuke Akutagawa, who toward the end of his life began 
increasingly to incorporate structures borrowed from silent film scenarios into his prose short 
stories (see Chapter One).  Though it is possible that other notable authors, such as Jun'ichirō 
Tanizaki (who is known mostly as a writer of novels and short stories, but who also wrote 
several filmscripts) wrote texts that could be constituted as “closet films,” none of these exist in 
English, and it is difficult to ascertain in any case except the singular one that is Akutagawa, 
whether unpublished Japanese screenplays were the result of intention and experiment or simply 
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the difficult realities of the world of film production. 
 A definitive closet film, a paragon of the genre, is rather hard to pin down.  With closet 
drama, there are a plethora of examples to point to that illustrate exactly what epitomizes the 
form.  Not so with closet film.  There are several shorts stories that partake of scenario form, and 
even a few novels that incorporate scriptic structures.  But if we take the strictest definition of the 
genre, as a novel written entirely in the form of a screenplay, then I have managed to find exactly 
one.  That is Darius James’s Negrophobia: An Urban Parable (1991).  The long period between 
the genre’s inception in the 1920s and its zenith decades later is populated, if sparsely, with half-
examples, quasi-closeted and pseudo-filmic texts.  In the chapters that follow, I’ll explore several 
of the most notable and interesting examples I have been able to find, attempting a historical 
survey with an emphasis on outlining the potentialities of this literary form and analyzing its 
primary texts. 
 
 
 
Summary of Chapters 
 In Chapter One I analyze the historical origins of closet film in silent film era Tokyo, 
looking at scenarios written exclusively with an eye towards literary publication by Ryunosuke 
Akutagawa in the mid-to-late-twenties.  Existing criticism tends to read Akutagawa’s rampant 
formal experimentation at the end of his life and career––he killed himself in 1927––as a 
desperate and failed attempt to reconcile opposing cultural and formal forces within his writing, 
and that this itself constituted an extension of his own spiraling depression.  But in focusing on a 
few of his closet films, rather than his biography, my own reading showcases Akutagawa’s 
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exciting innovation, prescient formal hybridity, and a profound exploration of the relation 
between literary and cinematic representation.  Then I explore the lasting impact of Akutagawa’s 
experimentations with closet film in the work of his literary inheritor, Haruki Murakami.  
Murakami, who has written extensively about Akutawaga, has also in his own novels taken to a 
new level Akutagawa’s paradigm of exploring the complexities of Japanese identity in the 
context of East/West and Film/Literature binarisms.   
 In Chapter Two, I look to a movement contemporaneous with Akutagawa, in a very 
different linguistic and geographic situation: the formal experimentations undertaken by 
members of the French Surrealist movement in late 1920s Paris.  I argue that Surrealist Cinema 
is best understood not through the very small body of films produced by the Surrealists 
themselves (which many critics number as few as seven, and some critics as few as two), but as 
the much larger body of potential films that exist only in traces: the failed film career constitutive 
of the celebrated drama-theory of Antonin Artaud, for example, or the relatively unknown film 
scenarios of Benjamin Fondane.  Though much emphasis has been placed on actual Surrealist 
Cinema, I stress the importance of Surrealist potential cinema, especially at the level of the 
closet film.  In this regard I explore the way Artaud’s dramatic theory is imbued with his failures 
in screenwriting, and how Fondane’s closet films explore similar terrain and establish the 
fundamental literary techniques of the Western closet film.      
 Chapters Three and Four turn towards more contemporary and local examples of the 
closet film.  In Chapter Three, I offer an extended close-reading of Darius James’s 1993 closet 
film, Negrophobia, which I argue is the single most fully realized example of the potential genre.  
Analyzing the particular formal idiosyncrasies of this outrageous and complex text illuminates 
the literary effects specific to closet film and foregrounds problems of realism, representation 
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and ontotextual stability.  In the fourth chapter, I turn towards a series of contemporary examples 
that partially fulfill the criteria for inclusion in my closet film canon.  After brief discussions of 
Adam Thorpe’s Ulverton (1992), which contains various prose fiction chapters, written in a very 
diverse array of genres, culminating in a final chapter written in screenplay formatting, and 
David Flusfeder’s A Film By Spencer Ludwig (2010), which contains several scenes in which 
especially dialogue, but occasionally also action, are rendered in screenplay formatting, I turn 
towards a final recent paradigmatic example of the closet film.  The first half of Mark Leyner’s 
The Tetherballs of Bougainville (1998) is written in the form of prose fiction, the second half as 
an extended screenplay written by the protagonist of the first half.  Leyner, much like Darius 
James, explores the possibilities of literary play through a radically absurdist and hallucinogenic 
lens.  Though only half the novel is written as a screenplay, the balance and interplay between 
the two sections offers a foundational exploration of what the closet film can do.   
 The Conclusion poses a brief analysis of the way that closet film complicates current 
theorizations of Literary Realism, and offers an experimental reading of a contemporary but 
traditional novel, Kazuo Ishiguro’s The Remains of the Day (1989), as itself a kind of potential 
cinema.  Central to this thesis is that Realist models that suppose a literary text should 
mimetically reference an anterior reality, typically conceived of as real reality or the mind of the 
author, would do better to posit a potential film as a kind of hypothetical/fictive textual object 
mimetically referenced by the text.   
 On a final note, it is not lost on me that an intriguing alternative structure for this project 
would have been to write this study itself in screenplay form.  It has been done.  Karen Pinkus’s 
The Montesi Scandal (2003) is an excellent and highly original study of everyday life in 1950s 
Rome.  The book is totally unique in that, though clearly a scholarly study, it understands that the 
  
60 
imbrication of cinema into the everyday life of Italians at the time ran so deep that a filmic mode 
is necessary in order to best examine it.  The study relates the story of the scandal surrounding 
the mysterious death of Wilma Montesi just outside Rome in 1953.  And it is rendered as a film 
script, heavily annotated with explanatory notes, a kind of meta-closet-film.  Ultimately, this 
radical experiment is motivated by the importance of foregrounding how deeply cinema was 
woven into the everyday life, and so is part of a very different sort of project than this 
dissertation.  That said, I remain willing and eager, should anyone like to option the rights, to 
adapt this dissertation or any portion thereof into a screenplay.  
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CHAPTER 1 
THE JAPANESE CLOSET FILM FROM AKUTAGAWA TO MURAKAMI 
 
 One of the very earliest practitioners of works that can productively be called “closet 
films” is the modernist author Ryunosuke Akutagawa (1892-1927).  In Japan he is a household 
name, known mostly for his short stories.  In Europe and the United States he is best known as 
the author of the 1922 short story “Yabu no naka,” or “In a Grove,” upon which Akira Kurosawa 
based his film Rashomon (1950).5  Akutagawa’s filmic legacy also lived on in two of his sons, 
the actor Hiroshi Akutagawa (1920-1981) and composer Yasushi Akutagawa (1925-1989).  But 
most notably for our purposes here, towards the end of his brief life Akutagawa began 
experimenting with cinematic form in his writing.  While at first this meant simply incorporating 
cinematic techniques of tone, structure, and montage, eventually his stories became more and 
more similarly structured to actual film scenarios.  As early as 1920, in stories like “The 
Shadow” and “Shiro the Dog” (1923), Akutagawa was dealing with issues involving the impact 
of cinema on literature and the problematics of visual representation in prose within an emerging 
Japanese cinema culture.  In even earlier works, Akutagawa had discussed film, but only as the 
content or subject matter, such as in “Unrequited Love” (1916).  But by the time he wrote stories 
like “Asakusa Park,” shortly before his suicide in 1927, he had begun a full-scale appropriation 
not only of cinema, but specifically of the film-scenario form.  This represents a distinct shift in 
modernist writing practice and its relation to cinematic form, and Akutagawa’s works represent 
some of the very earliest examples of the potential genre of the closet film.   
 There is a dearth of critical work on Akutagawa in English, especially in terms of his 
                                                
5 Akutagawa is also the author of a short story titled “Rashomon,” which has no direct relation to the film other than 
its title.   
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works’ relation to film scenario form, but what studies that do exist are quite helpful.  A.A. 
Gerow, in “The Self Seen As Other: Akutagawa and Film,” sets out by “investigating the 
possible influences of film on Akutagawa’s literary production” (197) and notes that he “did not 
frequently go to films, and when he did, often did not think much of them” (197).  What Gerow 
offers us is an excellent framework for understanding in Akutagawa’s work the twin matrices of 
a cinema/literature divide on the one hand, and a rapidly westernizing and modernizing Japan on 
the other.  He elaborates: 
Because he decided to confront the challenge of cinema not by making films but 
by attempting to express its Otherness within literature, Akutagawa was not only 
acknowledging the changing semiotic landscape of Taisho Japan, he was also 
attempting to regain control over meaning by inscribing what presented a 
threatening new language, film, in a more familiar semiotic system, literature. 
(202) 
 
Gerow’s view represents a popular position in regard to Akutagawa’s closet films: that the 
“closet” here is a kind of defensive posturing.  Closet film, in other words, is constituted by a 
reaction against film, which is represented as an encroaching, threatening force.  Gerow is 
careful to note, however, that despite the fact that “[f]ilm in Akutagawa is an alien phenomenon” 
(198), and that “cinema is articulated through the sign of the Other” and “figures as the 
preeminent sign of the fantastic… [C]inema is not wholly assimilable to this East-West 
binarism” (198).  And though cinema, Gerow claims, was dynamically opposed to the ‘i-novel,’  
a Japanese literary genre comprising aspects of naturalistic and autobiographical literature which 
was the dominant mode of fiction during the Taisho period (1912-1926), which almost perfectly 
overlaps with Akutagawa’s active career (200), we nevertheless cannot simply equate film for 
Akutagawa with cultural imperialism.  This is because, as Gerow claims, film is about a 
differentiation not only between Self and Other, but also an interior differentiation with the Self: 
“Film to Akutagawa is the creation not only of an impersonal technology, but also of a self 
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increasingly technologized, split, and unknown to itself” (199).  In Gerow’s account then, film 
represents a fulcrum in Akutagawa’s work upon which are balanced multiple fragmentations in a 
changing modern Japan: 
Akutagawa’s incorporation of cinema into his literature is a contradictory effort to 
recognize the loss of Japaneseness while simultaneously attempting to construct a 
new identity through that loss.  The presence of film in Akutagawa’s literature is 
deeply imbricated with the ambivalence and turmoil of the Taisho era, before the 
moment when literature ‘returned to Japan’ in the 1930s and less ambiguously 
served the project of constructing a homogenous national identity. (202) 
 
Though Gerow notes that “Asakusa Koen” (Asakusa Park, 1927) and “Yuwaku” (Temptation, 
1927) “are actually written in the form of film scenarios” (198), he does not differentiate 
between the different modes through which Akutagawa “incorporated… cinema into his 
literature.”  For Gerow, in other words, not much stock is placed in the differences between 
Akutagawa’s being influenced by cinema, appropriating cinematic techniques, or in utilizing 
scenario form.  Gerow’s study thus ends precisely where the present study begins: at the specific 
potentialities of the closet film form.  We will see this in a moment when we turn our attention to 
“The Shadow” (1920), and Gerow’s analysis of the text, but first we could use more critical 
background on Akutagawa. 
 Seiji M. Lippit’s work proves pivotal here, especially his article, “The Disintegrating 
Machinery of the Modern: Akutagawa Ryunosuke’s Late Writings.”  Lippit outlines the role of 
film in Akutagawa’s later writing: 
Akutagawa experimented with writing for the film medium in two works in 1927, 
“Seduction” (translated as “San Sebastian”) and “Asakusa Park.” An earlier work, 
“Kage” (Shadow, 1920), also incorporates aspects of the film scenario into its 
structure. Beyond these specific works, the general principle of montage seems to 
have had a significant impact throughout his late writings. In effect, Akutagawa 
discovered in the film scenario form a process that violently fragments literature; 
montage represents literature's dismemberment into a series of short, discrete 
units that are connected according to their contiguity rather than any linear logic 
of plot development. For Akutagawa, montage in the literary text was thus a 
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destructive, rather than constructive, principle, performing the literal dismantling 
of the novel form. (36) 
 
Lippit, like Gerow and others, doesn’t completely distinguish between Akutagawa’s literal 
appropriation of scenario form on the one hand, and the more “general principle of montage” 
informing his work on the other.  He views the one as a simple extension of the other.  Moreover, 
he sees both as mechanisms, part of Akutagawa’s larger arsenal, that adequately represent the 
fragmentary nature of modern reality.  Lippit, like Gerow, views Akutagawa’s work, and 
especially the texts written towards the end of his life, as grappling with increasing urgency with 
questions relating to the fragmentation of identity.  This approach to his stories fits neatly with 
the narrative of Akutagawa himself spiraling into madness, depression, and eventually suicide.  
Lippit writes, “Caught in the interstices between rationality and madness, between universality 
and a native cultural imaginary, Akutagawa, in his late writings, defined the outlines of an 
intellectual crisis that would haunt Japanese writers and thinkers over the coming years” (49).  It 
therefore makes some intuitive sense to position cinema as one of modernism’s main instruments 
of fragmenting reality, and Akutagawa’s use of film form in his texts as an attempt to deal 
explicitly with such questions.  But while this accounts for why Akutagawa himself chose to 
experiment so heavily with cinematic form towards the end of his life, despite the fact that, as 
Gerow points out, he was not much of a film buff, it does not offer a way in to analyzing the 
texts themselves except in terms of basically biographical considerations.  If we look at 
Akutagawa’s short stories from 1926-1927 not as the end of his life and career, but as the very 
beginning of a brand new form, as the genesis of a new literary genre, then a slightly different 
narrative emerges: one in which the potentialities of the literary representation of visual reality 
are explored and experimented with in new and exciting ways, and one which opens up the 
potentiality of fiction anew. 
  
65 
 Reading Akutagawa through the lens of the closet film thus rewrites a critical history 
centered on an established narrative in which Akutagawa’s writings, like his life, tend towards 
increasing fragmentation, destruction, negativity, and a general sense of desperation.  For 
understanding the invention of the closet film as an act of personal and literary desperation, as an 
act of last resort, constitutes an integral––but not necessarily the only––paradigm through which 
we can conceptualize the function of the “closet” in “closet film.”  Lippit writes,  
Akutagawa had been regarded by many as the archetype of the man of letters 
(bunjin) and a representative of the ideology of self-cultivation, which placed 
almost limitless faith in the value of literature and in ‘culture’ generally. Yet in 
his later writings, any coherency or unity of literary practice seems to have been 
shattered. His late writings, marked by the breakdown of literary form and 
narrative technique, seem to question the very basis of literary expression… 
Indeed, during the 1920s, the conventional boundaries of literary practice came 
under assault from a variety of phenomena, including both the growing emphasis 
on class consciousness and the increasing demand for literature to engage social 
reality, as well as the rise of popular fiction and other forms of mass culture 
(particularly through newer media such as film). (29) 
 
Pivotally, it was only in Akutagawa’s latest writings that the form of his literary endeavors 
changed at the most basic level.  Lippit asserts, “While Akutagawa had always inscribed a 
variety of linguistic styles in his early works, they had more or less obeyed the demands of the 
short story form. These late writings, however, represent a collapse in the boundaries of genre; 
Akutagawa’s writings dissolve into a multiplicity of form” (34).  So it is only at the very end that 
Akutagawa broke completely from established form, looking for something wholly other.  We 
should note, however, that he did not only find the screenplay.  Indeed, Lippit offers a whole 
catalogue of forms Akutagawa experimented with in 1927: 
In just the last months of his life, for example, he produced works in a multiplicity 
of genres. They include those that tend to be classified as I-novels (“Cogwheels” 
and “Mirage”), but also the fictional story “Genkaku Sanbo” (The House of 
Genkaku); a fragmentary text that he called an “autobiographical esquisse” (“A 
Fool’s Life”); a satire that he modeled on Gulliver’s Travels (Kappa); two 
experimental film scenarios (“Yuiwaku” {Seduction and “Asakusa Koen” 
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{Asakusa Park]); a “sketch” of Tokyo (“Honjo Ryugoku”); as well as various 
critical essays (including his most important critical works, “Saiho no hito” [The 
Western Man] and “Literary, All Too Literary”), a series of aphorisms (“Juppon 
no hari” [Ten Needles]), and different forms of poetry (including tanka and 
haiku). (34) 
 
With so much breadth and variety, it is easy to see why his use of screenplay format has been 
overlooked.  Nevertheless, for our purposes here the few experiments Akutagawa conducted with 
scenario form are pivotal in establishing some of the earliest parameters of the closet film. 
 Lippit understands this variety as the desperate act of a man grappling with depression 
and seeking to find meaning before ultimately failing to do so.  Akutagawa’s intense generic 
experimentation is reduced to a signifier of his failure and his impending demise.  Lippit’s 
analysis of “A Fool’s Life” (also translated as “The Life of a Stupid Man”) is case in point.  He 
describes it appropriately as “an unclassifiable work, a mixture of diverse genres that contains 
aspects of the autobiography, prose poem, lyric, short story, confessional novel, film scenario, 
and aphorism” (35).  Elsewhere it has even been called a “closet screenplay,” and Quimby 
Melton lists it in his ongoing closet screenplay bibliography since it can be construed as such, 
though it fits in the genre only loosely.  Lippit asserts,  
The work also appears to incorporate formal elements of the film scenario; it is, in 
effect, constructed as of a series of isolated, momentary scenes of his life that 
have been edited together. The work’s structure reveals Akutagawa’s inability to 
create a novelistic narrative of his life; he instead reduced the story to a 
succession of separate moments in time that are stitched together to form a 
somewhat disjointed, patchwork personal history. In this sense, the main 
technique Akutagawa deploys in this work is montage: it consists of a series of 
rapid shifts between seemingly random events, without reference to any sense of 
logical or linear development. The material body of the text––the graphic 
laceration of the work and prominent blank spaces between the scenes––seems to 
reflect the complete breakdown of Akutagawa’s faith in the capacity of fiction, 
and narrative in general, as a vehicle of self-expression. (36) 
 
It is this sense of failure that defines Lippit’s view of Akutagawa’s final works, but that is not the 
only way we can conceive of them.  For, quite to the contrary, they are also exciting, new, 
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revolutionary texts that pave the way for a potential, if marginalized, subgenre to take root and 
grow over the ensuing century.  While the content of the stories might deal with grave issues 
(madness, depression, alienation, etc.), Akutagawa’s formal play constitutes an energetic 
engagement with these problems.   
 Take, for example, “Kage” (“The Shadow,” 1920), one of Akutagawa’s earliest stories 
that engages fully with cinema, but also one of his most fully developed meditations on 
temporality, the gaze, scopophilia, and paranoia.  Though this text predates by several years 
Akutagawa’s attempts to utilize actual film scenario formatting, “Kage” sets up most of the 
principle themes and concerns that run throughout Akutagawa’s late career, and especially his 
very final efforts at experimenting with film form in stories like “Asakusa Park.”  “Kage” is 
marked off by section titles that simply state the location: Yokohama, Tokyo, and Kamakura.  In 
the first section, a man named Chen receives a letter alleging that his wife is cheating on him.  In 
the second, Chen’s wife Fusako becomes oddly convinced someone is watching her.  In the very 
short third section, Imanishi gazes at a photograph of Fusako.  In the fourth section, a man 
named Yoshii reports to Chen that all the while he’s been watching Fusako he has not seen 
anything suspicious.  In the fifth, Chen goes home and spies on Fusako himself.  Hidden by 
darkness, he himself can only see the silhouette of a male figure in her room.  He sneaks in, 
listens from outside her room, then lowers his eye to the keyhole: “The scene that flashes upon 
Chen’s vision will haunt him forever” (100).  Abruptly the section ends and we find ourselves 
back in Yokohama, where Imanishi finally stops staring at the image of Fusako.  He gets up and 
starts typing another letter to Chen.  The next section brings us back to Chen’s home in 
Kamakura, where something very strange happens.  Having forced his way into the bedroom, 
Chen,  
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immobile in the corner, stares at the two bodies on the bed, one lying upon the 
other.  The one below is Fusako––or perhaps was Fusako till moments before.  
The entire face swollen and purple, the tongue protrudes halfway from the mouth 
and the partly closed eyes gaze toward the ceiling.  The figure on top is Chen Cai, 
the very replica of the Chen Cai in the corner.  The fingernails of this figure are 
buried in the flesh of Fusako’s neck, and the head rests upon her naked breasts. 
(101) 
 
The rest of the scene offers little in the way of resolution: the two Chens stare at each other in 
dread and demand to know who the other is.  This gets them nowhere, and they both seem to 
give in to despair.  The final section takes us to a whole new location, a theater in Tokyo, where 
a man, sitting with a woman, has just finished watching a movie called “The Shadow.”  But the 
woman is apparently confused when the man says, “ ‘So that’s how it ends,’ ” (102), as if they 
haven’t watched a film at all.  They check the program and there is no film called “The Shadow” 
listed there.  He wonders if he had been dreaming or something, and tells her about the film.  She 
says she has also seen this film before, and one of them––it is unclear which––suggests they 
simply drop it altogether.   
 The bulk of the story is therefore rendered, by the last section, as retrospectively filmic––
or possible something entirely else, a dream, or a vision.  Gerow’s analysis of the story is 
insightful: 
One could simply categorize ‘Kage’ as another in Akutagawa’s modernist 
explorations of the ambiguities of knowledge and subjectivity.  What is 
noteworthy, however, is that this episode, and ‘Kage’s’ entire story, revolves 
around cinema and the process of viewing, being suffused with and structured by 
characteristics one can call cinematic.  It does not merely attach film to a story to 
lend a fashionable air to a marketable literary text, but rather confronts the filmic 
phenomenon from a serious critical standpoint, delving into the nature of cinema 
and its possible uses for literature.  ‘Kage’ is cinematic not in the trite sense of 
being ‘visual,’ but in being a text that apparently owes the form of its existence to 
the contemporary appearance of the cinema in Japan. (197) 
 
Gerow also notes that the text’s “primary story is itself structured around and through a 
cinematic metaphor” (198) and that “the plot [is] structured with flashbacks and parallel 
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montage…” (197).  He sums this up: “ ‘Kage’ is seemingly about viewing and the power and 
nature of the gaze, connecting paranoia, scopophilia, and visual investigation to the subjectivity 
of the film viewer” (198).   
The story hinges on raising and deferring questions regarding exactly who is watching 
whom.  At first, it is unclear whether Fusako might feel like she is being watched because 
Imanishi is staring at a photograph of her.  This is accomplished with the abrupt juxtaposition of 
her increasingly irrational sense that someone must be watching her, even when she turns the 
lights on, etc., with the immediately following image of Imanishi quite literally watching her, in 
the photograph.  But even when it is revealed that it is Yoshii who has been watching her, this 
doesn’t solve anything, since it then turns out, after Chen himself begins watching her, that, 
mysteriously, some other version of Chen has been watching her (and indeed has been murdering 
her) as well.  Whether this alternate-Chen simply represents another part of Chen’s split 
consciousness, or Chen from another point in time (i.e., future Chen, after he paradoxically 
catches Fusako cheating on him with himself, and subsequently murders her), or some other 
possibility, is left radically ambiguous.  This ambiguity is cast into further doubt by the mise en 
abyme structure in which the whole story is first revealed to be a film, and then even this is 
undermined, when that film is shown to have not actually been screened.  But even then, when 
we think it might have simply been the unnamed man’s dream, the unnamed woman claims to 
have also previously seen the film version of the man’s dream/vision/memory.  The “truth” of 
“what really happens” in the story is thus cast into an infinitely regressing series of Russian-doll 
paradoxes.   
 For this reason it makes a lot of sense for Gerow to understand what Akutagawa was up 
to here in terms of a rejection of cinematic realism: 
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Basic to Akutagawa’s portrayal of the fantastic quality of the cinematic medium is 
a questioning of the indexicality of the cinematic sign.  It is this quality of being a 
trace of a profilmic event authenticated by a technology considered scientific that 
is usually seen as justifying the characterization of film as an art of truly recording 
reality. ‘Kage’ in particular questions this as well as the ontological status of the 
art form itself by portraying a filmic text that is not a trace of a profilmic reality, 
but rather a work whose own reality has been put in doubt. In Akutagawa, the 
rationalistic forms of creation represented by cinema are themselves strange and 
Other, marking modernity and industry as somehow beyond the Japanese norm” 
(198). 
 
But, again, implicit here is the idea that literary realism is somehow opposed to cinematic 
realism, and that a written film, a kind of closet film even, necessarily constitutes a defensive 
posturing against an encroaching modern Western technology.  However, it is not only cinema, 
but indeed all forms of gazing, whose connection to reality is here called into question.  The 
question of whether the film in the story traces a profilmic reality or not is not even askable, 
since the very existence of the film itself is so radically uncertain.  In other words, Gerow wants 
to understand the story as a critique of a simpleminded understanding of film’s scientific claim to 
objective realism.  While it certainly is that, it is a lot more, as well.  For not only does it call into 
question the objectivity of all such gazing, from the actual human eye to the dream to the short 
story to the film, but indeed the story hinges on particularly literary tricks in order to do so.  For 
while throughout the story, the different sections (or, we could say, scenes) are both clearly 
filmable and function primarily through visual juxtaposition and montage, it clearly showcases 
literature’s ability to accomplish these effects.  That we read it first as a short story and then 
retrospectively as a film demonstrates the relative irrelevance of that very realization: rereading 
the text as a description of a film (or dream, or etc.,) is no different than reading it as a 
description of an anterior (or profilmic) reality.  In other words, what is exposed by the very trick 
of retrospective recasting of the ontological status of the previous text is the failure of models of 
realism which rely on our understanding any given text as the representation of a specific reality 
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(anterior or profilmic), outside the reality of the text, instead of on its own terms: the ontology of 
fiction.  
 In some of Akutagawa’s very last works though, he took his experimentation with 
cinematic form one step further, imbricating the fabric of fiction and film in a wholly original 
way.  Instead of simply appropriating and translating filmic techniques into literature, 
Akutagawa began actually using the form of silent film scenario writing in his own stories.  For 
example, “Asakusa Park” (published in April of 1927), one of Akutagawa’s final works, is a 
dark, imagistic, surrealistic story of a lost boy (oddly, he is described as twelve or thirteen, 
though in the story he seems more like nine or ten) at the intersection of western consumerism 
and Japanese tradition (a shopping center featuring western-style goods being sold near an old 
Japanese temple).  Our attention is immediately drawn towards the strong emphasis on vision 
and seeing, both in terms of what we see as camera/audience, and what the boy is able to or not 
able to see in the story.  A few examples from the opening sections: “We look out across…“ (1), 
“The Nakamise seen vertically” (2), the father “gazes into a hat store” (3), “A toy store seen at an 
angle” (5), and later: “A pumpkin field gradually comes into focus beyond the signs” (33).6  In a 
more dramatic example, after the boy has lost track of his father: 
12 
The window of an eyeglass shop.  Among a row of concave glasses, convex 
glasses, binoculars, magnifying glasses, microscopes, and protective glasses, sits 
the head of a Western doll, smiling and wearing a pair of glasses.  The boy 
standing in front of this window.  Seem [sic] from the waist up, at an angle from 
behind.  The doll’s head changes into a human head.  It speaks to the boy: 
13 
“You must buy a pair of glasses.  The glasses will help you find your father.” 
“There is nothing wrong with my eyes.” 
 
We should note that the numbers clearly do not refer to individual scenes, but sections that 
represent beats or moments within scenes, potentially individual shots.  The use of the numbered 
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sections is not necessarily a formally cinematic component here, though it can be read that way; 
rather, it is the use of a second-person plural seeing, as well as references to focus and angle, 
which mark the text as clearly cinematic.  Later in the story, a helpful metaphor signals for us the 
problematic genre of the very piece we’re reading: “A rectangular sign on which is written: ‘an 
XYZ Production: Lost Child.  A Literary Film.’ It changes into a sandwich man with this 
signboard in front and back” (49).  The question perhaps, with “Asakusa Park,” is whether to 
conceive of it as a literary film or a filmic piece of literature. 
 In another important moment, the thematics of vision are allegorically interwoven with 
the problematics of cultural imperialism: 
59 
A concrete wall that leaves visible only a sliver of sky.  The wall becomes 
transparent on its own, revealing several monkeys crowding together behind iron 
bars.  Then the entire wall changes into a puppet stage.  The stage consists of a 
Western-style room.  There, a puppet of a Westerner nervously looks about.  
Given the puppet’s mask, it appears to be a thief who has snuck into the room.  In 
the corner of the room is a safe. 
60 
The puppet Westerner breaking into the safe.  Some of the strings attached to the 
puppet’s hands and feet are clearly visible…. 
 
On one hand, the boy in the story is subject to threats from shady, possibly western figures like 
the thief-puppet, but, on the other hand, the boy also seems to identify with the puppet here, 
since he himself is “nervously look[ing] about” for his father.  It might be tempting to suggest a 
reading in which the film scenario is a western cultural form imposing itself on traditional 
Japanese forms, but the allegorical relationships between the story’s surrealistic images and its 
own form seem more complicated than that, and trouble the easy parallels they seem to raise. 
 Haruki Murakami’s introduction to the collection of Akutagawa’s works that contains 
“The Life of a Stupid Man,” but not “Asakusa Park,” may offer some insight.  Murakami is a 
                                                                                                                                                       
6 Citations are to section numbers, not page numbers. 
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Japanese author especially attuned to the fraught relationship between traditional form and the 
appropriation of western literary models.  His novels often thematize that very problematic in 
overt ways (see below for an extended discussion of Murakami’s novel, Hard-Boiled 
Wonderland and the End of the World).  He argues that 
Akutagawa successfully imported his propensity for modernism into a fictional 
world in the borrowed container of the folktale.  In other words, he succeeded in 
giving his modernism a 'story' by skillfully adapting the pre-modern––the 
medieval tale form that had flourished almost a thousand years earlier.  Instead of 
creating a purely modernistic literature, he first transposed his modernism into a 
different form.  This was his literary starting point, and it was an extremely 
stylish, intellectual approach. (xxviii) 
 
Murakami thus understands the way Akutagawa sought to deal with the problematics of 
combining a rapidly modernizing Japanese culture as a formal problem (xxix), developed in part 
because Akutagawa did not connect with the Realist trends of either Marxist fiction or the 
Japanese 'I-novel’ (xxx).  In the end, however, Murakami suggests that Akutagawa was never 
fully able to resolve the conflicts in his literary identity between Japan and the West: “Joining the 
two cultural systems through a clever technique is never more than a temporary solution to the 
problem.  Eventually, the bond just falls apart” (xxxiv).  While Murakami is not thinking 
explicitly here about the “clever technique” of adopting film scenario form, we might understand 
this as one of the “props” that Akutagawa experimented with towards the end of his life.  The 
origin of the closet film we might thus understand as an attempt not to compete with or get away 
from the cinema, but to combine two different forms into something wholly other, something 
distinct unto itself: what Akutagawa, with some measure of irony, calls a “literary film.”   
 Instead of a reading Akutagawa’s later works as a desperate and even failed defense 
against cinema as an encroaching and threatening form––driving literature out of business, as it 
were––we can additionally understand his formal experimentation as an exciting celebration of 
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the potentiality of capitalizing on new forms of representation.  For example, we might see the 
details through which Akutagawa renders the dark surrealistic images of “Asakusa Park” as 
meticulously drawn from the liberating gaze of the camera lens, offering an ability to go 
everywhere, to offer some objectivity to the narration and thus drawing our attention more 
closely to the character, and, perhaps most prominently, to guide our eye very carefully through 
the details of the story.   
 And furthermore, the manipulation of elements within the narrative––like angle, focus, 
and the rhythm created by numbering sections in terms of individual “shots”––casts into stark 
relief the fact that the story we are reading is not a representation of an anterior reality unless we 
take that reality as mediated by a filmic one.  That is, as we read what presents itself to us as a 
film scenario, we have to imagine the text as a film.  Unlike in “Kage,” where it is eventually 
revealed that what we have been reading is some kind of representation of a film, here we are 
from the get-go asked to imagine the text as a sort of potential film.  But there is a pivotal 
distinction created by the use of scenario form that distinguishes texts that simply claim to 
represent films from ones that are written in scenario or screenplay form: film scenarios are an 
actual production element of actual filmic production.  The potential film generated by a closet 
film such as “Asakusa Park” thus operates in a different ontological mode from those of stories 
like “Kage.”  With the former, we are asked to imagine the film that could potentially be 
produced as a result of the blueprint we are reading, whereas in the later we are asked simply to 
imagine the story as a movie that already exists.  In the latter case, in other words, the potential 
film is already made.  It is identical with the story we have been reading.  But in the former case, 
we are given a sort of choice.  We can read imagining the story as film, or we can read imagining 
the story as a script for a possible film, a “real” one, one that would need to be cast, designed, 
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and shot with a crew and a budget.  The point here, in other words, is that closet films like 
“Asakusa Park” underscore their filmicness in a distinct and much deeper way than those like 
“Kage,” though they are much, much more rare.  Texts written in scenario form are in some 
sense more cinematic than texts which simply claim to be, or are revealed to be, representations 
of cinematic realities.  Akutagawa’s late works help parse out the distinct mechanisms through 
which this distinction and intensification of cinema form take place. 
 Let us take a closer look at his story “Yuiwaku” (1927), translated variously as 
“Seduction,” “Temptation,” or “San Sebastian.”  I should preface this discussion by noting the 
extent to which this work, which I am arguing constitutes a founding document of closet film, 
has been widely overlooked in the West.  It exists in only one full English translation, and in an 
unlikely place at that: The Real Tripitaka is a study about––and collection of short stories 
relating to––the life of the historical seventh-century Chinese pilgrim of that name.  Listed here 
as “San Sebastian,” it is contextualized as offering a window into the “Christian Period” of 
seventeenth century Japan, rather than for its wholly original and exceptionally notable formal 
innovation.  Arthur Waley does note briefly in his Introduction to “San Sebastian” that 
Akutagawa wrote “a few pieces… in scenario form, using it, however, simply as a literary form, 
with no thought of having films made” (224), of which this is a prime example, but the text’s 
inclusion here is clearly motivated by its content (the role of Christianity in medieval Asia) 
rather than its form.   
 “San Sebastian” is organized as a listed series of “shots,” and it does not shy away from 
specifically filmic language, such as camera direction.  For example: “Shot 3. Close-up of the 
sailing-ship running before the wind” (225).  The story describes the surrealistic encounter 
between a Catholic hermit and the captain of a Dutch sailing ship.  Waley describes it as 
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“broadly speaking an allegory of the struggle between the spiritual and material, or, as 
Akutagawa puts it in his note-books, between ‘religion’ and ‘politics’ ” (224), though it also 
clearly continues Akutagawa’s meditations on the encroachment of Western forms and cultural 
imperialism.  Titling the piece “San Sebastian,” rather than the more intuitive and direct 
translation of “Temptation” or “Seduction,” perhaps obscures this political valence: the 
temptation of the Catholic padre by the Dutch trader, who seems to offer, on behalf the East 
India company perhaps, the world and the stars.  In Shot 33, the Dutchman, having disembarked 
from his ship, offers Sebastian a telescope, and Shots 34-39 show us separate views through a 
telescope of different absurd domestic happenings in Dutch homes.  This culminates in the 
captain plucking a star from the sky and placing it in the palm of Sebastian’s hand, at which 
point “Sebastian, trembling from hand to foot, struggles frantically to make the sign of the Cross; 
but this time he seems utterly unable to do so” (231), at which point the star morphs into a 
pebble, a potato, a butterfly, and finally “a diminutive Napoleon, in cocked-hat and uniform” 
(231).  Sebastian is eventually able to overcome the temptation by clinging to the Cross (233-
234), but the scenario ends with the goatee-bearded Dutch sea-captain, a clear parallel for the 
ultimate tempter, Satan, sitting comfortably in his living room, smoking a cigarette (234).   
 Characteristically, however, Akutagawa complicates a simple allegorical narrative in 
which an encroaching Western-Other tempts and is barely defeated by an original Japanese Self.  
Akutagawa’s Sebastian is here clearly a recent convert, ostensibly by the Spanish and Portuguese 
missionaries who in the early seventeenth century converted thousands of Japanese to 
Catholicism, despite resistance and persecution by the Tokugawa shogunate during the early Edo 
period.  What is authentically Japanese here is thus already called into question.  The temptation 
by the Dutch seacaptain is essentially secular, since what is in it for him in the suppression of 
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(Spanish/Portuguese) Catholicism is the potential for a Dutch trading monopoly (as in fact was 
historically constituted).  In another complicated maneuver, Akutagawa demonstrates the first 
effects of the Dutchman’s temptation before the seacaptain actually arrives: 
Shot 12.  Sebastian’s hands, joined in prayer.  They seem now to be holding 
something.  It is a Dutch tobacco-pipe.  At first it does not seem to be alight, but 
presently curls of smoke begin to rise from it. 
Shot 13.  Inside the cave.  Sebastian scrambles to his feet and flings the pipe on to 
the rocky floor of the cave.  As it lies there, smoke continues to rise from it just as 
before.  He looks bewildered, but makes no further attempt to do anything about 
it. (226) 
 
After this the pipe begins to morph into a flask of a wine, a sugared bun, and then a diminutive 
geisha (226-227).  In this confusion of linear causality, as well as the ontological instability 
effected by the morphing pipe, a simple binary (whether East-West, politics-religion, old-new, or 
whatever) is rendered unavailable. 
 This is perhaps most clearly expressed in the formal experimentation at play here.  
Akutagawa’s appropriation of scenario form is complicated by the evocation of special effects 
techniques that likely would have seemed all but technically unfilmable in 1927.  For example: 
Shot 5.  The head of the murdered sailor, face upward.  Suddenly a long-tailed 
monkey crawls out of one of his nostrils and squats on his chin.  It takes a good 
look round and then, as though satisfied with what it has seen, crawls back again 
into the dead sailor’s nostril. (225) 
 
or, 
Shot 24.  Sebastian’s right ear.  Out of the lobe grows a tree, heavily laden with 
clusters of round fruit.  The ear-hole is a meadow with bright flowers growing 
among the grass.  The grass is stirred by a gentle breeze. (228) 
 
Uncannily, with its abrupt juxtapositions and radically plasmatic formal play, Akutagawa’s 
scenario recalls the films of the French Surrealists (see Chapter Two below), such as The 
Seashell and the Clergyman (1928) and Un Chien Andalou (1929), well in advance of those 
productions, let alone their ubiquity in Japan.  In a striking way, “San Sebastian” might be 
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understood as a Surrealist Film avant la lettre.  It even predates the early Disney animations 
(again, see Chapter Two below) that “invented” some of these techniques.  It is difficult to posit 
whether Akutagawa imagined his text was using unfilmable descriptions or if he was imagining 
the potential special effects of films to come.  But in any case he was pushing the limits of the 
filmable in scenario form. 
 What is more pressing, for our purposes here, is the question of what it means to 
represent the dramatic and surrealistic staging of this conflict between Dutch economic interests 
and Japanese Catholicism specifically in the form of a film scenario.  The primary effect here is 
that, with every repeated invocation of a “Shot,” the reader is reminded to imagine a film as the 
intermediary reality between the text and the posited diegetic world of Edo Japan.  This insistent 
framing radically fictionalizes and historicizes the narrative in a way that it utterly inaccessible to 
other literary forms.  That fact of the potential film’s anti-realism is thus pivotal here.  What is 
invoked is a complicated matrix of conflicts: between the spiritual and material, between the 
literary and the filmic, etc., without these binaries lining up neatly with each other.  The reader’s 
phenomenological experience is one of imagining the defining conflicts of feudal Japan through 
the lens of a perpetually fictionalizing process.  That is, the story does not represent a view, 
allegorical or otherwise, of a seventeenth-century Japanese coastal mountain, but rather is a 
procedure of constantly representing precisely the representation of that image of Japan.  And yet 
it does so gracefully, without disjointedly fragmenting the reader’s experience in ways other 
experimental and avant-garde fiction tend to do when attempting to complicate the reader’s 
desire to posit a coherent diegetic reality through the use of metafiction and other anti-
illusionistic devices.   
 And there is a logical reason why the closet film would be so good at doing this, 
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seamlessly interweaving the telling of a narrative while simultaneously disrupting the conceit of 
its own claim to reality.  And that is that we already do exactly this, to some extent, anyway.  
That is, when we in the age of cinema read, we are already playing a film in the screening room 
of our mind’s eye.  If we already read as if a text represented a reality always already mediated 
through film form, then perhaps the closet film’s relative unpopularity is partly a result of its 
quasi-redundancy.  But there is a pronounced distinction between reading a text as if there were 
a film and reading a text that explicitly invokes the production aspects of cinema.  It emphasizes 
our role as creator of the text, it renders traditional Realism obsolete, since the referent is 
cinematic rather than “real,” and it historicizes in a different sense altogether.  Rather than 
establishing a nostalgic past as if it were real, closet film views the past as a visual construction 
of the past.  Ironically, perhaps the most illustrative example of this principle comes not from 
closet film at all but from an actual film: Kubrick’s Barry Lyndon (1975), in which we in the 
twentieth century understand the visual reality of the eighteenth century only by constructing it 
through the intermediary aesthetic of eighteenth century painting.  In much the same way, what 
Akutagawa’s foundational texts of closet film effect is a representation of feudal Japan in which 
we can only conceptualize what that looks like through the intermediary of cinema.  Perhaps the 
real resistance to closet film, the real reason it holds so much less sway than its sister genre, 
closet drama, is that it bears something inherently threatening to our deeply held attachment to 
Cinematic Realism, to a view, in other words, of the film text in which it directly (if complexly) 
represents an anterior reality.  Closet film, it would seem, might be a potentially revolutionary 
form, and it is high time we cease to overlook it as a genre.   
 More than half a century after Akutagawa’s initial experiments in the form, the 
contemporary Japanese novelist Haruki Murakami has picked up this thread of experimental 
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fiction written in the margins between film and the novel while thematizing issues of orientalism 
and cultural imperialism and appropriation.  Though Murakami does not utilize screenplay form 
in his novels, and his works are not by any measure “closet films,” a more extended discussion 
of his work is warranted here since he is very much the postmodern inheritor of Akutagawa’s 
modernist experimentations with potential cinema.  With the exception (discussed in the 
Introduction, above) of Infinite Jest, perhaps no novel goes further with creatively refiguring the 
cinematicity of text than Murakami’s Hard-Boiled Wonderland and the End of the World (first 
published in 1985 and translated into English in 1991).  While not immediately clear from a 
surface reading, the novel focuses pivotally in the internalization of cinematic thought and the 
way it structures the everyday life of a typical mid-eighties Tokyo urbanite.  At the level of plot, 
everything in this novel spirals from the central fact that its antagonist’s career as a film editor 
was disrupted by World War II.  
 On the formal level, the novel itself is split into two distinct narratives, “Hard-Boiled 
Wonderland” (hereafter HBW) and “The End of the World” (hereafter EotW).  In HBW, an 
unnamed man in a futuristic alternative Tokyo who launders information using his uniquely 
structured brain gets caught up in a Chandler-esque detective mystery.  In the EotW section, 
another unnamed man arrives in a vaguely allegorical town named The End of the World, where, 
separated from his Shadow, he learns to read dreams from unicorn skulls.  Not only do the 
alternating chapters strictly follow this narrative dualism, but also much of the book’s design 
reinforces it.  In the HBW chapters, “Hard-Boiled Wonderland” is written on the heading of the 
left-hand, even-numbered pages.  In the EotW chapters, “The End of the World” is written on the 
heading of the right-hand, odd-numbered pages.  In the Table of Contents, each of the respective 
sections follows a distinct naming convention.  The HBW chapter titles (which comprise the 
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twenty odd-numbered chapters, 1-39) are each comprised of three distinct things mentioned in 
the chapter.  For example: “Elevator, Silence, Overweight,” “Skull, Lauren Bacall, Library,” or 
“Rainy-Day Laundry, Car Rental, Bob Dylan.”  The EotW chapter titles (comprising the twenty 
even-numbered chapters, 2-40) are generally shorter, describe one central image from the 
chapter, and are rendered in the Table of Contents in italics.  For example: “Golden Beasts,” 
“Shadow,” and “Dreamreading.”  At the beginning of each chapter is a low-resolution black-
and-white image, about the size and shape of a postage stamp, though apparently having been 
torn from the pages of a notebook.  For the HBW chapters, the image is spiral, ringed with 
musical notations, with a musical staff running through it.  It appears to be a kind of spiral clef.  
For the EotW chapters, there is an obscure landscape image of what appears to be a mountain 
road or possibly a river, with two tree stumps in the foreground.  Neither image is ever directly 
referenced anywhere in the novel.  Though both sections are rendered in first-person narration, 
the HBW section is written in past tense, the EotW section in present (to reflect an otherwise 
untranslatable grammatical distinction in forms of the first person in Japanese). 
 I am emphasizing the material differences in the book’s construction of the novel’s two 
narratives at such length because much of the experience of reading this novel is entirely bound 
up in the attempt to figure out the precise nature of the relationship between the two sections.  
Indeed, the entire project of the book is precisely shaped around this question, and the deeper one 
looks into it the more complex this relatively simple-looking novel becomes.  For if at times 
Murakami seems to set each section up along an axis of East/West, Self/Other, Film/Novel, 
Conscious/Unconscious, Totalitarianism/Democracy, Reality/Fantasy, and a host of other 
available binarisms here, then the complicated nature with which the narrative plays itself out 
temporally serves only to blur, complicate, and interweave these concepts.  Indeed, in doing so 
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Murakami has borrowed two major lessons from Akutagawa’s late experiments in form.  On one 
hand, the rendering of Japanese selfhood here is as much internally split as it is externally.  The 
novel foregrounds generic and formal distinctions between East and West, but it also delves into 
the historical disruptions within a particularly Japanese context.  If it is tempting, in other words, 
to see the two narratives as embodying different sides of a Japanese/American coin––and it 
certainly is at times, as the novel clearly emphasizes its own hybridity in this regard––then it is at 
least as possible to read the two narratives as conjoining the two halves of a purely Japanese 
coin, on either side of World War II.  And, on the other hand, all of this is bound up in overtly 
cinematic terms.  One (oversimplified) way of reading the novel is to take at face value the 
possibility that the EotW narrative is the cinematic unconscious of the conscious literary reality 
of the protagonist in the HBW narrative.  I will explain what this means below at length, but I 
point it out here to highlight the depth to Akutagawa, who similarly struggled and experimented 
(quite successfully) with combining multiple dualistic matrices (East/West, Ego/Id, 
Film/Literature).  As I will shortly demonstrate, much of this turns on the central character of the 
Grandfather, the old professor, about whose past we learn two pivotal pieces of information and 
not much else.  First, that he is responsible for the neurosurgery that altered the protagonist’s 
brain such that his conscious and unconscious mind can (or must?) be rendered by two such 
different narratives.  And second, that in his youth, before the war, he had been a film editor.   
 The first chapter opens in the HBW narrative with an unnamed man traveling in a huge, 
soundless elevator.  As he continues to wait in the elevator, which moves so imperceptibly he 
cannot be sure whether it is moving or not, he separately counts the change in the left and right 
pockets of his pants, and subsequently muses on the strange nature of this hobby: “Whether or 
not I really do put the right and left sides of my brain to separate accounts, I honestly can’t say.  
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A specialist in neurophysiology might have insights to offer on the matter.  I’m no 
neurophysiologist, however” (3).  This is an ironic observation because, unbeknownst to our 
unnamed protagonist, who we will come to know only as the Calcutec––none of the characters in 
either section of the novel is ever given a name—he is on his way to meet with precisely a 
neurophysiologist, and one intimately familiar with the Calcutec’s own mind at that.  Calcutecs, 
of which our hero is simply a “lower-echelon field independent” (27), belong to the “quasi-
governmental” (33) organization called the System, a data encryption corporation.  Their rivals 
are the Semiotecs, who work for the Factory, also known as the “Data Mafia,” since “it does bear 
a marked resemblance in its rhizomic penetration to various other underworld organizations” 
(33).  Semiotecs “traffic illegally obtained data and other information on the black market, 
making megaprofits” (33), whereas the Calcutecs, in theory, keep data safe.  After a bout of 
minor anxiety about this odd elevator, he eventually elects to do nothing, and comforts himself, 
“I was here in proper accordance with my duties.  No need to worry, no cause for alarm” (6).  
Eventually he emerges into a “gloomy, featureless” hallway where he encounters a young 
woman in a pink suit who motions for him to follow her, and who silently forms words with her 
mouth that he happens to be able to read, though not always accurately, and whom the Calcutec 
repeatedly describes as “beautiful” and “fat” (6-8).  By the end of the chapter, all that has 
transpired, plotwise, is that she has led him, silently, to room 728 (11).   
 Our initial impression of the Calcutec is shaped around references to Western pop culture 
(“Henry Fonda in Warlock” (6), for example, or his incorrect reading of the girl’s lips as 
articulating “Proust” (9))7, and his comparisons of this odd place to the mundane aspects of his 
                                                
7 References to Western popular and material culture are almost manically sustained throughout the novel.  A very  
abbreviated list would contain whiskey (67), Coke (69), Hemingway (70), Bogart and Bacall in Key Largo (71), 
fast-food (72), John Ford (77), Kubrick (81), the Marx Brothers (93), Johnny Mathis (94), Nike (129), Star Trek 
(132), Budweiser (132), Godard (132), Turgenev (162) along with Dostoevsky, Tolstoy and Stendhal (163), 
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lifestyle: “You don’t get this much going over when you visit the Bank of Japan” (5), or, “Sex is 
an extremely subtle undertaking, unlike going to the department store on Sunday to buy a 
thermos” (8).  He is a remarkably compelling character, especially since he seems so clearly a 
representation of a cynical, unemotional, and all-around boring Tokyo yuppie.  This kind of dry 
wit, which itself overwhelms the characters unknowingly performing it, is a trademark of 
Murakami’s, and demonstrates his debt to, amongst, others, American noir writers, especially 
Raymond Chandler.  But the humor here is so subtly interwoven, it rewards only a kind of 
paranoid attention to detail.  For example, after the Calcutec has been musing about the way the 
girl’s cologne sends him on his own “nostalgic yet impossible pastiche of sentiments” (9), he 
asks her, “Long corridor, eh?”  (9), to which she replies, in his estimation of her silent moving 
lips, “Proust” (9).  Of course, what seems to have occurred is that the Calcutec’s own reverie 
regarding evocative sense-memories somehow itself evoked for him Proust’s famous madeleine-
scene, but this is never directly mentioned, and the Calcutec never himself puts this together.  In 
fact, the connection is so tenuous the reader might just as well consider this a sloppy or otherwise 
weird moment in which it was Murakami himself who didn’t catch his own reference.  But what 
is clear in any case is that this ironic humor immediately effects at least three levels of 
disconnection: between the Calcutec and the girl, between the Calcutec and himself, and between 
the Calcutec and the greater environment in which he finds himself, in the form here of the total 
absence of sound.   
 The second chapter launches the reader into a radically different scenario.  The dramatic 
shift in setting, tone and even grammatical tense––reflecting in the translation a similar shift in 
the Japanese pronoun for “I”––immediately places the reader into a whole new narrative, The 
                                                                                                                                                       
Hitchcock (340), The Wizard of Oz (341), Schonberg (344), Bob Dylan (345), Maugham (358), Ray Charles (364), 
and  Miller High Life (387). 
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End of the World, in which another unnamed protagonist arrives in a “Town” we will come to 
learn is also called The End of the World.  He describes one of the town’s prominent features, a 
herd of “Beasts” that live there.  These are unicorns, though he doesn’t use this term, describing 
them rather as small horselike animals bearing a “long, single horn protruding from the middle of 
their forehead” (13).  The Town, a map of which is featured in the frontmatter of the novel, is 
comprised of the generic features of a medieval European village, with a stone wall, watchtower, 
and a central clock tower.  Like the elevator in Chapter One, which the Calcutec describes as a 
“hermetically sealed vault” (2), this place is closed off to the outside world: “This West Gate is, 
to my knowledge, the sole passage in and out of the Town.  The entire community is surrounded 
by an enormous Wall, almost thirty feet high, which only birds can clear” (15).  But where the 
first chapter’s main tonal feature was precisely the complete absence of noise and muted tactile 
sensations, here the narrator focuses on brilliant color and sound: “Spring passed, summer ended, 
and just now as the light takes on a diaphanous glow and the first gusts of autumn ripple the 
waters of the streams, changes become visible in the beasts.  Golden hairs emerge, in scant 
patches at first, chance germinations of some unseasonable herb” (12-13).  He also notes the call 
of the Gatekeeper’s horn: “Whenever I hear the horn, I close my eyes and let the gentle tones 
spread through me.  They are like none other” (13).  
 The town, in other words, seems in odds ways both parallel to and the polar opposite of 
the Calcutec’s world.  For example, in some ways the Town seems idyllic, Utopian, though with 
a clear aura of ominous portent.  The world of HBW, on the other hand, appears immediately 
dystopian, urban, imprisoning, but with the oddly reassuring and generous figure of the Chubby 
Girl in the pink suit.  The EotW takes on the characteristics of a fable or allegory, whereas HBW 
takes on those of the eponymous hard-boiled detective fiction genre.  Where the Calcutec over-
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analyzes his situation and presses for answers, in the Town everything is settled, static, 
unchanging and unchangeable.  “ ‘Why do you round up the beasts at nightfall and send them 
outside the walls, only to let them back in again in the morning?’ ” the narrator asks the 
Gatekeeper.  He replies, “ ‘We do it that way… and that is how it is.  The same as the sun rising 
in the east and setting in the west” (15).  Though Murakami’s prose is eminently readable, breezy 
even, the potential for the reader’s analysis of the text is practically unlimited, as a function of 
the idiosyncratic dualistic structure of the twinned narratives.  The primary question invoked on 
every page is what the precise nature of the relationship between these two narratives is.  What 
makes the read so rewarding is the way that, as it unfolds, this question continues to grow in 
complexity even as the picture grows gradually clearer. 
 In Chapter Three, the Girl leads the Calcutec deep into Tokyo’s sewers in order to meet 
with her Grandfather, who reveals that all the silence has been due to him removing all the 
sound, and all the security is to keep out INKlings, a bizarre and apparently dangerous 
subterranean race akin to the Japanese folkloric figure of the Kappa (18-24), in part a nod to one 
of the most important texts about the Kappa figure, Akutagawa’s cynical satire Kappa (1927).  
The quirky Grandfather explains himself to the Calcutec, “ ‘I’m a biologist… But the word 
biology doesn’t begin t’cover all that I do.  Everythin’ from neurophysiology to acoustics, 
linguistics to comparative religion.  Not your usual bag of tricks, if I do say so myself.  These 
days I’m researchin’ the mammalian palate” (27).  His interests, in other words, span precisely 
the unconventional and sprawling themes of this novel itself.  Because, in a very rudimentary 
sense, if at the level of form the novel’s main mystery concerns the hazy connection between its 
two distinct narratives, then at the level of content the mystery concerns the connections between 
the things the Grandfather is researching: experimental neurosurgery and its effects on left-right 
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brain function, the removal of sound from reality, and unicorn skulls.   
 The Grandfather then shows the Calcutec his warehouse of hundreds of mammalian 
skulls, which include examples of “every species of mammal imaginable” (27), including 
humans.  The Calcutec notes “Caucasoid, Negroid, Asiatic, Indian, one male and one female of 
each” (28).  When the Grandfather mentions that the whale and elephant skulls are in the 
basement, the Calcutec muses to himself, “A few whale skulls and there goes the neighborhood” 
(28), an odd phrase in this context, borrowed as it is from the racist discourse that relies on the 
very sort of biological taxonomies of race that seem to be on display in the Grandfather’s 
laboratory.  This inchoate invocation of race slowly clarifies over the course of the novel.  
Though it remains hazy, it gradually crystallizes around a discourse of eugenics, with the 
Grandfather as a kind of mad scientist doing experiments in the name of “pure science” to 
perfect the world in what seem to be increasingly nightmarish ways (such as removing all the 
sound).  Here though, what the Grandfather says is extremely cryptic, and appears more 
charming and quirky than outright ominous: “ ‘Every bone has unique sound.  It’s the hidden 
language of bones.  And I don’t mean metaphorically.  Bones literally speak.  Research I’m 
engaged in proposes t’decode that language.  Then, t’render it artificially controllable’ ” (28).  
But, the Grandfather cautions, the Semiotecs are after his research: “ ‘’Fraid the word’s out.  
They all want my research for their own ends.  F’r instance, suppose you could draw out the 
memories stored in bones; there’d be no need for torture.  All you’d have t’do is kill your victim, 
strip the meat clean off the skull, and the information would be in your hands’ ” (29).  The 
Grandfather, therefore, needs the Calcutec to “launder” the research data, a kind of mental 
encryption.  But, above and beyond the normal encryption Calcutecs are capable of, the 
Grandfather wants him to utilize a new, experimental super-encryption method, called 
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“shuffling,” which is why he has bypassed normal System hierarchies and summoned him 
directly and privately to his lab (29-31).  The Grandfather sends him home to do the laundry and 
shuffling, and begs him not to be late, or else “ ‘something terrible will happen’ ” (32).  The 
Calcutec asks him, “ ‘World going to fall apart?’ ” (32), to which, mysteriously, the Grandfather 
replies, “ ‘In a way… yes’ ” (32).  Perhaps most ominously, the Grandfather suggests that one of 
the possibilities of artificial sound control, beyond the powers of turning off people’s hearing, is 
that “ ‘we can erase speech’ ” (35).  The chapter ends with the revelation that the Girl is of 
course not indeed a mute, but rather that her Grandfather simply forgot to re-active her sound: “ 
‘Darn… Plum forgot.  She’s still sound-removed from that experiment.  Darn, darn, darn.  Got 
t’go and undo it right now’ ” (36). 
 The Calcutec attempts to explain the cryptic process of laundering as a function of 
moving information between the left and right brain: 
‘I input the data-as-given into my right brain, then after converting it via a totally 
unrelated sign-pattern, I transfer it to my left brain, which I then output as 
completely recoded numbers and type up on paper. This is what is called 
laundering.  Grossly oversimplified, of course.  The conversion code varies with 
the Calcutec. This code differs entirely from a random number table in its being 
diagrammatic. In other words, the way in which right brain and left brain are split 
(which, needless to say, is a convenient fiction; left and right are never actually 
divided) holds the key.’ (32) 
 
Here we have the beginning of a kind of “key” to decoding the structure of the novel, in which 
the apparent split is really a “convenient fiction.”  In other words, the first key the novel gives us 
is the left-right brain split image, in which the HBW narrative and the EotW narrative are the 
split halves of one whole, but split only as a device for protecting or encoding the information––
decryption, in other words, as a figure for the literary.  The “totally unrelated sign-pattern” itself 
could be seen as Murakami’s own literariness.  In this account, then, the two halves of the novel 
represent the same information, one the “laundered” version of the other.  On the more literal 
  
89 
plot level, the stage is now set to understand the protagonists of both sections as potentially the 
left-and-right- brain versions of the same character, though what exactly that means remains 
vague. 
 In Chapter Four, the unnamed protagonist is instructed by the Gatekeeper to go to the 
Library to learn to read old dreams: “ ‘Ask whatever questions you want, but remember, I may 
not answer… There are things I cannot say.  But from now on you must go to the Library every 
day and read dreams.  That will be your job’ ” (39).  At the Library is a “girl” (38) who will help 
him––at this point we can begin calling the protagonist the Dreamreader.  A few things begin to 
crystallize, in the form of parallels between this narrative and the other.  For example, the 
Gatekeeper and the Grandfather seem to occupy a similar position in relation to the protagonist 
in each narrative.  They are each a figure of authority involved, in some nebulous way, in 
“employing” him, and, pivotally, they each clearly possess knowledge that would be of interest 
to the protagonist, but are reticent or unable to share it with him.  They are both secretive, 
potentially malicious figures, the closest thing to a tangible antagonist in each of the two stories.  
The Grandfather is indeed a kind of gatekeeper, controlling the Calcutec’s experience of the 
world around him by, for example, hiring him in a secretive way outside of normal System 
protocols, bringing him to a secret location, turning off and on the sound in the world around 
him, and ultimately involving him inextricably in the greater conspiracy involving the shuffling 
of his coveted data.  In both narratives, around this point (more on the detail of the temporal 
layout of the linear alternating chapters below), the protagonist receives definitive confirmation 
on his “job.”    
 In other words, Chapters Three and Four offer us two corresponding representations of a 
similar kind of experience.  This becomes nearly explicit when the Dreamreader finally meets 
  
90 
the Librarian and finds her incredibly, but inexplicably, familiar: “I look at her and say nothing.  
Her face comes almost as a reminiscence.  What about her touches me?  I can feel some deep 
layer of my consciousness lifting toward the surface.  What can it mean?  The secret lies in 
distant darkness” (41).  On one hand, it seems like perhaps the events of the EotW come much 
later than HBW.  It is a place at the end where the Dreamreader faintly remembers the Librarian, 
perhaps even as a past life, suggesting the transmigration of the Calcutec and the Girl’s souls.  
The Dreamreader tells the Librarian, “ ‘Still, I have the impression that elsewhere we may have 
lived totally other lives, and that somehow we have forgotten that time’ ” (42).  But at the same 
time, Chapter Three posited the potential “key” here as two parts of one mind, perhaps two 
“layers” of one “consciousness.”  The EotW narrative, with its archetypes and fantastic objects, 
certainly seems to follow a kind of unconscious or dreamlike logic.  “ ‘As you may know,’ ” she 
tells him, “ ‘in this Town, memory is unreliable and uncertain.  There are things we can 
remember and things we cannot remember.  You seem to be among the things I cannot.  Please 
forgive me’ ” (42).  While memory defines one possible connection between these two worlds, it 
might also be transmigration, something to do with the two hemispheres of one mind, or 
something to do with different conceptual layers of one mind.  But Murakami stops well short of 
pinning this down here, and seems to figure exactly this experience of the reader’s in the 
chapter’s end, where the Librarian tells the Dreamreader: “ ‘You have nothing to do here today.  
Your work starts tomorrow.  Please go home and rest’ ” (43), to which he responds inwardly, “It 
is certain: her face bears a fatal connection to something in me.  But it is too faint.  I shut my 
eyes and search blindly.  Silence falls over me like a fine dust” (43).  Though the exact nature of 
the connection is ambiguous, with multiple possibilities now on the table, what at least seems 
clear is that Chapters Three and Four form a kind of couplet, in which characters and events 
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parallel each other in some way. 
 This reading of the two sections’ basic parallelism holds up to some extent for the entire 
first half of the novel.  The Calcutec explains a little later: 
My shuffling password was “End of the World.” This was the title of a 
profoundly personal drama by which previously laundered numerics would be 
reordered for computer calculation.  Of course, when I say drama, I don’t mean 
the kind they show on TV. This drama was a lot more complex and with no 
discernible plot. The word is only a label, for convenience sake.  All the same, I 
was in the dark about its contents. The sole thing I knew was its title, End of the 
World. (113) 
 
So The End of the World is a complex drama inside the Calcutec’s head that he does not himself 
know about.  He explains that “The scientists at the System had induced this drama” via a 
complex kind of training such that ultimately, he says, “my conscious mind [was] completely 
restructured” (113).  “First there was the overall chaos of my conscious mind, then inside that, a 
distinct plum pit of condensed chaos in as the center,” he explains.  So the EotW sections appear 
to be the “condensed chaos” at the center within his mind.  The scientists tell him that the 
secrecy surrounding the drama’s contents is to protect his shuffling ability.  “ ‘You can call up 
the drama, because it is your own self, after all.  But you can never know its contents’ ” (114).  
This drama inside his brain seems to interact in some way with his conscious mind, since parallel 
elements seem to turn up in either, though the arrow of causality is hard to pin down.  In any 
case, what we now appear to have is an unconsciousness that has been induced by a kind of 
trauma and results in the expression of symptoms, including, for example, the Calcutec’s erectile 
dysfunction.  It is on one hand extremely Freudian, but on the other extremely political, in that 
this condition is “induced” by the “System,” producing as it does a kind of unconscious drama 
that replicates a totalitarian state.   
 But at the same time, this simplistic structure of dualistic narratives does not quite hold 
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up.  One thing that crucially complicates our attempt at a straightforward reading of the relation 
between the two narratives is the temporal schema, which is more complicated than one in which 
the even-numbered EotW chapter simply compliments the odd-numbered HBW chapter that 
came directly before it.  Chapter Four does not simply retell and relate to Chapter Three.  For 
example, after the Gatekeeper orders the Dreamreader to go to the Library, he performs on him a 
mysterious kind of operation that enables and/or makes this position official: 
Next he reaches for a dull, rounded blade from his knife rack and heats the tip for 
ten minutes. He blows out the flame and lets the knife cool. 
 ‘With this, I will give you a sign,’ says the Gatekeeper. ‘It will not hurt.  
No need to be afraid.’ 
 He spreads wide my right eye with his fingers and pushes the knife into 
my eyeball. Yet as the Gatekeeper said, it does not hurt, nor am I afraid. The knife 
sinks into my eyeball soft and silent, as if dipping into jelly. 
 He does the same with my left eye. (40) 
 
This event does not directly relate to an “event” in the previous Chapter.  In fact, this grotesque 
image clearly recalls the famous shot of an eyeball sliced by a knife in Bunuel and Dali’s Un 
Chien Andalou (discussed, or rather explicitly not discussed, in Chapter Two).  In one sense 
then, this is a cinematic image before it is a referent to an antecedent within the novel itself.  At 
the level of the narrative, it might clarify something which happens there (the Calcutec’s ability 
to “shuffle”), but we can’t possibly know this until much later in the novel.  In fact, this 
“surgery” seems to be the EotW version of an event which, in the HBW world, happened long 
before the events of Chapter Three, but which we don’t learn about until much later in the novel, 
when it is revealed that the Grandfather performed an experimental surgery on the Calcutec.  
But, as becomes clear, in that case it is equally ambiguous whether the surgery enabled the 
Calcutec to shuffle, or whether there was some other purpose or result (more below).   
 The other thing that complicates a reading of the two sections as presenting a simple 
dualism is that more is happening symbolically; there are other levels of allegory at play between 
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the two narratives.  The Town is a kind of allegorical closed system representing the ideological 
ideal of Tokyo in the post-occupation boom years known as the Japanese economic miracle 
(1952-1989).  It presents itself as utopia in which all of its citizens’ primary needs are adequately 
met, a bare bones ideal of cleanliness and order: “ ‘This is a poor town.  No room for idle people 
wandering around.  Everyone has a place, everybody has a job’ ” (39), the Gatekeeper tells the 
Dream Reader.  HBW on the other hand, represents a hyper-consumerist vision of mid-1980s 
Tokyo, the Calcutec immersed, mentally and physically, in a world of things––mostly things 
imported from the West.  The two narratives thus begin to form a picture of an allegory of a 
political ideology whose surface is a technodystopia, but through whose underfabric runs a 
current of totalitarian nightmare.  This reading, in no small part, turns on the triple meaning of 
end in The End of the World: as both a thing which delineates the terminus of the world, as well 
as the ideal goal of that world, and finally also a place physically located at the world’s edge.   
 One of the town’s citizens, The Colonel tells the Dreamreader that “ ‘this town is perfect.  
And by perfect, I mean complete.  It has everything. If you cannot see that, then it has nothing.  
A perfect nothing.  Remember this well’ ” (86).  The Gatekeeper corroborates this view of the 
town as a quasi-utopia: “ ‘A body who works bad thinks bad, I always say’ ” (108).  And: “ ‘The 
wall has no mortar… There is no need.  The bricks fit perfect; not a hair-space between them.  
Nobody can put a dent in the Wall.  And nobody can climb it.  Because this Wall is perfect.  So 
forget any ideas you have.  Nobody leaves here’ ” (109).  He says that in this town there is “ ‘No 
worry, no suffering’ ” (109).  At the same time, the Dreamreader’s Shadow, from whom he has 
been separated by the Gatekeeper, warns him, “ ‘There’s something wrong here’ ” (63).  An 
atmosphere of ominous portent hangs over the otherwise idyllic Town.  The Librarian 
remembers her mother but says, “ ‘It is wrong to talk about people who have disappeared’ ” (61-
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62).  While the Wall seems to present a perfect and unbreachable mechanism of control, the 
Town seems to operate in more subtle ways to keep the Dreamreader in check.  The Colonel tells 
him, “ ‘The Town is powerful and you are weak’ ” (170), and encourages him to keep his nose 
down.  The Colonel, it seems, is the parallel in the HBW narrative of the character Junior, who, 
along with Big Boy, is one of two thugs (later revealed to be working for the Factory) that accost 
the Calcutec in his apartment (132).  After confusedly filling him in on some of the details of the 
INKlings and their own role in all this, they ask him what things in his apartment he values the 
most, then destroy them for the purpose of “ ‘Destruction for the sake of destruction’ ” (141).  He 
mentions his TV, videodeck, collection of whiskeys, his new suit and his “U.S. Air Force 
bomber jacket with a fur collar” (141).  They proceed to thoroughly ransack his home: “Big Boy 
was bringing new meaning to the word destruction in my cozy, tasteful apartment” (142).  After 
Junior grabs the Calcutec’s penis and stabs a horizontal gash into his abdomen (157), then 
leaves, his door broken off, the Calcutec says, “The mangled frame of my steel door was now 
open for all the world” (158).   
 The two atom bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki were named Fat Man and 
Little Boy.  It is unclear whether the Calcutec himself intends the allusion consciously or not, but 
what is clear is that, for the novel, this is a dense nest of political allusions.  The connection 
between Junior and the Colonel is made clear in the identical advice they each give the 
protagonist.  The Colonel tells him, over a game of chess, “ ‘Worth fighting to the end.  In five 
moves your opponent can err.  No war is won or lost until the final battle is over’ ” (85), and 
Junior reveals himself to be The Colonel’s doppelganger in the other narrative when he says to 
the Calcutec: “ ‘It’s like chess.  You get checked, you beat a retreat.  And while you’re 
scrambling around, maybe your opponent will screw up.  Everybody screws up, even the 
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smartest players’ ” (156).  Both are vaguely threatening, authoritative figures who keep him in 
line, and both are the source of a certain level of wisdom and insight.  The Colonel is simply the 
ideological version of Junior, who in effect represents the repressive apparatus.  Where Junior 
stabs him, The Colonel offers vague threats in the guise of paternalistic advice.  If Junior is like 
one of the two atom bombs he seems to be named after, then The Colonel represents the flipside 
of that coin, the unconscious lingering trauma of post-war Japan.  For, crucially, the Town is a 
place after war, where former soldiers like The Colonel relax in useless retirement.  The Town 
represents a certain ideal of a peaceful Japan, but one that necessitates great sacrifice. 
 As the Dreamreader goes through some abandoned luggage in the Town’s Library, he 
starts to realize more about the insidious nature of this place: “It is as if someone has 
painstakingly removed any indication of individuality.  Only person-less dregs remain” (228).  
What seems to have been removed in sloughing off one’s shadow is memory.  It is a town where 
people forget their pasts.  It is for this reason that his Shadow, an embodiment of his past, his 
memories, encourages him to leave: “ ‘The Town seems to contain everything it needs to sustain 
itself in perpetual peace and security.  The order of things remains perfectly constant, no matter 
what happens.  But a world of perpetual motion is theoretically impossible.  There has to be a 
trick.  The system must take in and let out somewhere’ ” (248), and so they conspire to escape 
together.  Later, his Shadow finally reveals that Dreamreading is the work that kills off the 
undead dreams of the townspeople: “ ‘Dreamreading is a task for newcomers to the Town––
people whose shadows have not yet died.  The Dreamreader reads each spark of self into the air, 
where it diffuses and dissipates’ ” (336).  In this way the EotW world section can be read, not 
simply as the unconscious of the Calcutec/Dreamreader, but indeed as the political unconscious 
of postmodern Japan, as a satire of the existential alienation and loss of individuality that 
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Murakami sees as tied to the dogged economic drive that marked Japanese political rhetoric in 
the post-occupation period through the time of this novel. 
 But this relatively simple binary scheme––of the two sections as a political 
conscious/unconscious, or the repressive versus ideological apparatuses of power at work––can 
be further complicated when we add the East/West binary into the matrix of subdivisions that 
form the novel’s very structure.  Perhaps nowhere is this made more clear than during the 
centerpiece discussion between the Calcutec and the Librarian (the one in the HBW narrative , 
not to be confused with the Librarian in the EotW narrative) about two books on unicorns.  After 
the Grandfather gives the mysterious skull to the Calcutec and he deduces that it might be a 
unicorn’s, he consults the Librarian for research assistance.  In Chapter Nine, the two of them go 
together through “two volumes” on subject: “One was Archaeology of Animals, by Burtland 
Cooper, and the other Jorge Luis Borges’s Book of Imaginary Beings” (94).  Ironically, while the 
latter is of course a real work by a real author, it is the more straight-laced sounding Archaeology 
of Animals that is in fact made up by Murakami, along with its fictional author Burtland Cooper.  
These two works correspondingly add several more possible “keys” to the novel, stacking 
repeated binary structures on top of each other as metaphors for this novel itself.   
 The Librarian first offers an analysis of Borges, and this is presented to us as part of the 
main narration: “There are two types of unicorns: the Western variety, which originates in 
Greece, and the Chinese variety” (95).  Both cultures, the Calcutec says the Librarian says 
Borges says, interpret these two mythological characters totally differently.  Incidentally, 
Murakami has the Librarian taking some interpretive liberties with Borges’ scholarship.  In 
reality, Borges is actually quite careful to point out the way that the unicorn inhabits a different 
place in the thinking and culture of Greece and China foremost because in China it was 
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developed as a mythological creature, whereas in Greece it was first documented as an empirical 
animal in exotic lands.  The Librarian simplifies Borges in order to produce a streamlined binary 
reading of the Greek versus Chinese conception of the Unicorn.  She suggests, “East and West 
could not agree on character and symbolism… The West saw the unicorn as fierce and 
aggressive… The Chinese unicorn, on the other hand, is a sacred animal of portent… Extremely 
gentle in temperament” (96).  In case there is any question of missing the obvious, she 
summarizes: “In the East, peace and tranquility; in the West, aggression and lust” (97).  So, in 
one narrative at least, the West is an aggressive invading force that disrupts the peace of the East.  
To some extent, this kind of framework plays itself out in the novel, for example in the scene in 
which our Japanese Calcutec is accosted in his “cozy” apartment by two thugs named similarly 
to the American bombs that targeted the relatively similarly tranquil citizen populations in 
Hiroshima and Nagasaki.  But that the Calcutec is himself clearly carved out of the Marlow-
esque Western mold is only the first sort of complication to any kind of simple dualistic reading 
in this way.  For the manner of Murakami’s appropriation, or perhaps better combination of 
Western and Eastern literary forms in this novel is substantially more hybrid than a 
condemnation of cultural imperialism.  If anything, the novel’s deeply ironic love-hate satire of 
eighties Tokyo consumerism offers a closer paradigm for understanding its broader cultural 
implications.  Murakami clearly finds himself attracted to the very things he seems to 
acknowledge are part of the existential problems of the Tokyo Yuppie lifestyle (more on this 
below). 
 But it is the second book on unicorns, Burtland Cooper’s Archaeology of Animals, that 
most concretely complicates the East/West reading and subsequently frames the novel’s 
historical and political valence.  After a long passage ruminating on the scientific probabilities of 
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the existence of large single-horned mammals, the Librarian explains the text’s section on a “ 
‘recorded instance of a unicorn’ ” (100).  What clearly emerges is a lost history of this potential 
creature that lines up precisely with a history of the two world wars: “In 1917, the very item was 
discovered on the Russian front.  This was September, one month prior to the October 
Revolution, during the First World War, under the Kerensky Cabinet, immediately before the 
start of the Bolshevik Coup” (100).  A soldier who had been a former biology student apparently 
finds a strange skull on a tablelands called the Voltafil.  After a lengthy enumeration of the twists 
of the soldier’s journey through the Russian front, the skull ends up in a stable in Petrograd 
where it remains until 1935 (100-101), when the stablemaster tries to sell it to the Chairman of 
the Faculty of Biology at Petrograd University, but is unable to find him because he was “a Jew 
who had been sent to Siberia after Trotsky’s downfall” (102).  He ends up selling it to another 
biologist, a Professor Petrov, who assembles a team to excavate the Voltafil.  They find nothing, 
and future attempts are rendered impossible because, “During the Second World War, the entire 
plateau was bombarded beyond recognition” (103).  Petrov is ridiculed by the academy for 
claiming the evolutionary plausibility of the skull as an example of a unicorn living on the 
isolated “lost world” of the Voltafil plateau.  But it is finally the realities of international politics 
that again determine the history of the mysterious skull:  
Thereafter, Professor Petrov waited valiantly for the winds of fortune to shift and 
his research to achieve recognition, but the onslaught of the German-Soviet War 
in 1940 dashed all such hopes and he died in 1943, a broken man.  It was during 
the 1941 Siege of Leningrad that the skull vanished.  Leningrad University was 
reduced to rubble by German shelling.  Virtually the entire campus––let alone a 
single animal skull––was destroyed.  And so the one piece of solid evidence 
proving the existence of the unicorn was no more. (104) 
 
The Calcutec considers whether the skull the Grandfather gave him might indeed be this very 
skull, though this mystery is never conclusively solved.  What is clear, however, is the way that, 
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strikingly, the history of this mythical animal is mapped onto a chronology of global military 
conflict, culminating in the events of World Word II. 
 In fact, throughout the novel, which for the most part remains within in a hermetically 
sealed off world of Tokyo sewers and supermarkets––the middle class consumerist existence of 
the white-collar Calcutec––historical references to violent combat seem to poke through, 
intruding on the Calcutec’s otherwise tightly controlled, isolated world.  For example, when 
musing to himself about the sexually forward Chubby Girl, the Calcutec says, “The last time I’d 
slept with a fat female was the year of the Japanese Red Army shoot-out in Karuizawa” (73).  
There is no immediately clear connection between the Calcutec’s sexual life and the 1972 police 
siege of a hotel where a Maoist revolutionary group had taken a woman hostage, resulting in 
three deaths.  But the Calcutec tends to map his own history along a trajectory of the history of 
contemporary global warfare and of post-war leftist violent revolution.  At another point, he 
recalls, “I bought that jacket in 1971, I was pretty sure.  The Vietnam War was still going on, 
Nixon and his ugly mug were still in the White House” (219).  Later he sees a girl “who 
reminded [him] of a girl [he’d] known in high school.  Neat and clear-headed, she married a 
Kakumaru radical, had two children, then disappeared” (345).  In fact, hiding in every corner of 
this novel is a surprising backdrop of world war, communist radicalism, and even seemingly 
totally random violence.  The Chubby Girl’s past is also defined by a single major traumatic 
event.  She was in the hospital having a heart operation the night her "whole family got killed”––
it is never explained what happened (220).  But she says, “ ‘Well, it was the end of the world for 
me.  Everything got so dark and lonely and miserable’ ” (220).  And the Librarian (of HBW) tells 
him, “ ‘My husband was something of a jazz buff.  You probably had similar tastes.  He was 
beaten to death in a bus, with an iron vase’ ” (362). 
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 This underlayer of violence and trauma, on both the personal and national levels, seems 
at least in part to explain the Calcutec’s more immediate sexual dilemma, of not being able to 
achieve erections.  By ignoring his own personal traumas and trying to shut himself off in a 
closed system that is in reality penetrated by these multiple violences, he renders himself 
impotent.  The Calcutec describes the Librarian as “a regular machine gun of hunger, this girl!” 
(91).  She eats a ton and then he says, “Probably that was the reason I couldn’t get an erection.  It 
was the first time I hadn’t risen to the occasion since the Tokyo Olympic Year” (91), and he 
admits the last time he had sex was two weeks ago with a “Call girl,” which seems de rigueur for 
him (92).  The idiosyncratic metaphor, relating the girl’s appetite to hunger, concretizes the 
connection between his sexual malaise and a history of violence, more specifically of intrusive 
violences that penetrate otherwise apparently stable closed systems.  Perhaps this is why he is 
only finally able to achieve erections again after he has experienced and accepted the ultimate 
violence, his inevitable descent into his own unconscious mind, the end of the world.  At this 
point, he is “cured,” and states, “We made love three times… My erections had been perfect as 
the pyramids of Giza” (364).  This is only possible only once he has accepted “the end of the 
world,” in every sense: as the thing inside his head, as the agenda of a non-closed world system 
around him, and as the inevitable demise of the world and him in it.  In the following EotW 
chapter he acknowledges, “Everything here is part of me––the Wall and Gate and Woods and 
River and Pool.  It is all my self” (369).   
 In other words, what this novel depicts, on one level, is the disruption of the typical 
middle-class yuppie lifestyle of one Tokyo man who has been trying desperately to forge a clean, 
ordered, and superficial closed system around himself.  On the structural level, this suggests that 
the main problem of selfhood and the relation of that self to the global political body is bound up 
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in the “drama” or film inside the mind of the protagonist, and the relation between that film and 
the outside world.  If the mind works like a film, then the question of authority––who gets to 
produce that film, and more specifically who gets to edit it––becomes the pressing central 
question of this novel.  The novel is certainly a critique of yuppism, but the specific manner of 
that critique is intimately bound up in questions of internalized media ideologies and the larger 
set of issues surrounding the possibilities for our imagining the relationship between the novel’s 
two sections.  At the very center of the philosophy of selfhood and the relation of individual to 
state power that Murakami establishes in this novel, in other words, is very precisely the 
internalization––a la Christian Metz––of a kind of imaginary cinema, an unconscious cinematic 
logic, and the question of what kind of authorities can “edit” the “films” in our unconscious.   
 The Calcutec’s world is hyper-materialistic, superficial, and isolated.  He is alienated 
from all human connection, walled off from others, and focused only on his career and the 
mundane facts of his routine existence.  He embodies a postmodern ironic update of the 
exaggerated stereotype of the kind of alienated capitalist subject that Akutagawa and other artists 
focused their creative energies so intensely upon during the period of high modernism.  Whether 
he is judging people based on their “choice of sofa” (45), or rationalizing his preference to never 
sleep with people he knows because it “only complicates things” (56), the Calcutec keeps 
himself sealed off in a neat, orderly consumerist life.  He intentionally shuts out the outside 
world.  Whenever outside forces begin to encroach, he presses back against them: “OPEC would 
go on drilling for oil, regardless of anyone’s opinion, conglomerates would make electricity and 
gasoline from that oil, people would be running around town late at night using up that gasoline.  
At the moment, however, I had my own problems to deal with” (188).  To some extent this 
lifestyle works for him.  It is certainly an attractive one.  Murakami does not merely satirize it; 
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rather, the simple order and minimalism of the Calcutec’s life has a certain profound something 
that is undoubtedly attractive.  This is perhaps most clear in the way he describes the day after 
his initial encounter with the Chubby Girl and her Grandfather, which appears totally typical and 
quotidian for him: 
At eleven o’clock, I left the apartment, headed for the supermarket near the 
station, stopping next at the liquor store for some red wine, soda water, and 
orange juice.  At the cleaners I claimed a jacket and two shirts; at the stationary 
shop I purchased a pen, envelopes, and letter paper; at the hardware store, the 
finest-grain whetstone in the place.  Then to the bookshop for two magazines, the 
electrical goods store for light bulbs and cassette tapes, the photo store for a pack 
of Polaroid film.  Last, it was the record shop, where I picked out a few disks.  By 
now, the whole back seat of my tiny coupé was taken up with shopping bags.  I 
must be a born shopper.  Every time I go to town, I come back, like a squirrel in 
November, with mounds of little things. (71) 
 
It is this passionate and self-aware attachment to his superficial lifestyle that maintains it, 
keeping the outside world safely out.  However, unfortunately for the Calcutec, this neat division 
of inside and outside the closed system of his life, like all other such divisions in this novel, 
slowly unravels.  After completing the Shuffling, he readies himself for sleep: “Twelve solid 
hours.  Let birds sing, let people go to work.  Somewhere out there, a volcano might blow, Israeli 
commandos might decimate a Palestinian village.  I couldn’t stop it.  I was going to sleep” (126).  
But right after this defensive rehearsal of his own separateness from the global political world, 
the Calcutec switches immediately into his protective yuppie fantasy of the his retirement––the 
“end,” we might say, of consumerist life: 
I replayed my usual fantasy of the joys of retirement from Calcutecdom.  I’d have 
plenty of savings, more than enough for an easy life of cello and Greek.  Stow the 
cello in the back of the car and head up to the mountains to practice.  Maybe I’d 
have a mountain retreat, a pretty little cabin where I could read my books, listen 
to music, watch old movies on video, do some cooking. (126) 
 
The Calcutec’s retirement fantasy is matched as a parable of consumerist ideology perhaps only 
by his love of supermarkets, the quintessential postmodern space (not coincidentally, the central 
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image of Don DeLillo’s White Noise, published in the same year (1985), and often considered 
the postmodern novel par excellence).  The Grandfather says of his granddaughter, the Chubby 
Girl: “ ‘The child really likes supermarkets, she’s always going to them.  Office to supermarket, 
supermarket to office.  That’s her whole life’ ” (48).  And the Calcutec seems to approve of this 
life, rather than the Grandfather’s ostensible rejection of it.  When he goes later to meet the 
Chubby Girl at the supermarket, he describes the “housewives buying the breakfast bread and 
milk, university students hungry after a long night out, a young woman squeezing a roll of toilet 
paper, a businessman snapping up three different newspapers, two middle-aged men lugging 
their golf clubs in to purchase a bottle of whiskey.  I love supermarkets” (130).   
 But all is not well with the Calcutec and his ostensibly perfect yuppie life.  Early on, he 
describes himself: “On the whole, I’m a regular guy.  I say I understand when I do, and I say I 
don’t when I don’t… Most people, when they go around not speaking clearly, somewhere in 
their unconscious they’re asking for trouble” (50).  Fair enough––but in the very next section, the 
Dreamreader does precisely the opposite.  When the Librarian tries to explain dreamreading to 
him, he says, “I nod, but do not understand” (58).  Since the latter, it is later revealed, is actually 
some kind of representation of the interior life of the mind of the former, it is clear that there is a 
polar disjunction in the way the Calcutec/Dreamreader understands himself.  The levels of irony 
here stack several more times: he is misunderstanding his own understanding of what 
understanding means, and then to top it off he ironically nails exactly the problem, since it is 
precisely the case that his “unconscious” is “asking for trouble” with this.  The puzzle starts to 
become clearer later in the novel when this disjunction between what he “says” and what he 
“understands” becomes directly related to the sexual dysfunction he experiences.  For indeed, 
after being unable to achieve an erection with the Librarian whom he is ostensibly attracted to, 
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he finds he is able to achieve one when thinking about a sort of tableau of consumerist fantasy.  
As the Calcutec descends into the sewers in search of the Grandfather, he “kept thinking about 
that young couple in the Skyline, Duran Duran on stereo.  Oblivious to everything” (204).  And 
suddenly he gets a “hard-on” (205).  He muses: “Just great.  Why now?  Why didn’t I get an 
erection when I needed one?  And why was I getting so excited over two lousy bracelets?” (205).  
It is not only the material objects that arouse him; it is exactly the fantasy of “oblivious” 
materialist life.  Ironically, it is right after this that, seemingly completely “oblivious” to his own 
advice, he tells the Chubby Girl in regards to her Grandfather, “ ‘Genius or fool, you don’t live 
in the world alone.  You can hide underground or you can build a wall around yourself, but 
somebody’s going to come along and screw up the works’ ” (210).   
 There is a fine line between the degree to which the Calcutec is self-aware of this 
problem, or whether he is totally oblivious.  Shortly after telling this to the Chubby Girl, while 
they are still underground searching for the vanished Grandfather, he finds himself “longing for 
the morning edition” (235), but, he says, “I’d given up on newspapers three years ago.  Why?  I 
felt disconnected.  Converting numbers in my brain was my only connection to the world.  Most 
of my free time I chose to spend alone, reading old novels, watching old Hollywood movies on 
video, drinking.  I had no need for a newspaper” (235).  He knows he feels disconnected, but is 
that a bad thing or not?  He has no need for a newspaper, but he chronologizes his life in terms of 
global events.  After the traumatic “two and half hours” in which Big Boy and Junior destroy his 
apartment and stab him, he appears to see middle-class Tokyo life differently.  He goes to the 
supermarket again, this time seeing it from outside: “Housewives filed past, leek and daikon 
radish tops sticking up from supermarket bags.  I found myself envying them.  They hadn’t had 
their refrigerators raped or their bellies slashed.  Leeks and daikons and the kids’ grades––all was 
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right with the world.  No unicorn skulls or secret codes or consciousness transfers.  This was 
normal, everyday life” (161).  But while he is jarred out of “normal” life, it is not clear whether 
or not he sees the personally existentially destructive aspects of that conception of normality.  He 
comes close to epiphany while identifying with Julien Sorel in Stendhal’s The Red and the Black, 
a character he says tragically had all his flaws cemented in by fifteen: “It was as good as sealing 
yourself into a dungeon.  Walled in, with nowhere to but your own doom” (163).  This leads him 
to envision “a world completely surrounded by walls” (164), which he acknowledges is an image 
his subconscious must have dreamed this up, despite the fact that “it was like a scene from a 
movie, a historical blockbuster.  But which?  Not El Cid, not Ben Hur, not Spartacus” (164).  His 
unconscious drama is like, but is not, one of these films.  He offers a “quick-and-dirty analysis” 
of this image as if it were a dream: “Certainly, the walls represented the limitations hemming in 
my life.  The silence, residue of my encounter with sound-removal.  The blurred vision of my 
surroundings, an indication that my imagination faced imminent crisis” (164), which is 
ultimately unfulfilling.  He is overcome with a feeling of emptiness and general existential 
despair (164-165).  This is as close as he comes to articulating his main problem: his lack of 
control over the filmic thing in his head.  Even at the very end of the novel, with his great 
symbolic gesture of rejecting consumerism––destroying his credit cards––he equivocates: “I took 
out my credit cards and lit them with a match.  I watched the plastic curl, sputter, and turn black.  
It was so gratifying to burn my credit cards that I thought of burning my Paul Stuart tie as well.  
But then I had second thoughts” (390).  His “second thoughts” offer no final conclusion on his 
embracing or rejecting the lifestyle that Murakami so eloquently describes, in all its horror and 
attraction.  But what remains pressingly, as if suspended in the very center of this dialectical 
equivocation, is precisely the question of the “historical blockbuster” in his mind. 
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 But if half this novel is indeed some kind of prose-representation of just this “historical 
blockbuster,” then one––of many––questions immediately begged is who authored it.  Of course, 
insofar as any “blockbuster” is de facto highly collaborative, it is only fitting that there are 
multiple.  And consequently, it makes intuitive sense that the model of selfhood in this novel 
would be multiple, as well.  While of course authorship of “The End of the World” can be 
attributed to Murakami, and much of it seems to have established by the Calcutec/Dreamreader 
himself, our knowledge of the ontological status of this section of the novel––what exactly it is 
supposed to be, within the fictive universe established by the novel––turns on the character of the 
Grandfather.  Early on, we are made skeptical about this character via what turns out to be 
something of a red herring: his mad-scientist rants about sound removal: “ ‘Now listen up, son.  
I’m tellin’ this to you and you alone: The world ahead of us is goin’ t’be sound-free… That’s 
because sound is of no use to human evolution.  In fact, it gets in the way.  So we’re going t’wipe 
sound out, morning to night… Don’t blame me.  That’s evolution’ ” (49).  Through the middle 
section of the novel, it is increasingly implied, mostly by his granddaughter, the Chubby Girl, 
that the coming end of the world which will result from the Grandfather’s experience might in 
fact be just this (the total removal of sound from the world).  For example, the Chubby Girl tells 
the Calcutec, somewhat cryptically, “ ‘If Grandfather’s research got out now, it’d be the end of 
the world’ ” (128).  As they race to stop the clock on this apocalypse, however, it becomes more 
clearly an end of the world for the Calcutec only––in which he will be relocated to his personal 
End of the World drama in his mind.  Eventually the Grandfather explains this: “ ‘Or t’put it 
another way, your mind will be living there, in the place called the End of the World’ ” (270), 
stuck that way forever when the junction box he implanted inside his brain melts.  What is 
therefore more important about the Grandfather’s earlier discussion of sound and evolution, 
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though perhaps not immediately clear early in the novel, is actually the ominous connotation of 
eugenics evoked by his mention of sound “get[ting] in the way” of human evolution and his 
desire to “wipe sound out.”  Later he will address this much more directly: “ ‘Of course, I 
deplore how those scientists cooperated with the Nazis conductin’ vivisection in the 
concentration camps.  That was wrong.  At the same time, I find myself thinkin’, if you’re goin’ 
t’do live experiments, you might as well do something a little spiffier and more productive.  
Given the opportunity, scientists all feel the same way at the bottom of their heart’ ” (264).  The 
Grandfather occupies a somewhat ambiguous space: he believes he can perform “pure” science 
free of the constraints of the real world consequences of his discoveries and experiments, and yet 
he is aware of precisely the ethical quagmire this has historically resulted in. 
 The Grandfather’s connection to a kind of ethically reprehensible science of human 
experimentation is thus never explicitly laid out, but it is certainly invoked by repeated inference.  
For example, the Chubby Girl at one point chastises him: “ ‘You sometimes get so wrapped up in 
what you’re doing, you don’t even think about the trouble you make for others.  Remember that 
ankle-fin experiment?  You’ve got to do something to help him’ ” (274).  There is no further 
mention in the novel of the ankle-fin experiment.  There is, however, much discussion of the 
Calcutec’s ability to Shuffle, which, the Chubby Girl reveals, can be attributed to an 
experimental neurosurgery the Grandfather conducted, in which every other patient, of twenty-
six subjects, died as a result of the surgery after a year or so, as a result of “ ‘some brain 
malfunction, nothing clear’ ” (194).  The Chubby Girl tells him, “ ‘Perhaps you had natural 
antibodies.  Your ‘emotional shell.’  For some reason you already had a safeguard factor in your 
brain that allowed you to survive” (194).  Almost accidentally then, the Calcutec has survived 
this vague surgery which killed twenty-five others, all in the name of protecting information for 
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The System.  And what is the nature of that surgery?  Basically, the Grandfather’s “perfect” plan 
for heightened data encryption within the human mind is––though it is never explicitly stated––
just a replication of the German Enigma machine, the cipher system developed by Arthur 
Scherbius after WWI and used extensively by the Nazis in WWII: “ ‘There’s only one true 
crackproof method: you pass information through a ‘black box’ t’scramble it and then you pass 
the processed information back through the same black box t’unscramble it.  Not even the agent 
holdin’ the black box would know its contents or principle’ ” (255).  The Enigma machine is 
literally a black box in which the information is mechanically encrypted, effecting exactly the 
outcome the Grandfather describes here.  What he has then managed to do is to internalize the 
black box in a split human mind, as the unconscious.   
 The mechanism through which he has accomplished this is film.  Because the human 
mind, as a black box, changes in time, the Grandfather figured out a way to “fix” it (256-8).  So 
he implanted a circuit junction in the brain and tracked out what the “core” of the subconscious 
looked like:  
‘Next thing I did was t’read your black box into the computer pre-programmed 
with those patterns, and out came an amazin’ graphic renderin’ of what went on in 
your core consciousness.  Naturally, the images were jumbled and fragmentary 
and didn’t mean much in themselves.  They needed editin’.  Cuttin’ and pastin’, 
tossin’ out some parts, resequencin’, exactly like film editin’.  Rearrangin’ 
everything into a story.’ (262)  
 
In other words, what the Grandfather has very literally done is edited calcutecs’ brains to make 
them more like narrative cinema.  It is at this point that he explains, “ ‘I used t’––before the War, 
that is––work as an assistant editor in the movies.  That’s how I got so good at this work.  
Bestowin’ order upon chaos’ ” (263).  As the Chubby Girl already suggested, the experiment did 
not work on the others, only our Calcutec.  The Grandfather explains, “ ‘You possess some 
special oomph that the others didn’t’ ” (265).  It turns out he survived because, “ ‘Yours was the 
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least random, most coherent.  Well-plotted, even perfect.  It could have passed for a novel or a 
movie’ ” (268).  His consciousness was thus already basically structured like a narrative film.  
The Grandfather attempts to explain why this would be so: “ ‘I can think of many possible 
causes… Childhood trauma, misguided upbringin’, over-objectified ego, guilt… Whatever it was 
made you extremely self-protective, made you harden your shell’ ” (269). 
 This leaves us with a final, unresolvable ambiguity about the ontological status of the 
EotW narrative, with at least three distinct possibilities: (1) it is a representation of the narrative 
film edited together by the Grandfather that resides within the Calcutec’s mind, (2) it is the un-
edited original unconscious of the Calcutec, which for some reason is stunningly structured like a 
narrative film, or (3) it is neither or some combination of both, raising, for example, the question 
of what exactly about the Town the Grandfather might have edited.  When he explains to the 
Calcutec that inevitably he is going to end up stuck there in his mind for eternity, all he can offer 
is, “ ‘All’s not lost.  Once you’re there in that world, you can reclaim everything from this world, 
everythin’ you’re goin’ t’have t’give up’ ” (274).  Did the Grandfather edit the EotW drama to 
enable the possibility of escape from it?  Or were his edits the very cement that makes escape so 
difficult?  On another level, a major meta-question is raised: whether the EotW narrative we get 
there is actually what takes place right after the chronological end of the novel in the HBW 
narrative.  The temporal structure is never made clear, leaving us with the possibility that the 
EotW narrative is not actually a representation of the drama in his core consciousness at all, but 
rather the events that take place once the Calcutec himself has entered into that level of his 
consciousness.   
 We are now in a position, having laid out in great detail the questions and range of 
possibilities regarding relationships between the two sections of the novel, to take a closer look 
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at the status of those two narratives.  If the parallelism between the two certainly opens up the 
possibility of them being two sides of one coin: each explaining the conscious or unconscious 
version of the same events, the same characters, etc., then it is true that at the same time another 
possibility is maintained: that the events in the EotW section occur immediately following those 
in the HBW narrative, which ends with the character descending into a sleep that will land him 
squarely stuck for eternity in the drama inside his mind.  Early after his arrival there, the 
Dreamreader narrates, “Looking at the skull beneath her slender fingers, I am overcome with a 
strong sense of déjà vu.  Have I seen this skull before?… Is this a fragment of a real memory or 
has time folded back on itself?  I cannot tell” (60).  Here, at the beginning of the narrative, it is 
easy to read the linear chronology of the one narrative following the other, but, at the same time, 
that chronology is impossible to pin down.   
 But the most fully fleshed out, though perhaps also somewhat convoluted instance of the 
productive ambiguity surrounding the relationship between the novel’s two sections occurs in a 
bizarre, hallucinogenic passage deep in the Tokyo sewers, where the Calcutec and Chubby Girl 
have gone in search of her Grandfather.  When they reach the sacred underground home of the 
INKlings, they find a giant mountainous tower, and promptly a waterfall is unleashed upon them: 
It came. Torrents of water, gushing up from those hundreds of leech-infested 
holes. Tons of water, sluicing through the darkness. In the next instant, I am a 
child in a movie theater, watching a newsreel of the inauguration of a dam. The 
floodgates are open, a massive column of water leaps from the screen.  The 
governor, wearing a helmet, has done the honors and pushed the button. 
Billowing clouds of spray, a deafening roar. (237) 
 
After this, the Calcutec returns his awareness to reality, but after another moment, he turns “back 
to the newsreel, arcs of water shooting across the screen” (238).  He “sit[s] there, transfixed… 
but [he] doesn’t know how to react as a member of the audience” (238).  He believes, for some 
reason, that the shadow of arching water on the film screen is his shadow, which has been taken 
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from him, but he does not know what to do: “I’m a ten-year-old boy, wide-eyed and afraid to act.  
Should I get my shadow back from the screen?  Should I rush into the projection room and steal 
the film?  I do nothing” (238).  Clearly, this bears some resonance with the workings in his 
unconscious mind, in the Town where his shadow is torn from him like a separate being.  Is this 
then the cinematically generated trauma that induced for the Calcutec that element of his 
unconscious film-narrative in his dream mind?  Is the fact that this trauma was indeed induced in 
an experience of the cinema accountable for the idiosyncratically cinematic structure of his 
unconscious?  He describes this as a “memory” (238), but he admits, “I couldn’t be sure any of it 
had really happened to me.  I had no recollection.  Perhaps this was a hallucination induced by 
the sounds of the water in the darkness, a daydream dredged up in the face of extreme 
circumstances.  But the image was too vivid.  It had the smell of memory, real memory.  This 
had happened to me, it came to me with a jolt” (238).  He speculates that this genuine memory 
had been “sealed off” from his conscious mind by the “operation” in which the Grandfather had 
“stolen [his] memories” (239).  This account certainly seems plausible, raising the possibility 
that this memory is tied to the initial traumas that defined his unique identity: generated by film, 
and structuring his mind like a film.   
 But when he explains later to the Grandfather that he feels this was a “substantial 
memory” “triggered” by the water, which he “know[s] beyond a doubt” (265), he is given yet 
another possible explanation: “ ‘No, it wasn’t,’ the Professor contradicted me flatly.  You may 
have experienced it as a memory, but that was an artificial bridge of your own makin’.  You see, 
quite naturally there are going t’be gaps between your own identity and my edited input 
consciousness.  So you, in order t’justify your own existence, have laid down bridges across 
those gaps’ ” (265).  In other words, what is inside the Calcutec’s mind has been irrevocably 
  
112 
“edited” by the Grandfather, who embodies the specter of WWII trauma, the futurist drive of 
logical positivism and pure empirical science removed from all considerations of ethics, and the 
growth of postwar Japan and its blooming film industry, all entwined together.  His mind having 
been “edited” by trauma and cinema, he can now no longer be sure what is memory and what is 
internalized ideology.  “I took a gulp of whiskey,” he says.  “This was turning into a nightmare” 
(266).   
 Which, in a sense, is precisely what this novel is: a nightmare, a representation of the 
cinematically-motivated unconscious dreamlife of postwar trauma lingering in a high-tech, 
highly consumerist, contemporary Tokyo.  Though it is ostensibly a hardboiled detective novel 
about infowars coupled with a Kafkaesque parable about unicorns, references to the lingering 
traumas of WWII and the imbrication of cinema into the psychology of the contemporary self 
symptomatically pop up and intrude into the narrative.  The Calcutec cannot seem to help 
himself from using filmic metaphors, describing, for example, the couple in the Nisan Skyline as 
“character sketches for a TV treatment” (306).  Pivotally, this deeply internalized cinematicity in 
the novel traces its history back to the national and global trauma inflicted upon Japan and the 
rest of the world during WWII.  In the EotW, the Colonel tells the Dreamreader, “ ‘Once every 
fifty or sixty years, there comes a killing winter’ ” (144).  If this is indeed an alternate 1985, and 
we can expect this to be the next “killing winter,” that would conceivably place the last one 
around 1945 and/or the occupation period (1945-1952).  What connects the twin thematics of 
film and WWII trauma in the novel is, pivotally, memory.  It is not totally clear until deep into 
the novel when the Calcutec tells the Grandfather, “ ‘Up until now, I’ve recalled only fragments 
of memories’ ” (265), but the Calcutec, as a result of his operation, has apparently very limited 
functional memory of his own past.  It is no surprise then, that in his unconscious mind, he 
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remembers nothing of his “past” or what got him there: “Why did I cast off my past to come here 
to the End of the World?  What possible event or meaning or purpose could there have been?  
Why can I not remember?“ (109).  Once there he is given a task to rid himself of mind and 
memory (i.e., dreamreading), and none of the characters there seems to properly remember the 
past either.  Everything is future-thinking: the end of the world.  But, strikingly, it is perhaps his 
absence of memory, rather than simple caginess, that accounts for why we learn so little of the 
Calcutec’s backstory in the HBW section of the novel.  We learn early on that the Calcutec was 
previously married (55), but we don’t get details.  This comes up near the very end of the novel, 
with a similar dearth of clarity, when he tells the Librarian about his divorce: “ ‘Five or six 
summers ago, she up and left.  Never came back… Two people can sleep in the same bed and 
still be alone when they close their eyes, if you know what I mean’ ” (388).  Memory then is the 
centerpiece of this novel, the true protagonist perhaps, besieged by the twin villains of a 
lingering historical trauma that teaches us to forget, and the cinematic editing that reshapes and 
ultimately destroys the memories we’d rather suppress.  For Murakami, like Akutagawa, cinema 
is a trope for an invasive cultural imperialism but also an integral part of the interior of the self, 
and the exploration of this internalized cinematicity can be productively harnessed by such 
experimental literary works.  Works by Akutagawa and Murakami that explore new ways of 
appropriating and incorporating cinema within literature thus help recuperate and work through 
the lingering memories of national traumas. 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
THE IMPOTENTIALITY OF SURREALIST CINEMA 
 
 
There is no longer a school, but a state of mind survives.  No one belongs to this 
movement anymore, and everyone feels he could have been a part of it.  In every 
person who writes there is a surrealist calling that is admitted, that miscarries, 
seems sometimes usurped, but that, even when false, expresses a sincere effort 
and need.  Has surrealism vanished?  It is no longer here or there: it is 
everywhere.  It is a ghost, a brilliant obsession.  In its turn, as an earned 
metamorphosis, it has become surreal. 
–– Maurice Blanchot 
 
Never had a means of expression witnessed as much hope as the cinema.  With it 
not only is everything possible, but the marvelous itself is placed at hand.  And 
yet never has one observed such disproportion between the immensity of 
possibilities and the derisory results. 
–– Benjamin Peret 
 
Around the time Akutagawa’s career was flourishing in Tokyo, the Surrealist movement 
in Paris was just picking up steam.  Though the Japanese author and the group of French poets 
almost certainly knew nothing about each other’s works, they each took up the question of what 
to do with this new form of writing called the film scenario around the same time.  As such, they 
each independently developed the early closet film.  It makes a kind of intuitive sense that it 
would be in France and Japan, two developing powerhouses of the film industry, with long 
literary traditions as well, that the closet film would initially come to be.  But where Akutagawa 
experimented in isolation towards the end of his life, the young group of French poets led by 
André Breton in the 1920s worked together to develop their ideas throughout their early careers.  
And where Akutagawa came to the scenario form only by engaging with all kinds of genres and 
as a result of formal experimentation with practically all available literary modes, the Surrealists 
were drawn to the scenario form by way of their attraction first to the cinema itself. 
The well-documented importance of cinema to the Surrealist movement in 1920s Paris 
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(and vice-versa) is difficult to overstate.  Steven Kovács, in his landmark study The Story of 
Surrealist Cinema (1980), argues that “Surrealism was the first major literary and artistic 
movement seriously to concern itself with cinema” (15), and the special relationship between 
cinema and Surrealism has been well-documented (see studies by Williams, Mathews, and 
Kuenzli for examples that privilege Surrealism’s relationship to cinema in particular).  But what 
exactly is Surrealist Cinema?  What constitutes a Surrealist film?  In his book, Kovács proposes 
to look at films that “were made by members of the group and [which] were appreciated by the 
group for being Surrealist” (9).  But his exhaustive study comprises only seven films: Le Retour 
a la Raison, Emak Bakia, L’Étoile de Mer, and Le Mystere du Château de Dés, all by Man Ray, 
Germaine Dulac’s La Coquille et le Clergyman (written by Antonin Artaud –– more on this 
below), and Bunuel and Dali’s Un Chien Andalou and L’Âge d’Or.  Kovács is unambiguous in 
his stance that these films constitute the entire canon of Surrealist Cinema.  “No other films,” he 
argues, “satisfy the preconditions stated above” (10).  Linda Williams echoes this sentiment 
when she asserts that “strictly speaking, there are very few films that did grow directly out of the 
Surrealist movement” (xiv).  In fact, she argues, there are precisely two: “Un Chien Andalou and 
L’Age d’or are perhaps the only unquestionably Surrealist films” (xiv).  In a footnote, she 
excludes The Seashell and the Clergyman because Germaine Dulac wasn’t really affiliated with 
the movement, and Man Ray’s Etoile de Mer on the grounds that the film and its author were 
really more Dadaist than Surrealist.  And in the introduction to a collection of essays originally 
published in Dada/Surrealism, Rudolph Kuenzli cites other critics, such as Marguerite Bonnet 
and Odette Virmaux, who also “only include two or three films as truly Surrealist” (7), meaning 
in this case the Bunuel/Dali pieces and either L’Etoile d mer or The Seashell and the Clergyman. 
 This is an odd situation.  A great deal has been made of Surrealist Cinema, but there are 
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only somewhere between two and seven actual Surrealist films.  But if the Surrealists proper 
only produced a handful of bona fide films, it wasn’t for lack of trying.  Many of the original 
members of the group attempted to produce films, but, Kovács notes, “Their efforts failed 
dismally so that, despite their several attempts, none of the original group succeeded in 
producing a movie” (40).  However, neither Man Ray, Artaud, Bunuel nor Dali were original 
members of the inner circle of Surrealism headed by Breton.  The latter two only became part of 
the “in-group” as a result of the fantastic (and utterly singular) success of Un Chien Andalou.  
The original inner circle, as Kovács notes, attempted to replicate this filmic success, but failed.  
In a stunning footnote, he mentions, 
In 1929 Breton had plans for adapting Barbey d’Aurevilly’s Rideu cramoisi to the 
screen with Albert Valentin’s assistance.  Aragon had also planned to shoot a film 
with Valentin in 1930 based on his scenario Le Troisieme Faust.  In 1934 
Soupault wrote Le Coeur volé for Jean Vigo, which was not produced because of 
Vigo’s death.  In 1935 Breton and Éluard improvised a scenario called Essai de 
simulation du délire cinématographique for Man Ray which was abandoned when 
the camera jammed. (47) 
 
Similarly, none of Robert Desnos’ early scenarios were realized (61) until his later collaboration 
with Henri Jeanson, in which he “wrote the text and songs for Roland Tual’s Bonsoir Mesdames, 
Bonsoir Messieurs” (61), which was realized in 1944, but “a week later Desnos was taken away 
by the Gestapo.  Although he lived to see Allied troops liberate his concentration camp, his 
health had been permanently ruined” and he died a month later (61).  In some sense then, 
Surrealist Cinema seems to have been cursed: death, war, and faulty cameras damning projects 
from the get-go.  Marguerite Bonnet puts it very succinctly when she argues that “the whole 
history of Surrealism’s relation with cinema is, in reality, that of a great hope betrayed” (7).  But 
why exactly does Surrealist Cinema seem to have been doomed?  Kovács suggests, 
That the Surrealists did not succeed more often in creating memorable, haunting 
sequences [like the eyeball getting slashed in Un Chien Andalou] may best be explained 
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by the fact that for them the cinema was an exquisite toy and nothing more.  Their 
commitment was to painting, poetry, and drama first.  Movies were another potential 
form for expressing their ideas, but by no means the only or even most important one. 
(41) 
 
Why would Kovács write off the importance of the very thing he is talking so much about?  How 
can Surrealist Cinema both be a pivotal object of scholarly inquiry as well as a novelty aside of a 
movement essentially focused on other media?  To some extent Kovács here echoes an earlier 
seminal analysis, J.H. Matthews’ Surrealism and Film (1971), in which, for example, Matthews 
looks at Philippe Soupault’s early cinematographic poem “Indifference” (1918) and suggests that 
it “has more historical than intrinsic interest” (52), and that “the significance of Soupault’s 
experimentation with his new literary form is not so much that it serves as an example to film-
makers but that it testified to responsiveness among the earliest surrealists to the cinema as an 
inspirational force” (53).  And when he turns to look at film scenarios by Robert Desnos and 
Benjamin Peret, he suggests that they are simply borrowing from the cinema for basically 
literary/poetic projects (57).  In other words, even when critics take deep and sweeping looks at 
the importance of the imbrication of cinema and poetry amongst the Surrealists, they tend to 
trivialize the formal innovation and the potentialities of their hybrid-media experimentations in 
favor of “historical” and basically biographical considerations of these poets. 
  Rudolph Kuenzli offers a more pragmatic explanation than Matthews or Kovács for why 
there are so few Surrealist films, but one that seems somehow equally unfulfilling: “Of the 
numerous Surrealist film scenarios, only very few were made into movies.  The reason for the 
small number of films was probably due to the complexity of filmmaking” (9).  In other words, 
films are just too hard to make.  But that does not seem to totally explain it either.  For one thing, 
these sorts of complexities were not isolated to film.  Take the example of Antonin Artaud, 
whose failure as a theater practitioner, perhaps even more so than his failure as a filmmaker, was 
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the result of the complex financial, technical and basically industrial limitations not of cinema 
but indeed of theater.  As Martin Esslin puts it,  
By far the most glaring and disastrous example of the tension between Artaud’s 
theoretical ideas and his need to try to find a modus vivendi with the theater as it 
was at that time is the production of Les Cenci, in which he had to cast an 
inexperienced actress because she gave him access to funds, use a theater building 
totally at variance with his ideas, and, in the final analysis, produce a play which, 
although he had written it himself, was far removed from his ideal of a theater 
beyond a conventional text and the traditional structure of classical tragedy, based 
on the movement of large numbers of performers in an open space. (84)  
 
And for another thing, as Richard Abel notes, “Before the war, the French cinema, much like its 
American counterpart, relied on writers both inside and outside the industry to supply story ideas 
and scenarios for its films” (59).  It would make sense that a group of leading Parisian writers, as 
much as anyone else, should in theory have been able to get more of their film scenarios made 
into films.  It should therefore be quite striking that they did not, and that there are not more 
Surrealist Films cannot be written off merely by suggesting, as Kuenzli does, that filmmaking is 
more complicated than writing poetry, or as Kovács does, that the Surrealists were only 
tangentially interested in film in the first place. 
 As Richard Abel notes, the Surrealists were not the only writers interested in––but unable 
to produce––their own films.  He argues: “In the twenties and thirties, French writers, many of 
them Surrealists, wrote a good number of film scenarios and published them as literary texts” 
(58), and suggests that these writers (Surrealist and otherwise) capitalized as best they could on 
the literary potential of texts that they could not actualize in film form: “Blocked from using their 
texts as blueprints to produce actual films… the writers turned them into a new textual form of 
play.  If, as creators, they could not gain access to the new popular art of the cinema, at least they 
would use it to ‘revolutionize’ the forms and conventions of literature itself” (64).  Young French 
writers, in other words, unable to see their scenarios made into films, “instead turned to what 
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Alain and Odette Virmaux have called the ‘bastard genre’ of the ciné-roman and the scenario or 
script as literary text” (60).  Abel also points towards another phenomenon, in which writers 
were interested in publishing film scenarios not as a result of the failure to realize them as 
cinema, but simply on their own merit, publishing scenarios for their own literary value.  As 
early as 1917, Louis Delluc was suggesting: “Now that we are getting respectable scenarios –– 
much as happened in music not long ago –– let’s publish them.  Let’s print them just as they 
were written.  And I predict that they will be read with delight” (qtd. in Abel 61).8 
 So even before young French writers turned towards publishing filmic literary texts in the 
twenties and thirties as a result of the unrealizability of these projects as films, they were 
interested in publishing cinematic texts for other reasons, towards ends more literary than filmic.  
As Kovács says, it was Philip Soupault, possibly at the suggestion of Appolinaire (32-33), who 
first started experimenting with writing Surrealist film scenarios and publishing them as 
unconventional poetic scenario hybrids in January of 1919 (33).  Kovács calls these “cinematic 
poems” (33). Soupault really did want these to be made into films, but much of the writing 
produced by the Surrealists over the next few years falls somewhere along a spectrum between 
completely nonfilmic poetry and the totally filmic, such as Benjamin Peret’s film scenario 
Pulcherie veut une auto, which appeared in Litterature in May of 1923.  Along this spectrum we 
would encounter Breton’s own Nadja (1928), a novel punctuated with photographs, Antonin 
Artaud’s unproduced film scenarios, and a variety of poems that can variously be described as 
“cinematic” in one way or another. 
 Abel, however, is basically alone in his emphasis on the textual publications of Surrealist 
film scenarios and other kinds of literary/cinematic “bastard” genres.  Most of the critics who 
have published book-length studies on the relationship between Surrealism and cinema (Kovács, 
                                                
8 Louis Delluc, “Notes pour moi,” Le Film 94 (decembre 1917): 14. 
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Williams, Matthews, etc.) privilege almost exclusively the actual films produced during the 
period, even if that means isolating an archive of no more than seven films at the very outside.9  
The extent of the interest in the very few films that actually exist can perhaps best be 
demonstrated by the (unsubstantiated, but basically credible) piece of academic rumor that Un 
Chien Andalou is, minute for minute, the most written about film of all time.  And in any case 
most of the major book-length studies tend to dramatically overprivilege Bunuel in this context–
–not that Bunuel is not deserving of such study, but whether a few of his early films should stand 
as the entire canon of “Surrealist Cinema” is another thing altogether.  On the other hand, 
discussion of the unproduced, unrealized films tends to be relocated to footnotes and asides such 
as this one: 
Apart from a few abortive attempts at producing films and writing a handful of 
pieces on movies, the original group of Surrealist poets stopped actively 
considering the cinema from the mid-1920s on.  Philippe Soupault and Robert 
Desnos were the only two exceptions, and of the two it was Desnos who became 
the unofficial spokesman for Surrealist cinema. (Kovács 48) 
 
Here Kovács seems almost determined not to discuss the “few abortive attempts” and “handful 
of pieces” that in effect compose an entire subgenre of Surrealist work.  So in fact critics like 
Kovács and Williams might have it exactly backwards.  That is, we might posit that impotential 
Surrealist Cinema, the whole discursive field of filmic literary works produced (and often even 
published) by the Surrealists in the 1920s, could be seen as more fundamentally constitutive of 
Surrealism Cinema than the two-to-seven actual films produced during that period.  One can 
very well imagine a study in which a short film like Un Chien Andalou, itself a highly singular 
event in the history of Surrealism, is relocated to footnotes and dismissive asides, or at least 
simply considered a secondary document after the much wider and more primary field of 
                                                
9 Or see, for example, Graeme Harper and Rob Stone, eds., The Unsilvered Screen: Surrealism on Film, London & 
New York (Wallflower Press, 2007), for a more recent example of a collection of essays about Surrealist Cinema 
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literary-filmic texts produced by the group. 
  In other words, while at first it would seem to make sense that an examination of 
Surrealist Cinema would take as its major object of study the actual films produced by members 
of the Surrealist group in Paris in the mid-late twenties, in reality it makes more sense to look at 
what did not get actualized.  What critics tend to relocate to footnotes seems the stuff of real 
import, and the seven actual films that form the totality of the Surrealist canon seem like the real 
trivial novelties.  The real story of Surrealist Cinema is one of (im)potential cinema, not of seven 
anomalous and semi-arbitrary products, singled out because they were made by “members” and 
“appreciated by the group.”  And with the exception of the Bunuel/Dali collaborations, the rest 
of the films were not even widely appreciated outside the group.  Artaud and Dulac’s The 
Seashell and the Clergyman, for example, remains mostly overlooked and generally unwatched–
–and possibly unwatchable.  And it is for precisely this reason that we must now turn our 
attention in that direction.    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                       
and Surrealism in cinema that deals exclusively in actual films. 
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Artaud’s Forgotten Cinema of Pure Possibility 
The cinema is an amazing stimulant.  It acts directly on the grey matter of the 
brain.  When the savour of art has been sufficiently combined with the psychic 
ingredient which it contains it will go way beyond the theatre which we will 
relegate to a shelf of memories.  Because the theatre is a betrayal.  We see more 
of the actors than of the work––at any rate, it is they who affect us. 
 
––Antonin Artaud, “Reply to an Inquiry,” 60 
 
Recent attention has spotlighted the filmic efforts of Antonin Artaud, known more for his 
own later writings on his Theater of Cruelty, though in the twenties he had been a fringe member 
of the Surrealists in Paris.  It was his scenario for The Seashell and the Clergyman that some 
argue constituted the first truly Surrealist film.  In a recent article, Lee Jamieson outlines what he 
terms “Artaud’s forgotten cinema” (4), a recuperation of Artaud’s lost film theory, which must 
be retrospectively scraped together since Artaud’s “polemic is difficult to define precisely 
because he failed to realize his proposals during his lifetime. Consequently, we must piece 
together Artaud’s revolutionary film theory from a number of unproduced film scenarios, a 
handful of essays and scarce interviews” (2).  But while Jamieson notes the difficulty in 
establishing a clear picture of Artaud’s theory, it is apparent that it is immediately relevant here: 
“He advocated a complete eradication of all previous art, thus creating a cinema of pure 
possibility” (2).  Artaud’s potential cinema––or impotential cinema, since it was never 
actualized––constitutes an important expression of the overall trend of Surrealist Cinema 
towards the impotential.   
To start with, some have pointed toward the many film scenarios Artaud wrote in the late 
1920s, and even identified in them something like the closet.  As the writer of these eccentric 
blends of poetry, film treatment, and film scenario, Artaud is likely one progenitor of something 
we might call the proto-closet-film.  Kovács notes that although only one of Artaud’s scenarios 
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(Seashell) was actually produced, in the late 1920s he was mostly dedicated to writing for the 
screen: “above all he devoted himself to writing film scenarios which he hoped to see made into 
movies” (155).  But Kovács characterizes his first scenario, Two Nations on the Confines of 
Mongolia, as something more like what I’m calling a closet film: “While his other scenarios are 
plans for movies he has in mind, this one has an independent literary value.  It is written in the 
form of a prose poem” (157).  And, “The scenario wanders further and further away from its 
descriptive function and takes on a personal, meditative, sometimes imagistic character” (158).  
Kovács concludes, “Because of its ‘literary’ nature, there is little reason to believe that Artaud 
intended Two Nations to be made into a movie” (158).  Actually, there is little reason to believe 
he did not.  All of Artaud’s writing has a ‘literary nature,’ and most of it, even his nonfiction, has 
a “personal, meditative, sometimes imagistic character.”  More strikingly, Two Nations is not 
very different in this regard from any of Artaud’s other film scenarios, even Seashell, which of 
course was not only intended as a film, but indeed was produced.  Artaud’s scenarios all drift 
away from their function as a production document, going out of their way to establish tone and 
even to describe abstract concepts undergirding the projects.  Moreover, all of the “scenarios” 
included in Artaud’s Collected Works are written in prose, and none of them have numbered 
sections.  Two Nations is not totally singular here.  We are therefore left with a pressing 
question: why is Kovács compelled to insist that Two Nations in particular might be more of a 
cinematic poem than a film scenario?   
Kovács is right that Two Nations, of all Artaud’s scenarios, drifts furthest from direct film 
scenario towards something like poetry, though this is an issue of degree, not type.  While in 
most of Artaud’s scenarios there are few direct references to the camera or types of shots, in Two 
Nations there are none at all.  There is plenty in it that would make it unsuitable as a production 
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document.  The scenario concerns two quarrelling nations in Asia, about which Artaud explains, 
“Russian gold is at the bottom of it all, of course” (15).  This description is not directly 
translatable into film.  It gives us an explanation of the conflict as readers, and it establishes for 
us the setting and the tone, but it does not tell us how this should be represented filmically.  We 
can imagine different potential ways of portraying this, but only inasmuch as we can imagine 
filmic portrayals of anything.  But the scenario gets much weirder: 
French diplomats shrug their shoulders: 
amusing scenes between Poincaré and Briand who rush off to Montparnasse; 
intervention of love  
intervention of a woman 
definition of a certain Surrealism.  
 
Dizzy speed, sound; 
how the aeroplane swims in time; 
a mist of occultism for air traffic. (15-16) 
 
One can see why Kovács is tempted not only to describe this as poetic, but to insist even that 
Artaud intended it as solely poetic, as totally closeted and unintended for production.  The 
scenario assaults with a series of ideas and abstract concepts, it tells us there should be “amusing 
scenes” but it doesn’t tell us exactly the content of those scenes; indeed, it seems to explicitly 
chafe against produceability.  But where the question of intent is concerned, none of that is 
especially unique for an Artaud scenario. 
 Eighteen Seconds, which Kovács calls Artaud’s “first actual scenario” (159), and which 
he wrote in 1925, is only slightly more suitable to being a production document in an actual film.  
It bears most of the same marks of abstraction that render Two Nations closeted.  While there are 
specific camera directions, such as “Close shot of the watch indicating the seconds” (11), there 
are also explanations that establish not even setting or tone but indeed comment on the project in 
general: “The point of the scenario is that although the events described happen in eighteen 
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seconds it takes an hour to project them onto the screen” (11).  That is, instead of showing us 
how the film should do this, Artaud simply states that it should be known.  This sort of 
commentary makes the “scenario” feel more like a treatment or a proposal for a film, rather than 
something like a shooting script.  Moreover, there are abstract interrogative sections whose value 
is explicitly literary, and would puzzle any director trying to put together a shot list: “But what is 
the mind?  What does it consist of?  If only one could be master of one’s physical self” (13).  It is 
therefore hard to identify why Kovács raises the sharp distinction between Two Nations, a 
literary work not intended for production, and Eighteen Seconds, his first “actual” scenario.  
Both works––and all of the scenarios that followed––blur the distinctions between poetry and 
scenario, between literary and film-production-oriented text.   
 For Artaud would go on to write more than a dozen others, though only one of them was 
produced.  Artaud’s scenario for The Seashell and the Clergyman opens with a camera direction: 
“The lens discloses a man dressed in black, busy pouring a liquid into glasses of various sizes 
and volumes” (21).  Nevertheless, the scenario is written in long prose paragraphs, and the 
camera descriptions are fewer and fewer as it progresses.  And indeed, Artaud said of the project, 
“The Seashell and the Clergyman, before being a film, is an attempt or an idea” (Cahiers de 
Belgique 63).  Seashell, in other words, differs from Artaud’s earlier scenarios only in the respect 
that it happened to get made.  Artaud conceived of all these projects as potential actual films, but 
for Artaud films manifested not from text, not from a script, but from ideas.  Here we can already 
see the seeds of Artaud’s later, and much more well-known ideas, in Le Théâtre et son Double, 
regarding a new theater that breaks from the classical dialogue-driven model of the playscript.  
For this reason it is difficult to determine what to call Artaud’s scenarios in the naming structure 
I’m laying out here.  Can something be a “closet film” if it was both intended for the screen and 
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did indeed get made?  Is the criterion for “closet film” status simply the literary nature of the 
scenario, or the degree to which the scenario chafes against its produceability or the pragmatics 
of the document as a production tool?  Or must we be content for the moment with considering 
Artaud’s works something like proto-closet-films, inhabiting the grey zone of indistinction 
between experimental poetry and actual film scenario? 
After the failure of Seashell, which was widely scorned by critics and even Artaud 
himself, “[d]espite his repeated efforts to raise funds, Artaud failed to realize any more of his 
scenarios” (Kovács 176).  Thirty-Two, also written as a prose treatment, has no camera or 
production notes until seven pages in, when “The camera catches up with her” (33), and it reads 
very much like a short story, even recalling Akutagawa.  The Butcher’s Revolt is also clearly 
intended as an actual scenario, though written in the same format, as a treatment with no camera 
directions, few production-oriented notes, etc.  It is the same with Flights.  It would barely seem 
filmic at all save for the cinematic terseness of the short sentences without verbs that imply 
inserts, like “His office.  A calendar on the wall: a date” (43), and the few explicit film 
references: “Then again the client talking excitedly––the shot suddenly ends” (43), and “He 
keeps his bag in his hand––he gets into a car––the car drives off––the camera follows it like 
another car behind” (46).  Perhaps it is because these scenarios describe films that are vaguely 
abstract, that are not dialogue-driven or plot-heavy, that make the scenarios themselves less 
enjoyable to read than, say, an Akutagawa short story in the form of a scenario.  But perhaps 
because Artaud did intend them as production documents, he did not exercise the total literary 
potentiality of the form.  These can be productively read, and in some ways are designed only to 
be read, but they do not capitalize on the potentialities inherit to the form of the closet film.  In 
the end, then, what makes Artaud’s scenarios not qualify fully as “closet films” is less the 
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technical details of their having been made, or Artaud’s intention to have them made, but rather 
the degree to which their closetedness seems more generally inconsequential.  That is, there is 
little that is interesting about their not being filmed or their quasi-unfilmability.  With 
Akutagawa (and as we shall shortly see with others below), the closet is not a place where the 
works just happen to fall.  The closet itself is constitutive of the significance of the work itself.   
Perhaps this becomes most clear when we look at Artaud’s adaptation of Robert Louis 
Stevenson’s 1889 novel The Master of Ballantrae.  Even here, where Artaud has the opportunity 
explicitly to depart from the novel form, where the “ideas” are already in place and what Artaud 
is attempting is merely a translation across media, the scenario proves not particularly useful: 
“From the beginning of the film the relationships between the characters must be established” 
(48).  Artaud tells us something we should already know, and then does not tell us how his 
scenario plans to go about doing this.  He favors telling over showing: “From the beginning the 
problem of birth-right will be presented in all its painful agony through the reactions of all 
parties concerned” (48).  This would not be especially helpful in producing the film, but, perhaps 
more to the point here, it does not exactly make for great reading either.  It gestures only in an 
indistinct way towards a film that could be made, without directly giving us the idea of that 
particular film.  Loathe as I am to suggest it, we might also have to grapple seriously with the 
question of whether these are “closet films,” or just very bad film scenarios.  There is a fine line, 
but in any case, what we have in Artaud’s scenarios of the late 1920s is one of the earliest 
examples of a body of possibly closeted films: a poet experimenting with the line between the 
new form of the film scenario/treatment on the one hand, and the poem/short story on the other.  
Perhaps it is not so much regrettable as it is fitting that even in his potential films, much like his 
actual films and dramatic productions as well, Artaud failed as a practitioner though his ideas 
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remain foundational.   
  In 1933 Artaud abandoned cinema altogether and turned to the theater (Kovács 178), 
writing in Les Cahiers jaunes, “The world of cinema is a dead world, illusory and truncated” 
(qtd. in Kovács 178).10  Kovács speculates, “Perhaps it was only because of his inability to 
realize his scenarios as films that he totally abandoned the medium” (178).  Going one step 
further, we could say that the Theater of Cruelty itself actually comes out of––is somehow 
constituted by––precisely the impotentiality of Artaud’s cinema of pure possibility.  On one 
hand, we could read the cruelty as the compulsive manifestation of the earlier trauma of that 
failure.  On the other, we could turn instead towards understanding exactly how Artaud’s theory 
of theater contains within it the impotentiality of his theory of cinema.  Here, in other words, is a 
provocative rendering of Agamben’s formulation (see Introduction) of impotentiality conserving 
itself in itself in the passage to act: an overlooked impotentiality constituting the actuality that is 
familiar to history.  Jamieson notes: 
Tragically, Artaud’s film theory was never fully realized and remains historically 
lost.  Despite pursuing a number of avenues to raise funds, Artaud’s polemic 
remained purely theoretical. Although Germaine Dulac directed The Seashell and 
the Clergyman in 1927, the only one of Artaud’s fifteen scenarios to be produced, 
Artaud was denied artistic input during the process. (4) 
 
How are we to recover and understand a film theory that is “historically lost” and “purely 
theoretical,” if not to understand the way its impotentiality did not simply vanish, but rather 
conserved itself within the potentialities that were actualized?  His one film, The Seashell and the 
Clergyman, can only get us so far.  The fraught history of its production and reception testify to 
this fact.  Jamieson explains that the version of the film distributed in America had the reels 
mixed up in the wrong order (4), and that the film was banned altogether in England (4-5), the 
official decree proclaiming that “[The Seashell and the Clergyman] is so cryptic as to be almost 
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meaningless.  If there is a meaning, it is doubtless objectionable”  (qtd. in Jamieson, 5).11  I 
myself recently encountered the film being shown on a small screen in the Museo Centro de Arte 
Reina Sofia, in Madrid, where the aspect ratio had been altered, distorting the original frame.  A 
small crowd was gathered in the adjacent room, apparently mesmerized by an endless loop of Un 
Chien Andalou.  Nobody paid Seashell much attention. 
 But Jamieson certainly has, and his description is very generative: 
The film presents all corporeality as potentially unstable, and the boundaries that 
separate the three characters are impossible to locate. In the confessional box, the 
general sits next to the woman, lecherously listening to her secrets. Consumed 
with envy, the priest’s sexual frustration reaches boiling point and he attacks the 
general. Through a series of remarkable effects, where the general’s face is seen 
to crack and split, the image of the priest transfers, ‘slips under’ that of the 
general until he too becomes a priest. The intention is not to present a simple 
substitution of one image with another (the image of the priest replacing that of 
the general), but to convey a collision of identity. As the two men fight, touching 
for the first time, part of the priest’s inner essence merges with the general, their 
identities ‘slipping under’ one another. (6)  
 
What Jamieson’s apt description clearly foregrounds in Seashell is a kind of emphasis in the film 
on potentiality, on a suspension of the realization of ontologically unstable entities into concrete 
realities.  He describes the way “Artaud immerses the viewer into a world where all images are 
potentially unstable and dangerous.  Reacting alchemically to the priest’s sexual appetite, all 
images have the capacity to stretch, vanish or mutate” (7).  What Jamieson does not go quite so 
far as to suggest is that Artaud’s one film, in other words, replicates the logic of the unrealized 
nature of his theory of film, suspended in a kind of permanent unrealizability.  It is a theory 
about the impotentiality of cinema which exists only impotentially. 
 It should not be surprising then that one of the foremost theorists of impotentiality should 
have been crucially attracted to Artaud’s work, especially in his early career.  In “Agamben’s 
                                                                                                                                                       
10 See Antonin Artaud, “La vieillesse precoce du cinema,” Les Cahiers jaunes, No. 4 (1933). 
11 See James C. Robertson, The Hidden Cinema: British Film Censorship in Action, 
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Artaud,” Kevin Attell spells out the special place Artaud holds in Agamben’s thinking.  Oddly, 
Agamben’s published works do not mention Artaud between the brief mention in his first book, 
The Man Without Content (1970), and the striking identification of Artaud between no less 
figures than Spinoza and Heidegger as part of “a philosophical school with which he [Agamben] 
clearly aligns himself,” (Attell, “Agamben’s Artaud,” 175), those who, in Agamben’s own 
words, “ ‘maintain that men do not think (or do not yet think)’ ” (qtd. in Attell, “Agamben’s 
Artaud,” 175).  But, Attell notes, Agamben did publish several articles in the 1960s that focus on 
Artaud, though none have been translated into English nor even republished in any collected 
volumes in Italian, “making this early ‘Artaudian’ period… the least known in Agamben’s 
career” (176).  Agamben’s interest in Artaud, here in some of his earliest published work, 
already sets the stage for his later philosophical engagements.  To Agamben, Artaudian theater 
figures “not a return to the repressed, but a passage to the new by way of the gap opened up and 
held open by the separation of the two poles, a gesture that will occur with some frequency in 
various guises throughout Agamben’s work” (180).  Attell sums up the continuity of Agamben’s 
concerns regarding Artaud that trace across his career: “The task to which Agamben consistently 
gestures is to define a new logic of relation between the poles of the binary metaphysical 
apparatuses that contain and constrain human thought and action” (184).  Artaud’s work is 
focused on delving into the unconscious, “[b]ut the point is not simply to plunge into the so-
called primitive and leave the rational behind.  Instead the point is to exit from this impasse by 
means of the impasse itself” (185).  We might thus look towards Artaud, and specifically the 
status of a potential cinema in his work, through an Agambenian-tinged lens.  Attell’s summary 
of the lasting influence of Artaud on Agamben provides a good account of what this lens would 
look like: “What Agamben retains, centrally, from this early work on Artaud is the gesture of 
                                                                                                                                                       
1913–1972 (London: Routledge, 1989), 39. 
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casting off any and all appeals to an originary state of life or being (even in the form of 
deconstructing the illusion of such an origin) and orienting his analysis toward a new, future state 
that can be conceived (and possibly attained) only as the precipitate of the, so to speak, raction 
between the opposed positive and negative poles of the aporetic binary machine of metaphysics” 
(185).   
 There is an unlikely source which might help shed some light on Artaud’s cinema of pure 
possibility through the context of Agamben’s emphasis on Artaud as a figure interested in 
dialectical suspensions and recuperating originary potentialities.  In a 1942 essay, “Dickens, 
Griffith and Ourselves,” Sergei Eisenstein argues that montage, which many have asserted was 
invented by D.W. Griffith, can really be more accurately attributed to a much earlier and unlikely 
source: “Griffith came to [montage] through the device of parallel action.  But it was none other 
than Dickens who gave Griffith the idea of parallel action!… What were Dickens’ novels, for 
their time? What were they for his readers? There is one answer: the same as cinema is now for 
those same sections of the population” (363-4).  Eisenstein finds himself drawn to the 
“astonishingly plastic quality” (364) of Dickens’ novels, their “astonishing visual optical quality” 
(364).  He then proceeds to read Dickens cinematically: 
So I shall expect indulgence if, when leafing through Dickens, I find 'dissolves'.  
How else can one term this description from A Tale of Two Cities? 
Along the Paris Streets, the death-cars rumble, hollow and harsh.  
Six tumbrils carry the day's wine to La Guillotine…. 
 Six tumbrils roll along the streets.  Change these back 
again to what they were, thou powerful enchanter, Time, and they 
shall be seen to be the carriages of absolute monarchs, the 
equipages of feudal nobles, the toilettes of flaring Jezebels, the 
churches that are not my Father's house but dens of thieves, the 
huts of millions of starving peasants! 
How many such ‘cinematic’ surprises must be lurking in Dickens’ pages! 
But I shall gladly restrict myself to the chief constructs of montage which were 
shown crudely in Dickens’ work, and later flourished as elements of film 
composition in Griffith’s. (364) 
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Eisenstein goes on to quote the entire opening of Chapter XXI of Oliver Twist, and explains in a 
footnote: “For purposes of clarity I have broken the beginning of this chapter into smaller 
fragments than did its author, and numbered them” (365).  The result is something we might call 
a closet film: a numbered series of highly descriptive short prose scenes.  This raises a vital (and 
alarming) question: can it be possible that the only difference between a novel and a screenplay 
is the addition of scene numbers?  Can “closet film,” we might take one step further, be 
understood as a function of reading?  In other words, is it less about the formal properties of the 
text than with a mode of reading which privileges what Christian Metz has called the “mental 
machinery” of cinema?  Is, in some sense, everything we read today, given the dominance of the 
cinematic mode in mainstream culture that our minds have in some way internalized, a closet 
film? Eisenstein seems to suggest as much, equating the place of Dickens and Griffith in our 
cultural and mental landscapes.   
 But there is more to Eisenstein here than the mere suggestion that film in some sense has 
culturally replaced the novel, and has done so with ultimately superficial formal changes.  For 
there is a lot at stake here in Eisenstein’s appreciation of the “plasticity” in Dickens.  Recall that 
what initially attracted Eisenstein to Dickens is his novels’ “astonishingly plastic quality” (364).  
This is the same attraction that Eisenstein finds in early Disney animations in his earlier 
uncompleted notes on Disney.  In 1940-1942, the years leading up to Eisenstein’s article on 
Dickens and his conception of what we might call the formal plasticity between film and the 
novel, Eisenstein was working on a fabulously interesting article on early Disney animations.  
The unfinished result is a series of profoundly generative and provocative notes that, I will argue, 
begin to gesture at a theory of a cinema of pure potentiality very much in line with Giorgio 
Agamben’s writings on cinema and ontology, as well as with Artaud’s work in and around the 
  
133 
cinema. 
 As opposed to what one might presume in first encountering Eisenstein’s views on 
Disney, he is radically supportive and just head-over-heels in-love with the animator’s work.  In 
language that sounds suspiciously like praising an opiate-for-the-masses, Eisenstein writes, 
“Disney is a marvelous lullaby for the suffering and unfortunate, the oppressed and deprived.  
For those who are shackled by hours of work and regulated moments of rest, by a mathematical 
precision of time, whose lives are graphed by the cent and dollar” (7) and, “Disney… through the 
magic of his works and more intensely, perhaps, than anyone else, bestows precisely this upon 
his viewer, precisely obliviousness, an instant of complete and total release from everything 
connected with the suffering caused by the social conditions of the social order of the largest 
capitalist government” (8).  He even says that Disney explicitly allows one “to forget, to not feel 
the chilling horror before the grey wolf who, while you were at the movies, pitilessly turned off 
your gas and water for non-payment” (5). 
 Anne Nesbet appropriately sums up the tenor with which we should first approach 
Eisenstein on Disney: “It is astonishing how eloquently Eisenstein, famous for earlier attempts to 
create a cinema based on shocking its viewers with dialectical truths (the ‘montage’ of 
attractions), here defends the virtues of ‘obliviousness,’ a state generally associated, he admits a 
page later, with ‘evil’” (22).  Eisenstein’s grounds for this praise of obliviousness are somewhat 
vague.  At times he seems simply defensive and reactionary: “Even the string of a bow can’t be 
strained forever.  The same for nerves.  And instants of this ‘releasing’… are just as 
prophylactically necessary as the daily dose of carefree laughter in the well-known American 
saying: ‘A laugh a day, keeps the doctor away’ ” (8).  But he also takes up a more sober analysis, 
acknowledging that this all sounds a little like he’s aligning Disney with filmmakers whose goal 
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is “to distract the attention of ‘the man on the street’ from the genuine and serious problems of 
labour and capital” (9), situations in which “obliviousness is evil” (9).  He wants to separate the 
kind of obliviousness in Disney from the typical conception: “Obliviousness as a means of 
lulling to sleep; obliviousness as a way of distracting from the real to the fantastic; obliviousness 
as a tool for disarming the struggle.  This is not what Disney gives us” (9).  But what, then, does 
Disney give us, exactly? 
 It is important to recognize that Eisenstein seems more committed to appreciating Disney 
from the perspective of a fellow filmmaker than as a cultural analyst.  In other words, what he 
finds in Disney, he finds in imagining Disney’s process of creation, not only watching Disney’s 
films.  Though easily overlooked, this should be apparent from the outset, when Eisenstein 
exclaims, “What magic of reconstructing the world according to one’s fantasy and will!  A 
fictitious world.  A world of lines and colours which subjugates and alters itself to your 
command.  You tell a mountain: move, and it moves.  You tell an octopus: be an elephant, and 
the octopus becomes an elephant.  You tell the sun: ‘Stop!’––and it stops” (3).  This is 
appreciation rooted in the creation of such films, not in viewing them.  The “you” here is Disney 
himself or Eisenstein imagining himself in that position.  It is not the viewer, the masses.  In 
other words, what is particularly compelling to Eisenstein here is the experience of imagining 
one’s control over what does and does not constitute reality.  In this context it becomes clear why 
the fact of Disney’s films being animated is not trivial, but essential to Eisenstein’s whole theory:  
“This cry of optimism could only be drawn.  For there is no such slant on truthfully shot 
capitalist reality which, without lying, could possibly sound like optimistic reassurance!  But, 
fortunately, there are lines and colours.  Music and cartoons.” (4).  It is precisely the animated 
nature of cartoons that enables Eisenstein to assert that “Disney is simply ‘beyond good and 
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evil.’  Like the sun, like trees, like birds, like the ducks and mice, deer and pigeons that run 
across his screen” (9). 
 For Eisenstein then, Disney’s films are about the power of creating a new, fictive reality.  
But it is Disney’s ability to capitalize on the potential boundlessness of animated worlds that he 
finds so powerfully compelling.  And, pivotally for our purposes here, the basic fact that makes 
Disney’s cinema so good at this creation of worlds is probably best described under the umbrella 
heading of potentiality, in precisely the Agambenian sense.  For rather than seeming to resolve 
the dialectics of the class struggle, Disney represents for Eisenstein an earlier unity, somehow 
prior to the very division that makes the class struggle possible.  Eisenstein continually draws our 
attention to the ways that Disney precedes, temporally or ontologically, dialectics.  In very much 
the same way that Agamben’s method is to resolve dialectical aporias by attempting to 
recuperate a more originary unity (see Introduction), Eisenstein asserts that Disney “creates on 
the conceptual level of man not yet shackled by logic, reason, or experience” (2, my emphasis).  
What Disney offers us is therefore a kind of return to a unity specifically prior, in a conceptual 
way, to the class struggle, and in this way to achieve “absolute freedom from all categories, all 
conventions.  In order to be like children” (2).  Eisenstein’s notes here recall quite specifically 
Agamben’s interest in play and infancy, which help us conceptualize closet film as a playful 
genre insofar as the use-value of the film script has been reappropriated for more prophane ends 
(See Introduction). 
 Putting this into yet more dramatic terms, Eisenstein suggests that “Disney (and it is not 
accidental that his films are drawn) is a complete return to a world of complete freedom (not 
accidentally fictitious), freed from the necessity of another primal extinction” (3).  Eisenstein 
here underscores the way that animation is essential here specifically because it creates a whole 
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new world: it effects a complete return.  It is not bogged down by the aporias of representing 
something outside the class struggle from within the modern experience of that class struggle.  
Eisenstein, it seems, cannot himself quite pin down why this seems so important, so pivotal, and 
yet he feels certain that Disney is essential, despite his irrelevance from the material problems of 
labor and capital.  “Disney’s films,” he argues, “are a revolt against partitioning and legislating, 
against spiritual stagnation and grayness.  But the revolt is lyrical.  The revolt is a daydream.  
Fruitless and lacking consequences.  These aren’t those daydreams which, accumulating, give 
birth to action and raise a hand to realize the dream” (4).  And yet somehow they represent for 
Eisenstein the very pinnacle of cinematic achievement.  We might articulate this point as hinging 
on something like the difference between revolts that are potential, and ones which are actual.  
The dreamlike revolt of Disney’s animations represents potential action, and it is this 
potentiality––the potentiality of imaginatively placing oneself in the position of Disney-as-
animator, creating and controlling a world of “complete freedom,” defining the very ontology of 
the world he builds––that Eisenstein is struggling throughout his notes so palpably to express. 
 Eisenstein takes this thinking one step further in his attempt to analyze what he deems the 
universal attractiveness of this sort of potentiality.  What he most lauds in Disney is the 
“rejection of once-and-forever allotted form, freedom from ossification, the ability to 
dynamically assume any form” (21).  He terms this “plasmaticness” (21) and expounds at length 
upon its character: “A lost changeability, fluidity, suddenness of formations––that’s the ‘subtext’ 
brought to the viewer who lacks all this by these seemingly strange traits which permeate 
folktales, cartoons, the spineless circus performer and the seemingly groundless scattering of 
extremities in Disney’s drawings” (21).  Again, what seems easily missed here, but is in actuality 
so vital, is that this plasmaticness is specifically lost, as if Disney’s animations were somehow a 
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full recuperation of the very thing destroyed by modernity: potentiality of form.  It is as if, in 
some sense, Disney supplies us conceptually with precisely that which renders political 
liberation impossible: the potentiality to bend and permeate borders, to rewrite rules, to alter 
form and shape.  Eisenstein calls the work of these animations “a displacement, an upheaval, a 
unique protest against the metaphysical immobility of the once-and-forever given” (33).  He 
relates (at great length) this phenomenon (of the universally compelling representations of 
plasmaticness which Disney brings to perfection) to ghosts (22-24), fire (24-33), and animals 
(33-40).    
 In the third section of notes, written slightly later, in 1941, Eisenstein continues to work 
through these problems and attempts to invent the language to describe the political potential of 
such plasmatic representations.  At times he is radically generalizing and ahistorical.  One 
individual note, for example, which stands entirely alone, simply reads: “Metamorphosis is a 
direct protest against the standardly immutable” (43, emphasis original).  At other times, he 
relates the historical bent of Disney’s work, if confusingly: “America and the formal logic of 
standardization had to give birth to Disney as a natural reaction to the prelogical” (42, emphasis 
original).  At times Eisenstein’s prose seems to leap up like the very flames it describes: “the 
primal plasmatic origin, i.e. the use of poly-formic capabilities of an object: fire, assuming all 
possible guises.  Doesn’t the attractiveness of fire lie in this, and one of the ‘mysteries’ of fire-
worship?” (41, emphasis original).  And: “Thus, fire is like an embodiment of the principle of 
eternal coming into being, the eternally life-producing womb and omni-potence.  In this sense, it 
also resembles the potentiality of the primal plasma, from which everything can arise… Fire is 
an image of coming into being, revealed in a process” (45, emphasis original).  It is this sort of 
thinking, as opposed to Eisenstein’s earlier, perhaps soberer writing that he is best known for, 
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which guided his filmmaking during the period he made Ivan the Terrible (1944-1946).  Nesbet 
has eloquently spelled out the connections between Eisenstein’s notes on Disney and the films he 
made in the 1940s.  What is remains important for our purposes here is the theory of potential 
cinema he begins to develop here, which helps contextualize the playful, even plasmatic 
conceptions of cinema offered by the work Artaud and other practioners of Surrealist impotential 
cinema.   
 What is perhaps most striking is the direct similarity between Eisenstein’s reading of 
early Disney animations and The Seashell and the Clergyman, a film which, as Lee Jamieson 
puts it, “presents all corporeality as potentially unstable.”  In other words, what we find in 
Artaud and Dulac’s work from 1928 is already an attempt to create a film very much in the vein 
of what Eisenstein found so compelling in the early 1940s in Disney’s animations, and 
subsequently attempted to capitalize on in his Ivan films.  What Seashell perhaps best represents 
is an early attempt to represent in film a combination of the formal plasmaticness of animation 
with the special realism accorded to the cinema.  It is notable that Eisenstein did not, even after 
praising Disney so intensely, become involved in animation himself.  What Ivan and Seashell are 
both after is to produce the same effects on film, the obvious idea being to make this 
plasmaticness seem more real.  The unifying concept underlying all this is something like a 
notion of potentiality: to create in film a world in which being is not a given, in which realities 
are suspended in a potential state rather than actualized.  What these thinkers are developing, in 
other words, is precisely a theory of potential cinema. 
 But Seashell failed.  As far as actualizing this theory in filmic practice, at least.  What 
remains––and is, in many ways, more compelling––is the impotential underlying these cinematic 
efforts: Eisenstein’s notes, Artaud’s fourteen unproduced film scenarios, and closet films such as 
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those (discussed below) by Benjamin Fondane and others.  In a moment I will turn to these 
additional case studies, but I would first like to finish up with Artaud by briefly considering the 
work he is best known for, his theory of the theater of cruelty as outlined in Le Théâtre et son 
Double (1938).  With notable exceptions like Agamben’s (see above), most approaches to the 
theater of cruelty view it as the teleological pinnacle that, despite Artaud’s extremely diverse 
career, was truly his main focus all along and deservedly his only lasting major contribution to 
the arts.  Bettina L. Knapp’s early study of Artaud (1969) renders this point clearly.  Even though 
there is a short section dedicated to the film scenarios (71-83), Artaud’s filmic aspirations are 
undercut in general.  From Anaïs Nin’s preface, where she states, “When theatre failed… he 
turned to film” (xii), to Knapp’s reiteration of that point later in the book, “If the theatre had 
closed its doors to him, then he would direct his talents toward the relatively young film 
industry” (65), film is rendered as a deeply secondary concern to Artaud.  And where his 
contribution to film is lauded, it is only for his acting: “Though one cannot call the impact 
Artaud made upon the film industry sensational, he did, however, create two stunning portrayals 
which are remembered even today: Marat [in Abel Gance’s Napoleon, 1926] and the Monk in 
[Carl Dreyer’s 1928] Jeanne d’Arc” (71).  Knapp expends most of her energy looking at the 
Theater of Cruelty through the twin lens of Artaud’s personal psychological struggles and his 
lifelong dedication to theatrical theory and practice. 
 Martin Esslin’s seminal follow-up booklength study, Antonin Artaud (1977), re-
entrenches this paradigm for considering Artaud’s work.  Even though he notes in the Preface 
that “most books on Antonin Artaud hitherto available in English have concentrated on his 
theatrical theories and activities” (i) while this study aims to place in him in a wider context, 
Esslin focuses his study on the ways this wider context contributes to Artaud’s ultimately 
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primary concern for the theater.  Interestingly, even when Esslin does point to Artaud’s “impact” 
outside of the theater, “in poetry, literary criticism, psychology, political ideology, philosophy, 
the drug cult, and the search for alternative life-styles” (2), cinema is conspicuously absent.  And 
when he does discuss Artaud’s role in the world of film, he does so only in terms of his acting 
career.  Aside from a brief mention of Seashell (27), he emphasizes the point repeatedly that “the 
theater remained Artaud’s main concern” (23).  Reiterating Nin and Knapp, Esslin portrays 
cinema to Artaud as a kind of deeply secondary concern that only emerges in the cracks of his 
struggles with theater: “Having suffered a defeat in the theater, Artaud fell back on the cinema.  
He desperately needed money, not least to enable him to relaunch his theatrical ventures.  He had 
hopes of selling some film scripts and, through these, breaking into film production” (31).  None 
of this even begins to approach the question of the weird and potentially closeted nature of those 
scenarios.  He doesn’t seem particularly interested in the scenarios themselves, and he even 
states, “What he did, what happened to him, what he suffered, what he was, is infinitely more 
important than anything he said or wrote” (6).  Which is an interesting way to downplay the 
written works of an author one is studying.  Esslin’s ultimate point is rendered starkly clear: 
Artaud struggled and experimented in other endeavors, “Yet he never lost sight of his main 
objective: to revolutionize the theater” (33).  By casting Artaud’s whole life and oeuvre in a 
teleological trajectory culminating in his works outlining the Theater of Cruelty, Esslin casts all 
of his filmic writing as trivia and asides, as fundamentally secondary. 
 Esslin’s is not an idiosyncratic viewpoint.  Albert Bermel’s study from around the same 
time (1977) implicitly makes this same point when he mentions Artaud’s film background as a 
context for the Theater of Cruelty in a very short section on “Related Arts” (52-54) that suggests 
Artaud was influenced by silent films (53).  And even Lee Jamieson, one of the only scholars to 
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have seriously addressed Artaud’s film theory (recall his article, discussed above, “The Lost 
Prophet of Cinema: The Film Theory of Antonin Artaud”), in a more recent work, his book 
Antonin Artaud: From Theory to Practice (2007), does not list Artaud’s work in cinema as 
among the contextual background for the Theater of Cruelty.  He states, “Although his 
experiences with surrealism and theatre had both ended in failure, they provided the essential 
building blocks for the development of his most ambitious project, the Theatre of Cruelty” (6).  
In other words, even as Jamieson acknowledges the way other failures were constitutive of 
Artaud’s later and ultimate project, his (also failed) work in cinema is not considered relevant 
here.  Across the board, it seems, Artaud the filmmaker is abjected in favor of Artaud the drama 
theoretician, for the sake––one can guess––of cementing his historical importance within neatly 
defined institutional borders.   
 But to relegate Artaud’s filmic theories to the stuff of secondary trivia seems grossly 
incongruous with the image of Artaud we get from statements like the one quoted above in the 
epigraph to this section, which bears reproducing at this juncture: 
The cinema is an amazing stimulant.  It acts directly on the grey matter of the 
brain.  When the savour of art has been sufficiently combined with the psychic 
ingredient which it contains it will go way beyond the theatre which we will 
relegate to a shelf of memories.  Because the theatre is a betrayal.  We see more 
of the actors than of the work––at any rate, it is they who affect us. (Artaud, 
Complete Works, vol. 3, 60) 
 
So in contrast to previous critics and in the interest of opening up a fresh viewpoint for 
considering the Theatre of Cruelty, I would like to establish three specific contexts for 
understanding Artaud’s writings about the theater.  The first two I have already mentioned: first, 
Artaud’s early film scenarios are arguably proto-closet-films, though they are fundamentally 
actual film scenarios, and second, by 1933, Artaud had abandoned the world of cinema proper 
altogether, writing in Les Cahiers jaunes, “The world of cinema is a dead world, illusory and 
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truncated” (qtd. in Kovács 178).  The third context is that in May of 1935, Artaud attempted to 
stage Percy Bysshe Shelley’s famous closet drama, The Cenci, which Edward Scheer explains 
“was a failure and only ran for seventeen performances” (4).  As Scheer notes, this is indicative 
of Artaud’s entire career; he is mainly known for his influence in the world of drama theory, 
whereas he “clearly failed as a practitioner” (2).  The basic question I hope to pose by 
establishing this peculiar contextual framework for approaching Artaud is this: How does the 
impotentiality of Artaud’s theory of a cinema of pure potentiality undergird, inform, or otherwise 
manifest in his theory of the theater of cruelty?  After all, Artaud’s friend Benjamin Fondane 
(discussed below), articulated exactly that “Artaud hoped to find in the Theater of Cruelty the 
lost path of the cinema” (Christenson 73). 
 
 
 
An Onto-Cinematic Contextualization of Artaud’s Theater of Cruelty 
Ultimately, the stakes that Artaud carves out for his Theater of Cruelty are essentially 
ontological.  In “Theatre and the Plague,” Artaud compares the experience of theater to a literal 
plague: “Just like the plague, it [theater] reforges the links between what does and does not exist 
in material nature” (18).  Artaud claims that “theatre can only happen the moment the 
inconceivable really begins” (18).  Theater itself, in other words, rewrites potentiality.  It 
determines the laws of what is possible.  “In theatre,” articulates Artaud, “As in the plague, there 
is a kind of strange sun, an unusually bright light by which the difficult, even the impossible 
suddenly appears to be our natural medium” (21).  We might expect that Artaud would relate 
these ontological questions about theater to his earlier career in film, since his attempts to create 
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cinema, most notably with The Seashell and the Clergyman, were so heavily inclined towards 
Surrealist concerns with questions of being, psychology, and metamorphosis.  But the cinema is 
noticeably absent from Artaud’s most famous work, the essays collected under the title Le 
Théâtre et son Double.  There are zero references to film in the first five essays leading up to the 
manifestos on the Theater of Cruelty itself, more than halfway through the book.  And when 
Artaud does finally address the cinema, he does so in not only tangential, but downright bizarre 
ways.  On closer examination, however, there seems to be something of the cinema pervading 
the whole text on a deeper, more subtle level.  For it is precisely Artaud’s background in 
scenario-writing and his failure as a film practitioner that constitutes much of his later dramatic 
theory.  For example, though nowhere in “On the Balinese Theatre” does Artaud mention 
cinema, many of his seminal descriptions of the form that perhaps most directly influenced his 
dramatic thinking seem to uncannily mirror descriptions of the medium of film, especially 
Agamben’s thoughts on gestural cinema (See Introduction): “Everything in this theatre is 
assessed with living, unerring attention to detail.  Nothing is left either to chance or individual 
initiative.  It is a kind of sublime dance where the dancers are actors first and foremost” (40).  
What seems to attract Artaud to this sort of theater is somewhat cinematic: its attention to detail 
(think of the close-up), or the removal of chance and the aleatory that is so essential to live 
theater.  Is not “sublime dance” an astonishing epithet for cinema?  Artaud continues, “In the 
Balinese theatre one senses a state prior to language, able to select its own language; music, 
gestures, moves and words” (44), and adds, “This quintessent theatre where objects about-face 
strangely before returning to abstraction” (48).  It is not just that these descriptions seem to 
resonate with the filmic medium; indeed, it seems that cinematic tools might be the most 
appropriately suited to carrying to fruition the ideas that Artaud finds so compelling within 
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Balinese theater.  The ability to examine the most minute details of “music, gestures, moves and 
words”––think Muybridge––are perhaps most precisely articulated through film and 
photography.  And yet, despite a deep and long-lasting (if conflicted) interest in film, Artaud 
does not bring it up here, though he does compare theater to painting and poetry frequently. 
Nor is cinema referenced in “No More Masterpieces,” in which Artaud calls for a break 
from traditional textual dialogue-driven theater and outlines what he means by suggesting that 
cruelty should replace it.  Artaud writes, 
I suggest we ought to return through theatre to the idea of a physical knowledge 
of images, a means of inducing trances, just as Chinese medicine knows the 
points of acupuncture over the whole extent of the human anatomy, down to our 
most sensitive functions… Theatre can reinstruct those who have forgotten the 
communicative power or magic mimicry of gesture, because a gesture contains its 
own energy, and there are still human beings in theatre to reveal the power of 
these gestures. (61) 
 
Again, what Artaud harps on is this attention to the concrete image, and a sort of metaphysical 
return to prelinguistic gestural communication.  As Agamben and critics influenced by his 
philosophy have articulated (See Introduction ), cinema seems the perfect vehicle for such a task.  
But for Artaud at this point in his career, cinema is off the table in this regard.  Instead, he writes, 
“Therefore I propose a theatre where violent physical images pulverise, mesmerise the 
audience’s sensibilities, caught in the drama as if in a vortex of higher forces” (63).  Ironically, in 
practice history has borne out that arguably film, not theater, is best suited to “pulverising” 
audiences with “violent physical images.”   
When Artaud does tackle the question of cinema directly, he does so energetically, if 
occasionally cryptically.  In “Theatre and Cruelty,” he argues, 
The damage wrought by psychological theatre, derived from Racine, has rendered 
us unaccustomed to the direct, violent action theatre must have.  Cinema in its 
turn, murders us with reflected, filtered and projected images that no longer 
connect with our sensibility, and for ten years has maintained us and all our 
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faculties in an intellectual stupor. (64) 
 
Here, cinema becomes the signifier through which Artaud vocalizes his feeling of distinction 
from living action, and possibly also registers his personal disconnection from the film industry.  
Film lacks the physical presence and immediacy of theater, but it is unclear exactly what Artaud 
means that filmic images do not “connect with our sensibility.”  Then, Artaud goes on to say, 
“Practically speaking, we want to bring back the idea of total theatre, where theatre will 
recapture from cinema, music-hall, the circus and life itself, those things that always belonged to 
it” (66).  Artaud thus casts his project not as necessarily against or opposed to cinema and other 
media, but as a recuperation from them of what is proper to theater.  In establishing his own 
theatrical language, Artaud takes (or re-takes) from cinema objects which he believes should 
define the theater.  Perhaps the vaguely cinematic emphasis on ritualized gestural detail that he 
finds so appealing in Balinese theater is part of that project.   
In “The Theatre of Cruelty: First Manifesto,” Artaud’s turn away from cinema is clear, 
but the justification for this seems a vague rationalization.  Artaud clearly experienced great 
difficulty in articulating his disdain for the cinema, likely for the reason that he felt personally 
abandoned or betrayed by it:  
Cinema: Through poetry, theatre contrasts pictures of the unformulated with the 
crude visualization of what exists.  Besides, from an action viewpoint, one cannot 
compare a cinema image, however poetic it may be, since it is restricted by the 
film, with a theatre image which obeys all life’s requirements. (77) 
 
This passage is uncharacteristically unclear and obfuscating, even for Artaud.  It is notable that 
Artaud’s categorical denigrations of film are amongst the least cogent of his writings.  In “The 
Theatre of Cruelty: Second Manifesto,” Artaud takes an even weirder approach: 
And just as there are to be no empty spatial areas, there must be no let up, no 
vacuum in the audience’s mind or sensitivity.  That is to say there will be no 
distinct divisions, no gap between life and theatre.  Anyone who has watched a 
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scene of any film being shot, will understand just what I mean. (84) 
 
So while cinema represents in some sense an antithetical position to the Theater of Cruelty, in its 
textual distancing from the Real, the production of cinema itself is somehow very much akin to 
the spatial immediacy of the Theater of Cruelty.  Artaud continues,  
We want to have the same material means, lighting, extras, and resources at our 
disposal for a stage show, as are daily squandered on reels of film, where 
everything that is active and magic about such a display is lost forever. (85).   
 
Again, the interest here is, bizarrely enough, on the theatricality of cinematic production.  In an 
oblique way, Artaud thus gestures towards the same set of questions opened up by closet film: 
the introduction of the elements of cinematic production into another medium.  Even if film itself 
is a superficial waste, the live making of the film is itself a kind of definitional Theater of 
Cruelty par excellence, an assaulting barrage that closes the gap between life and theater.  
Perhaps the Theater of Cruelty’s debt to Artaud’s thinking (and repression of thinking) about 
cinema, can be best summed up by his oddly Eisensteinian assessment in “Oriental and Western 
Theatre,” that, “A playwright who uses nothing but words is not needed and must give way to 
specialists in objective, animated enchantment” (54). 
  
 
 
Benjamin Fondane and the Formal Foundation of Closet Film 
Let us now turn to one such specialist.  In 1928, Benjamin Fondane, a Romanian 
expatriate who had moved to Paris and become involved there with the Surrealist Movement, 
declared: “ ‘Let us open the period of unperformable scenarios’ ” (qtd. in Matthews 74; the 
French has “scénarios injouables”).  Matthews argues that whereas some other Surrealist poets 
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produced “awkward, unpolished imitations of the movies” (74), Fondane followed “a direction 
of thought in which the projection of the ‘film’ becomes conceivable only on the screen of the 
imagination… His is a form of a film scenario that actively resists adaptation to the cinema” 
(74).  Fondane was thus the earliest practitioner of the closet film in the west, following 
Akutagawa’s major efforts by only a year.  It is almost certainly clear that Fondane and the other 
French Surrealists developed the idea independently from Akutagawa, who was relatively 
unknown outside of Japan until 1950, when Akira Kurosawa’s Rashomon was released to 
massive international acclaim.  The film, which was based on one of Akutagawa’s short stories 
and took its name from another, catapulted Akutagawa into international awareness.  Jeffrey 
Angles notes that while Akutagawa was “among the earliest contemporary authors to be 
translated into English.  Several translations appeared during the prewar period,” most of these 
circulated only within Japan and not abroad.  I have not been able to find any translations in 
French of Akutagawa’s works that date from before 1950.  Though the years 1950-1955 
certainly saw a veritable explosion of Akutagawa’s works in French, he was likely unknown 
even in literary circles before that, and certainly would not have been familiar or even available 
to the Surrealists in the late twenties.   
Fondane called his first explorations into what I am now calling closet films “ciné-
poéms.”  Matthews argues that Fondane’s decree that these scenarios should indeed be 
unfilmable (injouables) constituted “less as a confession of failure than the expression of a wish 
to go beyond the technical restrictions of the film as form, in the direction of enlarged 
imaginative freedom” (74).  Fondane published his first collection of these ciné-poéms, Trois 
Scénarii, in 1928.  This, in other words, is an excellent place to look for Surrealist Cinema, albeit 
of a potential kind.  But Matthews doesn’t offer more than a brief gloss of Fondane; rather, he 
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shifts his attention to a long chapter on––who else?––Bunuel, following the trend of isolating 
Surrealist Cinema to an extremely limited number of produced films.   
Recently, however, we have seen a growing appreciation of Fondane’s work, especially 
in the context of his Romanian Jewish expatriat standing––Fondane was killed in Auschwitz in 
1944.  Benjamin Ivry writes about this recent trend within France, but laments the lack of 
international fanfare around his work.  Ivry argues that Fondane “deserves to be celebrated 
outside France, as well, as his far-ranging gifts and accomplishments are at the heart of 20th-
century Jewish artistic and philosophical modernism” (np).  Ivry emphasizes Fondane’s 
Jewishness and the theme of Jewishness in his oeuvre, almost to the exclusion of other avenues 
into his work.  And though Ivry notes, “As a great lover of film (and director of “Tararira,” a 
now sadly lost 1936 musical filmed in Argentina), Fondane did not take kindly to the advent of 
talkies, observing, “ ‘As soon as films become garrulous, they become nationalist’ ” (np), he 
does not anywhere mention his early ciné-poéms.  Of course, this is probably a fair assessment, 
and, to be sure, even in the small world of Fondane studies his early experimental closet films 
constitute marginalia.  But they are very interesting from the perspective of the present study, 
however, as the earliest western examples of the genre.  Fondane was one of the first to publish a 
collection of writings formatted entirely as film scenarios, but clearly intended to be published as 
literary texts without any real eye towards film production.   
 One critic to make note of Fondane’s intriguing works in the specific context of Surrealist 
Cinema is Peter Christenson, who in his essay included in Rudolph Kuenzli’s major volume 
Dada and Surrealist Film draws attention to Fondane’s ciné-poéms.  While ultimately 
Christenson neither contextualizes Fondane within a broader concept of filmic literature or closet 
film, nor does he analyze the formal idiosyncrasy of Fondane’s scenarios themselves, he does an 
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excellent job establishing the context and terms in which Fondane was operating and 
experimenting.  He writes,  “Fondane’s own six-page preface, ‘2x2,’ to the scenarios also does 
not discuss the filmscripts themselves, only the rationale behind them.  Fondane, who began as a 
symbolist poet, writing in his native Romanian, wanted his scenarios to be read only, not filmed” 
(72), thereby establishing, more-or-less definitively, the closet film avant-la-lettre.  Here is the 
most important passage of “2x2,” translated (by my estimation very well) by Christenson: 
Let us therefore inaugurate the era of unfilmable scenarios.  A little of the 
amazing beauty of a foetus can be found there.  Let us say at once that these 
scenarios written to be read will be suddenly drowned by literature (note the trace 
of acid in my cinepoems), the true scenario being by nature very difficult to read 
and impossible to write.  But then why deliberately hold on to this nothingness?  
Because a part of myself which poetry represses, in order to be able to pose its 
own agonizing questions, has just found in the cinema an all-purpose amplifier” 
(qtd. in Christenson 72). 
 
Fondane’s formulation, that cinema amplifies what poetry represses, is a remarkable one (In 
Chapters Three and Four I will discuss at length ways of thinking about how the closet film form 
has an amplifying effect), and sets the up the basic conceit of the genre quite eloquently.  For it is 
precisely through the generation of multiple potential anterior realities offered by the specifically 
closeted nature of this film form that such amplification occurs.  If poetry tends to point inward–
–at the text itself––then closet film gestures out: to the world of film production as well as the 
many potential films themselves.  A read scenario is an occasion for the reader to imagine 
making the film as much as it is one for spectating it. 
  Christenson locates these closet films in their particular Dadaist context.  He asserts, 
“The nihilistic and catastrophic element of Dada is apparent in the idea of films which cannot be 
filmed; they do not harden into works of art, but exist as events in the readers’ mind” (73).  
Taking this a step further, Christenson argues that these works constituted a critique of 
Surrealism and sympathize with the older aesthetics of Dada.  He states, “Fondane’s scenarios 
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should be seen in the Dadaist tradition of returning to a zero state and beginning anew… Trois 
Scenarii makes a fitting close to the Dada era of metaphysical questioning.  Even the film is 
gone” (83).  The radical gesture and inherent absurdism of the form, in other words, is more 
closely in line with Dadaist principles than with Surrealist experimentation.  Notably, however, 
Christenson makes this argument as much on the grounds of the confusing content of the 
scenarios as on their idiosyncratic form, claiming that “The lack of causation for many actions 
allows the reader to mentally project a film for himself/herself in which images will fill in some, 
but not all, of these gaps” (76).  Not only is the form itself a return to ground zero, a beginning 
anew, but also at every turn the scenarios, through their very obliqueness––their frequent 
metalepsis, the “gaps” in their plots––encourage a parallel return to the zero state of the story.  
But we might qualify any suggestion that Fondane’s closet films constitute a kind of throwing up 
one’s hands at the seeming impasses of film poetry––that they tear down everything and start 
from something wholly new––and rather understand them in the specific context of a careful 
fusion of two forms––silent film scenario free verse––and geared towards specific literary 
effects.   
  Take for example, Fondane’s own epigraph to his Trois Scenarii: “The cuts and other 
technical information included in the text of these three cinépoems should not be understood as 
oblique references to film direction; they were merely intended to facilitate the creation of a 
temporary state of mind that the memory destroys along with the act of reading.”  The emphasis 
here is on the creation of something already understood to be fleeting and ethereal, rather than 
some kind of reactionary or destructive force.  Like Akutagawa, whose closet films are 
sometimes understood as reactionary and anti-cinematic, Fondane seems less interested in 
resisting the cinema in favor of literature than he is in creating a wholly new fusion out of 
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multiple intersecting forms.  And in his attempt to do so in a way that plumbs the unconscious 
with absurdist juxtapositions, his work is at least as Surrealist as it is Dadaist.  What is also clear 
from this epigraph is Fondane’s awareness of the peculiar phenomenology of closet film form, 
which “facilitate[s] the creation of a temporary state of mind.”  This is precisely what it does so 
uniquely, for, like closet drama, closet film offers the reader an opportunity to read the text as a 
literary one while simultaneously imagining the potential film it references, as well as the 
production of that film.  The difference is one of degree, since the screenplay bears so much less 
cultural capital than the playscript, but also degree of complication, since we––in the age of 
cinema––already understand texts through a kind of internalized cinematic lens.  To read a poetic 
film scenario thus engenders multiple possibilities for the “state of mind” of the reader.  It is a 
highly subjective experience that necessitates the dialectical suspension in the mind of the reader 
of multiple simultaneously ontological states for the diegetic world of the text, its potential filmic 
product(s), and the production process of realizing that text into film.   
  To achieve this end and capitalize on the specific formal potentialities of the closet film 
genre, Fondane employs a new literary device I would like to call Surrealist Closet-Montage.  
Barre fixe, which Quimby Melton translates as “Horizontal Bar” in his recent translation, opens 
much like a typical scenario.  The first section seems fairly filmable and references the conceits 
of many typical silent films of the 1920s: 
7 on the sidewalk a laborer reads a newspaper 
8 the young man's head leans out of the poster over the shoulder of the 
laborer he reads: 
9 "Freedom!" 
10 the worker throws down the paper and runs away 
11 the young man steps down and picks up the paper 
12 he leafs through it for a moment 
13 and puts it back where he found it 
14 seen from behind the young man busies himself in front of the poster. (np) 
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The numbered sections seem to delineate individual camera shots, split mostly upon the lines of 
individual actions.  The separate shot for “Freedom!” (9) gestures towards either an insert of the 
newspaper or a title card with the text on it.  The head painted on the advertisement coming out 
of the poster is a familiar conceit, easy enough to do with one superimposition.  But very soon 
after this, weirder techniques emerge in the form, and not just at the level of absurd individual 
shots that strain credulity and filmability, of which there are plenty, such as “60 a half-kangaroo, 
half-human child files a complaint” (np).  Similarly, in Paupières Mûres, which Melton 
translates as “Eyes Wide Open,” though it more literally means, “mature eyelids” or “ripe 
eyelids” or, most surrealistically, “blackberry eyelids,” there are similar moments of technical 
challenge and absurdist imagery, such as “32 the unconscious man’s respiratory tract, his lungs 
expanding and contracting faster and faster until they detach –– dead leaves” (np).  And, on the 
other hand, there are moments of comically overspecific description, which seem to resist 
filmability from the other end of the ironic spectrum: “72 view of the café interior at a 57° angle” 
(np).  In his Translator’s Notes, Quimby Melton sums up these sorts of devices: 
Assuming it isn’t a simple printing error, which I think we’re safe in doing, one 
can interpret the absence of scenes 17 and 33-38, the repetition of scene 18, and 
the cinépoem's other ambiguities –– e.g., Fondane's refusal to describe the murder 
method in scene 30, provide actual dialogue for his “pontificating man” in scene 
40, or describe the contents of the newspaper page in scene 69 –– a number of 
different ways: it helps create a highly subjective text that invites experimentation 
and individualized reading experiences; it adds another, formal layer of surrealism 
to the text; it allows Fondane to challenge the ways in which texts are ordinarily 
presented and read; and it allows Fondane to interrupt and manipulate the reading 
experience and, reminiscent of the metatheatricality of Brechtian epic theatre, 
emphasize the artificiality of the text, that is, remind the reader s/he is reading a 
text or, more specifically, a cinépoem. However, perhaps most importantly for 
Lesescenario studies, by sacrificing the script's directive objectivity and syuzhet 
clarity, which all production-oriented filmscripts are expected to have, Fondane’s 
technique also weaves a strong anti-production sensibility into the text. (This is to 
say nothing of the various “special effect” challenges and technical impossibilities 
Fondane's script would have presented to early 20th century filmmakers).  (np) 
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But it is not so much in such individual instances that Fondane’s formal techniques best 
capitalize on the scenario form.  Rather, it is in the way that Fondane combines multiple shots 
together that the truly closeted elements of this closet film come to the fore.  Take for example: 
22 cut to a boy 
23 of whom nothing remains but a skeleton holding a satchel under its arm. 
(np) 
 
Though it is easy to simply read through Barre Fixe as a kind of fever dream poem, if you stop 
and consider the formal eccentricities of a passage like this something fascinating emerges.  In a 
film, you cannot see the description of a character introduced in one shot in a different shot than 
the one that introduces him.  That is, if we see the boy in Shot 22, it cannot be revealed a 
moment later that there is nothing left of him but a skeleton.  We could choose to adapt this 
conceit by dissolving from a “boy” to a “skeleton” in one shot to the next, but since there is no 
specification here to do so, that would be a liberty not justified by the script.  The effect here, in 
other words, is highly literary, and very anti-production.  In fact, it constitutes a thing in this 
closet film that is quite literally technically unfilmable, because what is achieved here can only 
be done so by reading the scenario.  Ironically, this is done right at the moment where direct 
technical information, in the form of the “cut to,” intrudes into the text.  At the moment where 
the text most insists upon its scriptic function, calling the reader’s attention to the filmic detail of 
editing, it simultaneously sweeps the rug out from the conceit of filmability by producing a 
purely literary effect that is untranslatable to cinema.  This is the phenomenon I am calling 
Surrealist Closet-Montage, and it is a paradigmatic formulation of Closet Film, and by extension 
Potential Cinema itself.   
 Fondane exercises this technique throughout the Scenarii.  Later in Barre Fixe, he writes:  
101  cut to an ostrich 
102  eating an Eskimo. (np) 
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The primary question here involves how we conceive––and necessarily re-conceive––Shot 101 
as we read this text.  In the potential film referenced by the text, in Shot 101 is the ostrich eating 
the Eskimo?  Or does the ostrich only begin to eat the Eskimo in the next shot?  While this line 
of questioning might seem like we are quibbling over minutiae, it is actually precisely this formal 
oddity that constitutes the ground upon which the whole ciné-poem functions.  The irony of the 
impossibility here is what engenders the humor, and the formal impossibility of shooting this as 
it is written forms the backdrop for the impossibility of the image itself, in which characters from 
literally opposite ends of the world are doubly inverted by their unusual pecking order, if you 
will.  This is, in other words, an incredibly economic structure for accomplishing some of the 
primary literary effects sought by Surrealist authors in late 1920s Paris.  The juxtaposition of 
bizarre symbolically laden images is rendered fantastically impossible.  It is, in Fondane’s own 
terms, calibrated to “facilitate the creation of a temporary state of mind,” in which the 
unconscious can be accessed in a deep and innovative manner.   
It is perhaps for this reason that mannequins play a distinct role in both Barre Fixe and 
Paupières Mûres, uncannily recalling the emphasis on puppets in Akutagawa’s Asakusa Park 
(See Chapter One).  In Barre Fixe, “29  a group of mannequins stands at attention and 
immediately begins marching” (np), and then later the young woman flirted with by the young 
man transforms into a mannequin:  “49  the young woman is a mannequin who breaks in his 
hands” (np).  These images are recalled in Paupières Mûres when we see,  
21 a pale tailor's mannequin in a shop window 
22  applauds wildly with both hands. (np) 
 
Both scenarios involve a basic love story between a young man and a young woman that goes 
surrealistically awry, and include murder and misunderstandings which result in mob chase 
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scenes.  Typical of Surrealistic films (and literature), it is difficult to summarize anything like a 
plot, and in both cases what we have mostly gestures toward story and narrative in the form of a 
montage of absurdly juxtaposed images.  So it is interesting that mannequins are an imagistic 
conceit that adheres not only in these closet films, but in totally independent Japanese ones as 
well.  On one hand, it is clear that the mannequin-coming-to-life is a trope that silent film was 
able to handle with singular aplomb, the moving picture being able to perform this “trick” more 
nimbly than the stage, and more viscerally than literature.  But, on a deeper level, what the trope 
foregrounds is the uncertainty between the animate and inanimate, the static and the moving.  
The mannequin reveals itself as alive through its ability to move, which is registered as a purely 
visual phenomenon.  It is therefore not just a cinematic trope, but a cinematic trope that speaks to 
the essence of what cinema is perceived to have over and above the literary text: the ability to 
shock and delight with the visual spectacle of the unexpected, inanimate thing seeming to come 
to life.  Or, on the other hand, the human woman who becomes a mannequin and subsequently 
breaks in the hands of the young man.  These images gesture directly toward the question of 
what is real and what is illusion, as well as what is possible and what is impossible in the space 
between filmic and literary art. 
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Surrealism, Realism, and the Real 
And at the same time it [surrealism] is in search of an absolute event, in which 
man manifests himself with all his possibilities, that is to say, as the entirety that 
surpasses them.  It is an absolute event, the revelation of the real functioning of 
thought by automatic writing.  It is an absolute event in which everything is 
realized, the discovery of a ‘certain point of mind in which life and death, the real 
the imaginary, past and future, the communicable and the incommunicable, high 
and low, cease being perceived as contradictory. 
–– André Breton  
 
  Surrealism, as a movement, has a basically ontological crux: it is a collection of ideas 
organized around the problematic relationship of art to being, and to questions about art and the 
Real.  This is perhaps best demonstrated by the quarrel that occurred between the two factions of 
poets, each self-applying the title Surrealists, over the potential of cinema.  As Kovács relates, in 
October 1924 a group of young poets, influenced by Appolinaire, published their own manifesto 
of Surrealism contra the group that would become “the Surrealists,” headed by André Breton. 
Their outlet was the first (and last) issue of Surrealisme, in which they denounced the other 
Surrealists’ emphasis on dream and thought and advocated the superiority of reality and the 
physical (25-26).  It was this group, under the leadership of Ivan Goll, that vouched for the 
cinema in different terms: “Film is the most realistic art possible, pure art.  Films of imagination 
are impure (“Manifeste de surrealisme,” Surrealisme, October 1924).”  So where Breton’s group 
looked to the cinema for its potentialities in exploring the poetic, the emotional, and the 
psychological, Goll’s group of anti-surrealists, or perhaps alter-surrealists, loved cinema for a 
different, and perhaps obverse reason: aptitude for materialism, its attachment to the concrete 
and the real. 
  What is key here is the way that the group that would come to be called the Surrealists 
defined their own artistic relationship with the cinema as specifically opposed to Realism.  Their 
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stance on cinema, in other words, was defined against the conception that the cinematic medium 
affords a special connection to representing reality authentically.  J.H. Matthews states: “Among 
the cinema’s prime qualities, generally acknowledged even by those who would not accept this 
as its supreme virtue, is a remarkable aptitude for recording reality with admirable fidelity” (vii).  
But “In sharp contrast, the surrealists’ approach to movies takes its point of departure in the 
conviction boldly summarized by one of their leading spokesmen on film, Jacques B. Brunius, 
that the cinema is ‘the least realist art’ ” (vii).  In this context it makes quite a lot of sense that 
Surrealist Cinema would be keep cinema itself at arm’s length.  The Surrealist closet film thus 
emerges in part out of this schism, or perhaps as a way of reconciling Breton’s emphasis on the 
unconscious and the poetic with Goll’s on cinematic Realism.  Fondane’s closet films, like a 
certain strain of Artaud’s thought, rewrite Realism within the confines of the closet film.  There 
is neither a text nor a film that faithfully represents an anterior reality, but the text certainly 
represents the reality of the potential film it generates in a faithfully mimetic way.  The model of 
realism emphasized by the Surrealist closet film––and in this it is indicative of the genre as a 
whole––is thus one in which the mimetic occurs at the level of representing not an anterior 
reality, but on the potential filmic reality gestured to by the text itself.   
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CHAPTER 3 
THE QUEER BLACK CLOSET FILM 
 
 One of the rare texts to have been treated as a closet film, James Baldwin’s One Day 
When I Was Lost: A Scenario Based on Alex Haley’s The Autobiography of Malcolm X is a 
screenplay that was never made into a film as such.  Rather, under unique and auspicious 
circumstances (discussed below), Baldwin published the screenplay in book form, as a literary 
work.  Brian Norman, in an essay that eloquently and generatively outlines the text’s unique 
publication history and its relation to American race politics and the limits of cinematic 
representation, describes the piece as something he “can only call a ‘closet screenplay’ ” (103).  
Norman’s befuddlement with how to contextualize such a work bespeaks the gaping hole of 
critical work in the field.  That “closet screenplay” is the “only” term he can even think of 
demonstrates the fundamental absence of a theoretical grounding for the genre.  There is clearly 
no existing technical vocabulary readily available here.  For one thing, it is not immediately clear 
if the “closet,” whether you call it a closet film or a closet screenplay or whatever, is even the 
most proper epithet in this case.  For, at first glance, the closet is organized around the concept of 
intention, works not meant or intended for the stage or for film production (See Introduction).  
The OED defines the closet drama, for example, as “a play intended to be read rather than 
performed; such plays collectively.”  The most immediate correlate, we should think, in the 
world of cinema, should therefore be a screenplay not intended to be filmed.  But, as Norman 
notes, Baldwin clearly intended this project to be made into an actual film, and the history of 
Baldwin’s work on the project is well documented in, for example, his own No Name in the 
Street (1972), as well as other sources, such as his secretary David Leeming’s biography of 
Baldwin (1994).  As Norman relates, “Shortly after Malcolm's murder in 1965, Hollywood 
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approached Baldwin to adapt the Autobiography” (104).  However, later Baldwin “hastily 
published his original version of the script in 1972 as One Day, When I was Lost, and split 
town,” (105) after he realized that Hollywood would inevitably turn “Malcolm X into yet another 
American monument on tourist expeditions into American history.  With this danger in mind, 
Baldwin turned to his ‘scenario’ to extend the unfinished project of Malcolm X” (109, emphasis 
original).  For example: “Baldwin's former secretary, David Leeming, notes that familiar actor-
heroes were considered for the role of Malcolm X, even Charlton Heston––‘darkened up a bit’ ” 
(104).  What emerges in Baldwin’s and Leeming’s accounts is that when it became clear 
Hollywood would take the project away from Baldwin, he used literary publication as a method 
of protecting the integrity of his work, as well as securing the copyright on his portion of work 
on the project.   
 We might thus understand One Day When I Was Lost as a “closet” film in the sense that 
we can understand its publication as a kind of metaphoric retreat into the closet of small-scale 
literary circulation instead of the mass appeal of, say, Spike Lee’s eventual film version.12  This 
would be very much akin to Catherine Burroughs’s discussion of pseudo-closet dramas labeled 
under the heading of “disappointed authorship” (217), in which playwrights have “aspired to 
theatrical success and then failed––and who then published their work so that it might be 
assessed anew, perhaps even eventually performed” (217).  Burroughs insists that “closet drama 
should be framed… apart” (217) from instances of “disappointed authorship,” and likewise 
closet film should not be confused with instances in which the closet is an afterthought.  
However, Baldwin’s work is uniquely positioned here as a work that was already somewhat of a 
                                                
12 Norman notes that “[t]he role of James Baldwin's script in Spike Lee's film has been thoroughly downplayed, 
dismissed, or in some way denied.  Lee mentions Baldwin's script as one of many from which he worked, and 
though he claims it to be the best, he succinctly dismisses it as lacking a finished ending, noting Baldwin's heavy 
drinking and the assistance of Arnold Perl” (108).  In other words, Baldwin’s screenplay isn’t even totally closeted 
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closet film before its author was disappointed by its failure to be produced.  Partly, this is 
because we can also understand Baldwin’s move to publish-as-literary-work as strategic, and 
even necessary.  In other words, its failure was inbuilt, and Baldwin seems to have been aware of 
this even in writing it.  Norman argues that “the ‘closet screenplay’ seems an appropriate vehicle 
for a version of Malcolm X written by a queer writer caught between a virulently homophobic 
Black Nationalist movement in one corner and a reactionary Nixon-era America in another” 
(103), because it 
offers a formal lesson in the politics of 'mainstream' markets, crossover 
campaigns, and race relations at the salt point in American history where calls for 
integration recede and self-determination surfaces on a national scene 
increasingly dominated by visual culture.  Further, the circulating print script 
might offer an example of a ‘queer’ reading practice that does not shut down 
questions of history, experience, and self-examination with the trump card of 
settled identity. (103) 
  
Implicitly making the move Nick Salvato does more overtly and sweepingly in Uncloseting 
Drama, Norman thus equates the strategic closeting of his screenplay with a queer political 
practice.  Reading Baldwin’s film, rather than seeing it, offers its audience a different, and 
possibly queerer, experience of its content.   
 Another way to understand Baldwin’s script in the context of the queer closet is that the 
term “closet drama” often refers not necessarily to the intention of the author, but to the 
technical––or, less often, sociopolitical––unstageability of the play.  In this case, we might see 
Baldwin’s work as in a sense beyond the limits of cinematic representation because of its 
controversial racial and political content.  And, unlike drama, because of the hyper-collaborative 
and industrial nature of the cinema (movies, until very recently, could very literally not be made 
without the sort of funding that occludes individual and small-scale endeavor), we might 
understand this kind of constitutive censorship as very much a technical limitation of film.  
                                                                                                                                                       
at all: portions of it find their way into Lee’s film. 
  
161 
Indeed, as this chapter will show, the closet film in general is perhaps most fully actualized when 
depicting the impotentialities of cinematic representation: that which cannot be filmed, but can 
be written about.  Not only in the work of James Baldwin, but also in closet films by William 
Burroughs and Darius James, the closet of closet screenplay is a resoundingly queer one.   
 
 
 
The Closet as a Formal Problem 
 Norman’s analysis of Baldwin’s relation to queer black politics is accurate overall, but 
his interest in the cultural and political context of the work dominates perhaps to the exclusion of 
a detailed examination of the text’s specific formal properties.  Indeed, he argues: 
In the end, the relation between text and image brokered by the never-filmed 
‘scenario’ is little concerned with generic differences between print and visual 
cultures or formal differences between film and text.  The ‘closet screenplay’ 
makes visible the racial propriety of an increasingly visual popular culture while it 
negotiates between seemingly immiscible poles: white and black, man and 
woman, text and image, history and present, Harlem and Hollywood. (115) 
 
In other words, the formal specificities of the “closet screenplay” only matter in relation to the 
contextual political “closeting” of certain unspeakabilities about race.  But while much of 
Norman’s analysis seems accurate, relevant, and clearly important, he (I think unnecessarily) 
jettisons from his discussion potentially interesting questions about “generic differences between 
print and visual cultures or formal differences between film and text.”  For example, Norman 
never discusses the implications of Baldwin’s noteworthy choice of “scenario,” a term for the 
pre-sound textual documents used in the production of silent films, nor does Norman discuss the 
repeated emphasis on multiple levels of refracted gazing (the opening lines: “We see the driver’s 
bespectacled eyes in the rearview mirror: eyes both haunted and alert" (1)), that seem to 
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foreground the problematics of visual representation in a screenplay bound for literary 
publication. 
 Baldwin’s script is mostly devoid of explicitly filmic references.  There are no real scene 
headings explaining location or time of day, and there are very few directions regarding camera 
placement or other production details.  But what is most fascinating (and what can only be 
arrived at by looking at the specific formal properties of the text and its complex negotiation of 
the “generic differences between print and visual cultures or formal differences between film and 
text” that Norman overlooks), is the way that what few direct invocations of filmic production do 
occur, do so at the moments of greatest affect and intensity.  For example, there is a rare but 
extremely powerfully used “Close-up” (99) on Malcolm’s face as he watches a wealthy white 
man get beaten by a black prostitute he was pimping.  We see only Malcolm's face, hear them in 
voice-over (99-100).  Another intense moment, where Archie is set to possibly kill Malcolm for 
allegedly cheating him at the numbers racket, and Archie shows up at the bar and pulls a gun on 
him, is where we get “MALCOLM's back is now to the camera” (111).  There are explicit 
references to close-ups again when Malcolm and Sophia receive their prison sentences (119-
120), and again on Malcolm and a prison guard at a tense moment when Luther is talking about 
blacks brainwashed into thinking they're white and starting a new country (126), then a whole 
slew of CUs in the tense scene where Luther seems to convince Malcolm to embrace his 
blackness and stop putting shit in his hair, etc., to look like the white devils who raped his 
mother and killed his father (129-131). 
 In other words, one line of thinking would suggest, at the moment when the burden of 
mimesis is felt most heavily, when the reader of this literary text is most significantly bound up 
in the verisimilar representation of its characters and events, the traditionally realist fantasy is 
  
163 
punctured by the reminder of cinematic impotentiality, the nonfilm that the script invokes.  But 
another way of thinking would suggest that our attention is not drawn away from mimetic 
illusion here, but rather that the explicit filmic references invoke for us a different, perhaps 
intermediary mimesis: that the mimetic illusion conjured by the reading of this text is not one of 
an anterior reality, but rather of the film that it plays in our heads while we read.  Thus this 
question, essentially of whether references to the camera here are jarring or not, is potentially a 
question about different kinds of readers, or different modes of reading.  In turn, it raises the 
further question of the extent to which this same dynamic plays out while reading novels.  And 
what consequences does that have for models of Realism in general? 
 
 
 
 
 
Further Down the Queer Black Closet Film Rabbit Hole… 
 
“One says to oneself: Either this guy is literally crazy or I’m in the presence of a 
real writer. I think that both possibilities should be entertained.”  
–Dany Laferriere on Darius James 
 
 Ultimately, Norman’s central thesis, that the “closet” of literature offers a good platform 
for understanding racial dynamics in ways that are not accessible by film, is perhaps best borne 
out by another queer black closet film.  Actually, Negrophobia: An Urban Parable: A Novel 
(1992), by Darius James (AKA “Dr. Snakeskin”), is probably the single best and most fully 
“realized” example of the closet film genre––I say “realized,” in scare-quotes, because I am also 
arguing that this genre is defined by its relation to potentiality explicitly against an 
understanding of the text as actualized, as realized totality.  We might say that this text is the 
most fully “realized” closet film in the sense that it most fully amplifies the potentialities of the 
genre.  To put it more simply, Negrophobia is literally the only work that fully and totally 
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answers the fundamental question that first instigated this entire project of potential cinema for 
me in the first place: are there any novels out there that are written in the form of the screenplay, 
like closet dramas are poems written in the form of plays?  While there are myriad works that fit 
this description in some ways but not in others, stunningly Negrophobia is, to my knowledge, the 
only thing we can totally and appropriately call “a novel written in screenplay format.”   
 In the (not surprisingly extremely scant) critical literature on Negrophobia, however, this 
central fact of the novel has been largely overlooked.  Ronald A. T. Judy’s “Irony and the 
Asymptotes of the Hyperbola” (1998) provides the first critical treatment of the novel, but 
examines mostly its publication history and the controversy surrounding its cover design, which 
originally featured an image of the black “Sambo” character and was later changed to a Sambo-
esque mask.  It was this controversy that the publishing house, Carol, sought to capitalize upon, 
but which ultimately, to some degree, backfired.  Judy reads Negrophobia as a “contemporary 
novel that illustrates the danger of identifying representation with experience” (167).  And 
though he does eloquently frame the text’s idiosyncrasy—“Negrophobia does not fit any of the 
recognized categories of literature, not even that of postmodern cult art.  It is unrecognizable” 
(168)—the novel’s specific formal uniqueness is never discussed.  In fact, though Judy does 
quote long passages, he never explicitly mentions its screenplay format except when he quotes 
Kirkus Review’s initial feature on the then-forthcoming novel, which mentions that it is “Written 
in the form of a screenplay” (qtd. in Judy 168).  Judy is not interested in formal questions.  Fair 
enough.  He is, on the other hand, interested in examining the nexus of art commodification and 
black representational politics in the avant-garde art world, and he makes an excellent case for 
Negrophobia’s originality and productive case history.  But taking the novel’s representational 
politics as the first fact of the text and largely ignoring the novel’s formal idiosyncrasy leads to a 
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few moments when its form is tangentially glossed: “The narrative of Negrophobia provides no 
clear perspective, no point of view from which it can be determined when one reality collides or 
slips into another.  The recurring shooting directions make the autonomy of each scene even 
more pronounced, resulting in an aggregate of radically disjunctive episodes, whose relationship 
to one another is indeterminate” (181-182).  That is a weird way to describe this novel, as if it 
were simply prose fiction that had shot descriptions interspersed throughout and not literally 
written almost entirely in screenplay formatting.  Clearly, without a conception of something like 
the “closet film” to begin with, texts like Negrophobia prove literally illegible to many readers.   
 The only other article (to my knowledge) that takes up a reading of Negrophobia at 
length is Rolland Murray’s more recent “Black Crisis Shuffle: Fiction, Race, and Simulation” 
(2008), which offers extended readings of Negrophobia as well as Paul Beatty’s The White Boy 
Shuffle (1996) as novels which “usefully trouble existing strategies for reading contemporary 
culture” (215).  Basically, argues Murray, these novels explore new potential modes for 
representing blackness without being bogged down by discourses focused on communal 
belonging and authenticity.  They each open up dialectical potentials for black representation that 
don’t fall into reductive categorization.  Instead, “They trade in the surprising aesthetic and 
political potential made available by racial identities that are more malleable and recombinant 
precisely because they have been so thoroughly abstracted from any social context but that of the 
commodity” (215).  Ultimately, the article’s thesis is that “Beatty and James write a black 
postmodernity that insists upon greater attentiveness to the relationship between an evolving 
political economy and the most fundamental assumptions of the African American literary and 
critical tradition” (215).  This seems both productive and accurate to me, though to my mind one 
of the most productive ways the novel engages with “an evolving political economy” is through 
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its incredibly distinctive engagement with intermediality and the specific formal fact of its 
closetedness.  Murray gestures vaguely in this direction, but ultimately has nothing to say about 
the novel’s formal structure: “James positions Negrophobia squarely within the minstrel 
tradition, and his work revels in the malleability that these mass-produced racial signifiers offer 
to the novelist.  At the same time, the novel foregrounds the debilitating effects that attend these 
forms” (216).  Even more-so than was the case with Judy, Murray is interested in foregrounding 
the text’s engagement with identity politics and the representation of black characters: “James 
asks us to read Negrophobia as a political counter to America's long history of racist 
representation” (217), he argues.  However, “The narrative seems bent instead on troubling the 
recovery of just such facile political readings.  It repeatedly stages the failure of key characters to 
reconfigure racist iconography in the guise of liberation.  And it is this disintegrative dimension 
of the novel’s aesthetic that can be most adequately interpreted with reference to late capitalist 
culture” (218).  Ultimately, he asserts, “The novel seems to promise a transformation of white 
consciousness itself by exposing Bubbles Brazil to an onslaught of a racist detritus that is both of 
her making and radically estranged from her.  But as I will show, the promise of transforming 
white consciousness is finally a red herring; Bubbles’ more revealing purpose in the text is to 
perform new modes of racial domination” (219). 
 The fact that Negrophobia is written in the form of a screenplay does not go entirely 
unmentioned, but is entirely foreclosed from the conversation here.  Murray states, “The novel 
presents itself as a screenplay where narration takes the guise of detailed scene descriptions. 
Throughout this cinematic text, the characters that appear are never presented as if they were 
actual subjects… There is no reality to race in Negrophobia outside the mass production of racial 
signifiers” (219).  Here we see the degree to which the lack of a defined genre is most felt.  Like 
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Norman’s befuddled characterization of Baldwin’s Malcolm X text as something he “can only 
call a ‘closet screenplay’ ” (103, my emphasis), Murray can apparently only understand the 
screenplay formatting of James’s novel as a “guise” for a more properly conceived “narration.”  
Sure, the “novel presents itself as a screenplay,” but, Murray implies, really it is just a regular old 
novel, and we can therefore roundly ignore this seeming formal idiosyncrasy.  He can then 
assert, on these grounds, that characters are never “actual subjects” without attending to the 
specific ontological questions that the closet film raises: if they are not “fictive” or “actual,” then 
what are they?  Cinematic?  How do we define this specific brand of ontological slipperiness?  
Here we therefore find a fertile ground for specifically the questions that seem to interest 
Murray—the way Negrophobia engages the problematics of identity politics, late capitalism, etc.  
Instead he, like Judy, draws a conclusion that seems accessible before one has even read this 
novel—that, in other words, one could draw simply from judging this book by its cover: “With 
equal potency, then, the disintegrative logics of late capitalism surface both as a mechanism for 
countering the hegemony of simulation itself and as a technology for anatomizing the resistant 
strategies that are the philosophical legacies of black nationalism and poststructuralism” (223). 
 My initial framework for approaching Negrophobia thus involves two key points.  First, 
we need to contextualize this work within the history of the previously unacknowledged closet 
film genre.  While of course we can trace its political lineage through African American and 
Caribbean literatures, its formal genealogy also has roots in not only American film culture, but 
in the closet-film form developed first in Tokyo and Paris in the 1920s.  Given this context and 
the overwhelming ignorance of such a genealogy, we should posit that the first and most central 
fact of Negrophobia—before we look to its potential political consequences and the history of its 
publication and marketing—is precisely that this text is “a novel written in screenplay format.”   
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 Not that we cannot call it other things as well.  In fact, it calls itself a great many things.  
The title page includes three separate lines of text: 
Negrophobia 
An Urban Parable 
A Novel 
If, in one’s confusion, one were to turn to the back copy on the cover jacket for some hope of 
generic illumination, one would likely find there only further befuddlement.  There, Catherine 
Texier describes the work, “Comic strip, sci-fi flick, vaudeville, black-faced minstrel show, and 
lyrical poem all rolled into one, Negrophobia is a funky, raunchy, angry, hilarious nightmare 
vision of black culture.”  Kirkus Reviews calls it “…a pop-schlock phantasmagoria.”  Steve 
Canon says, “This book is not a novel but a curse which will explode in your mind and cause 
your bottom to drop out.”  That all six of the back-jacket blurbs emphasize the literary merit of 
the text perhaps bespeaks the publisher Citadel’s especial concern with how to characterize such 
a novel, as if to say, “It’s all these crazy things, but don’t worry, it’s definitely literary.”  Kathy 
Acker’s entire blurb consists of the sentence, “Darius James is a great writer,” a position echoed 
by George Trow and Joel Rose.  Texier notes, “Darius James bursts into literature with a wild, 
surrealistic imagination,” and Kirkus calls Negrophobia the “the best novel to emerge from New 
York’s Lower East Side literary scene.”  Trow notes that while James is one of the funniest 
American writers, he is also “one of the most serious.”  Joel Rose calls him, among other things, 
“a nubile perpetrator of the great felony on new literature.  This is a writer of blazing intensity.  
Forever may he wave.”  Cannon says with this book James “proves himself to be the most 
promising” of “all the neo-hoodoo cosmogonic jesters.”  All of this makes for titillating back-
copy, but does not exactly clarify what is inside; rather, it serves to radically overdetermine the 
  
169 
formal and generic markers of the text. 
 If we do flip the thing open, James’ epigraphs only add to this obtuse complexity.  The 
first, a parody of a legal disclaimer, blurs the distinction between “fiction” and truth: 
Negrophobia 
is a work of fiction, 
a product of the author’s imagination. 
Any resemblance to any person,  
living or dead,  
is 
purely coincidental. 
Negrophobia is a work of fiction. 
Every word is true.  Fuck you. 
THE AUTHOR 
 
And the second, a quote from Steve Cannon (of back-jacket-blurb fame), blurs the distinction 
between history, image and reality: 
‘Jim, the whole history of this republic is the rape of a white woman and the 
lynching of a nigger.  Those two images.’ 
 ‘You’re speaking of images.’ 
 ‘Images my ass.  I’m speaking of reality.  That’s what makes this swirl go 
around.  The lynching of niggers and the raping of women.’ 
 
What is clear then is that this is a text that wants to position itself at the interstice of literary 
representation (“fiction”) and the extra-textual realities they not only reflect, but perhaps 
construct as well.  In other words, the reader is set up to read against the paradigm of Realism—
understanding the text as a representation of the anterior reality of, say, Darius James’ mind, or 
the social context of race in America, or even American cinema.  Quite to the contrary, we are 
encouraged to read along the axis of the incantatory and creative power of its words.  Indeed, the 
book has been marketed to us, before we even get to the text itself, as not only novel, comic 
strip, sci-fi film, and poem, but also a sort of performance or show, a kind of phantasmagoria, 
and even a curse.  In some sense then, the model of a Voodoo spell is invoked here as a mode of 
reading in which the text acts with or even upon the reader, ostensibly to cleanse us of the 
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demons of racism instilled in us by previous media images we’ve already encountered.   
 Then there are several epigraphs.  These establish a more overtly political context for the 
novel.  The first is from Louis Farrakhan, on the “Donahue” show, talking about the guilt and 
fear white people have for their history of violence against blacks, projecting that violence onto 
the minds of black people.  Donahue, apparently uncomfortable with this line of reasoning, 
responds: “And we’ll be back in just a moment.”  The second is a related quote from Paulo 
Freire’s “Pedagogy of the Oppressed,” urging those who are oppressed to regain their humanity 
without becoming oppressors of the oppressors.  And the third, slightly pithier quote, is from 
Michael O’Donoghue: “Sometimes I think this whole world is a big sharecropper’s shack.  Some 
of us are niggers.  And the rest of us are black.”  The work done by all three quotes is clearly 
aimed at dispelling an easy dichotomy of white vs. black, us vs. them, and correspondingly 
against understanding this novel as on a single side of that—or any—binarism.  Farrakhan 
demonstrates the psychological complexities underlying racial stereotyping, Freire encourages 
the oppressed “to liberate themselves and their oppressors as well,” and O’Donaghue links all of 
us in a racial enmeshment that rewrites the lines of identity in terms of semantics—the racial 
epithet “nigger” versus “black—instead of skin color.   
 All three quotes also gesture pointedly at history.  Farrakhan dismisses the racist 
stereotyping of blacks as violent by wittily—and cogently—remarking, “We do not have a 
history of killing white people.  White people have a history of killing us.”  Freire describes the 
process of liberating oppressed and oppressors both as “the great humanistic and historical task.”  
And O’Donaghue’s harkening back to the days of sharecropping—which could refer to 
antebellum sharecropping among poor whites or to post-emancipation sharecropping of black 
freedmen that persisted in the South until the mid-twentieth century—locates the contextual 
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setting of what follows in the complex history of racial struggle over several centuries.  The text 
of Negrophobia itself is thus in part determined by the rich context of overdetermined generic 
markers and the complex of racial politics, American history, and collective psychology.  Much 
of this is congealed in the fifth (and final) of the epigraphs, a longer section drawn from James’ 
own “The Blackman’s Guide to Seducing White Women With the Amazing Power of Voodoo,” 
which can be found in its entirety in his book That’s Blaxploitation: Roots of the Baadasssss 
‘Tude (Rated X by an All-Whyte Jury) (1995).  There, he describes Voodoo as “a powerful 
creative vehicle for pushing beyond the conventional modes of being into the self’s dangerous 
terrain” (2), which in effect defines the project of the novel itself: it is a text whose “mode of 
being” is the very object of inquiry.  The first question we have to ask about Negrophobia, in 
other words, is: what is this thing? 
  Judging from the cover, front matter, and back matter, perhaps the one thing we likely 
would not presume Negrophobia to “be” upon beginning to read it, is a “screenplay,” a word 
mentioned only once, on the inside front jacket synopsis from the Village Voice.13  If we 
approach this text thinking that it is going to be a “parable,” a “novel,” a “comic strip,” or a 
Voodoo curse, we are likely to be surprised when the format is, to a tee, that of the modern 
screenplay.  It begins like this: 
OPEN ON: 
INT. Brownstown in Manhattan's Upper West Side––Bedroom––Dawn. 
EXTREME CLOSE-UP OF A JOINT balanced on the rim of a silver ashtray. (3) 
 
From the very outset, unlike the “closet films” of Akutagawa or the Surrealists, what we have 
                                                
13 I feel confident in so closing analyzing the materiality of this book itself for several reasons.  For one thing, all the 
preparatory material is vital to the experience of reading Negrophobia, since the novel is both so unexpected (you 
will not have seen this coming) and also specifically about the demons you bring to it, the preconceptions about 
race, about the novel in general, and the way film and other visual media influence or even construct our 
subjectivities.  Another reason is that, to my knowledge, the book has seen only two printings (the hardback and 
subsequent paperback), has been read by relatively few people, and is probably totally unknown in most critical 
literary circles.  I would be tempted to suggest that I expect it to have a devoted cult following, except that it does 
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here appears, unambiguously, in the form of screenplay.  In contrast to its exterior framing––as a 
novel, published in the form of a book––the text itself is rendered in scrupulous screenplay 
formatting.  In fact, Negrophobia’s only failure to reflect something like normal or typical 
screenplay formatting is that it goes perhaps too far out of its way to appear as such.  There are 
too many specific camera directions, too many production-oriented notes, in comparison with 
most normal shooting scripts.  It reads, in some sense then, more like some kind of hyper-
screenplay.  Notes for “SFX: The joint’s sizzle is amplified, punctuated by the sound of pot seeds 
popping” (3) would, in a normal production-oriented shooting script, probably look more like 
this: “The joint SIZZLES, punctuated by the sound of pot seeds POPPING.”  James here 
manages to amplify both the literary quality of the phrasing, to establish tone and setting, as well 
as relentlessly draw the reader’s attention to its scriptic quality.  The reader is reminded, again 
and again, that this is a screenplay, that this is a production document for a film (that of course, 
as I will discuss below, cannot possibly be produced), and invocations of filmic notes like “SFX” 
reinscribe this continually.  In the first scene alone, the reader confronts repetitions regarding 
“camera pans” (3, 4), “Over-the-shoulder” shots (5), and “camera tilts” (6), as well as repeated 
references to specific camera movements, such as “Dolly in for a close shot of Bubble’s face” 
(7), or “Stop tilt on face for head shot” (7).  The lack of clarity in this last direction––what 
exactly is a “head shot?”––betrays perhaps most of all that the commitment here is not to 
screenplay realism, faithfully duplicating the production documents of actual films, but to a kind 
of exaggerated and hyperfilmic performance of cinematic production.  Because, even as the text 
over-indulges in production-oriented notes and camera directions, it totally lacks scene numbers, 
which would be pivotal if one were to realize Negrophobia as an actual film––far more 
necessary than all the minutiae of camera movement, etc., which normally occupy the space of 
                                                                                                                                                       
not even have a Wikipedia entry (as of 25 November 2013).   
  
173 
the director’s mind, notes, and/or shot list, but not the script.  
 But, unsurprisingly, Negrophobia is unlikely to be made into an actual film any time 
soon.  The closest it has come was suggested by James himself in a 1994 interview with Cups 
Magazine,  
John Cusack and Steve Pink, who have a motion picture deal with Paramount, and 
a theatrical company called New Crimes, which is out of Chicago, are supposedly 
going to have me flown out to LA to work on a live theatrical production of 
Negrophobia with musical assistance from the band, Fishbone. (np) 
 
This project was never realized, and attempts at translations of Negrophobia to film and stage 
have been almost as fruitless as those, for example, into other languages.  In an interview by 
Quimby Melton with Hiroo Yagamata, who translated into Japanese not only Negrophobia but 
also The Last Words of Dutch Schultz, Yamagata says of the former:  
Its reception has been non-existent. Hakusuisha, the publisher, asked me to do it. 
They wanted to start a new series of avant-garde US writers which they called 
“Writers-X.” The series included Acker, Michael Blumlein, Karen Tei Yamashita, 
several others. Has it sold well?  No.  They printed 3000 copies, I think, but it 
never sold out.  I'm quite famous as a translator, and statistically speaking, my 
name on the cover manages to generate 2-3000 extra sales. But even I couldn’t 
save Darius James.  As you point out, Negrophobia was a bit too local. (np) 
 
Negrophobia’s lack of attention in Japan is not totally surprising.  It is difficult to determine the 
degree to which the reason for this is due to its idiosyncratic form (screenplay), or its incredibly 
edgy, provocative, and controversial content.  Or perhaps the difficulty here lies in the way the 
two are so intricately interwoven for James.  In the aforementioned interview with Cups 
Magazine, he offers no less than three partial accounts of Negrophobia’s singular design.  On the 
most basic level, congruent with many filmmakers and screenwriters who turn to the novel as a 
sort of refuge for work that can be done alone, without the industrial burden of filmic capital, 
James suggests that Negrophobia’s unique format is at least partially the result of pragmatic 
concerns: 
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Basically, writing is really inexpensive. It only requires a typewriter, a pen and 
paper of some kind, or a computer if you can afford it. Originally, as a child, I 
wanted to write, direct, and star in my own monster movies––which I did. I would 
do eight millimeter movies and things like that. I was known as the Werewolf of 
Winchester Avenue by my own playmates. (np) 
 
But in another instance, James also suggests that the “closet” of this closet film has to do with 
the problem of writing a film outside language:  
My problem in writing Negrophobia was trying to express things outside of 
spoken and written language. Its essence is not only about me being at war with 
racist imagery, it’s about me being at war with English. To me, English is a 
colonial language. Theoretically, I was not intended to speak it. I’m supposed to 
speak some variation of Indian, Native American or African. So I'm working with 
concepts that are opposed to me. So I wanted to work with forms and language in 
a way that was contrary to how we normally process information. (np) 
 
James echoes this sentiment in his interview with Christian Haye preceding the book’s release 
(Summer 1992), when he says, “It’s my belief that in order for racism not to have a real psychic 
effect, Black people who are victims of racism have to take back the imagery of racism and turn 
it on those who use it against them. It’s taking back the vocabulary of racism and redefining it 
(12).  But at his most programmatic (and eloquent), James lays out his agenda (in the later 
interview) for the novel like this: 
One of the ideas for me was that the reader himself, who might have a racist 
thought after reading Negrophobia, would become ill and throw up. But 
magically, I would like the reader to step back and look at the absurdity of these 
images and laugh: laugh at the images, laugh at their own racism and not feel 
cowed by it. And also, black people should laugh at these images and realize that 
these images are not reflections of black people but rather a reflection of some 
diseased mind, which is a real distinction. Because some people—and not a lot of 
them—become critical of the book because they confuse what I'm writing about 
with the actual lives of black people. My book has nothing to do with the real 
lives of black people. It has to do with mapping out the terrain of a racist 
psychology and making fun of that. (np) 
 
All three of these ostensible authorial intentions for the novel play into the deeply complex 
formal-political structure undergirding its unique form and content, but the latter gestures most 
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overtly toward its pivotal focus on humor as a source of potential sociopolitical subversion.  
James says this even more bluntly in the earlier interview with Hayes, when he says, “Basically, 
what I’m doing is trying to subvert how one thinks about racist imagery.  Every time a person 
has a racist thought they become physically ill.  That’s my intent.  How successful I am at doing 
that I won’t know until the book is out there and people are reading it” (12).   
 “Primarily,” James adds, “I consider myself a satirist” (14).  But the novel’s overall effect 
is not purely rendered on the trajectory of satire or the comedic.  In a very real sense, the idea of 
reading Negrophobia as a kind of curse, or, perhaps more accurately, an anti-curse, an exorcism 
of the demons of racism via a specific way of invoking them, is arguably the most plausible 
reading of the text, and the most convincing explanation for its lack of mainstream circulation.  
What is most important for our purposes here is that the specific form of the closet film is 
uniquely and perfectly suited for this vital, if idiosyncratic task.  That is, the closet film is 
potentially the only mode of writing in which one can effectively evoke a specific set of racist 
visual imagery created by and subsisting wholly inside of televisual and cinematic media without 
simply reproducing it.  Since the collaborative and industrial nature of such media prohibits for 
various reasons (see below) the actual making of a film that fully grapples with the most difficult 
images embedded in the reader’s unconscious, some kind of closet film is needed to do so.  No 
text does this more explicitly, directly, or effectively than Negrophobia.  In this way, Darius 
James has confirmed the radical nature of the form described by Brian Norman in regards to 
James Baldwin’s Malcolm project.  That is, that the closet film is precisely the site of radical 
hybrid forms required by projects attempting to negotiate the cognitive terrain of the history of 
race in America.  But James has gone way, way further.  Indeed, we might propose that the 
extent to which Negrophobia goes further than Baldwin’s semi-closeted pseudo-film is inversely 
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proportional to the extent to which each author has been known and read. 
 Within the complex nesting (discussed above) involving the various epigrams and front- 
and back-matter, the short (about 170 pages) quick-paced text of Negrophobia is organized 
around a series of episodes, or we might call them sequences, that seem to take the place of 
chapters.  Multiple individual scenes, demarcated by typical slug lines (i.e., “INT. Brownstone in 
Manhattan’s Upper West Side—Bedroom—Dawn” (3)), make up these episodes/chapters/ 
sequences, which are demarcated by a full page break and a thick black line, a move which 
locates them as clearly literary, and non-scriptic.  For this reason, “chapters” is likely the best 
description of these bodies of text, and their presence marks the novel’s most pointed literary 
formal feature and departure from typical screenplay format.  The first of these opens on an 
“EXTREME CLOSE-UP OF A JOINT” (3)—out of which in a moment the film’s title will 
gather in the smoke (4)—and pans to a tremendously profane image that instantly renders any 
conceivable film of Negrophobia as markedly unproduceable for political reasons: 
In a profusion of fluted-paper-coffins, spilling over the sides of the box, and lying 
scattered across the tabletop, are several fez-capped, frog-faced fudge figurines.  
Each leering figurine bears the likeness of the Honorable Elijah Muhammad.  He 
clutches candy genitalia in tiny fudge fists.  Spurts of white chocolate fleck his 
thighs. (3) 
 
From the outset then, Negrophobia pushes the limits of visual representation by giving us 
precisely the sort of controversial imagery that few film studios would be interested in 
manifesting as visual content.  The status of these irreverent images of Malcolm X’s mentor, 
recalled later when a CARTOON BUCKWEED cries out, “Elijah Muhammad didn’t eat no pig 
tails, but he ate plenty o’ pussy!” (146), are complicated by the fact they are located in the 
bedroom of Bubbles Brazil, our protagonist.  Introduced first as a “DRUG-ADDLED TEENAGE 
GIRL” (4), Bubbles outlines in a voice-over her personal history on a trajectory from Rocky-
  
177 
Horror Transvestite Rock through bona fide sixties hippy freak and finally blonde bombshell, 
“the reigning queen supreme of the cover-girl wet dream” (7).  Outfitted lasciviously in Spandex 
that “outlines her protuberant pudendum,” a “black T” that reveals her “puffy pink areolas,” and 
“Dr. Martens marked with anarchosatanic symbols in metallic paintpen” (6), we first see Bubbles 
standing in front of a mirror painting a figure-eight on her face.  Notably, her face is radically 
nonindividualized.  It is represented as a kind of archetypal ur-face located in the collective 
unconscious.  In one of the more eloquent/literary passages counterpoised against the shockingly 
frank and sexual descriptions of Bubbles’ clothes and physical appearance, James describes her 
face, “The face in the glass is an uncommon one in the world of the wakeful.  It’s a face seen in 
the soup of sleep.  A face that surfaces in a stew of haunted imagery.  A face of fevered dreams” 
(5). 
 The second chapter (which is also rendered in a single scene) takes us downstairs, where 
the MAID is talking on the phone while “stirring a thick white brew in a black cast-iron pot” (8).  
The mixture, which we learn contains at least grits, fish entrails, and (graphically rendered) a live 
white mouse, appears to be some kind of horrible Voodoo breakfast that already recalls the “soup 
of sleep…the stew of haunted imagery” that marked Bubbles’ own face.  We are introduced to 
the Maid via minute descriptions of individual parts of her body, tracing over her form with the 
camera, and cutting between her body and the comparatively rendered stereotypes of black 
mammy-figures on the food items she cooks with.  The scene itself opens on a “Close-up on a 
chunky, brown-faced, kerchief-headed woman grinning from a cylindrical box of Savanna Sal’s 
Hominy Grits” (8), and then right away we “Pull back and reveal a hefty black arm, with sagging 
hamhock-shaped biceps, stirring a white brew in a black cast-iron pot” (8).  When she speaks, 
her dialogue is rendered in thick dialect, and we see only her mouth:  
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Black woman’s mouth into view.  Her gums are dark chocolate.  Her teeth are 
canary yellow. 
BLACK MOUTH 
When ‘at boy gwine to learn his sef some sense?  Ah don tol’ ’at 
boy messin’ wif dem whyte gals gwine a git ’im kil. (8) 
 
Immediately, the “Camera pulls back and reveals a monstrous, mammy-sized cookie jar of a 
woman with doughy animal features and crazed incandescent eyes” (8).  In this way we meet the 
Maid in a tangle of racial signifiers.  If she seems on the one hand directly juxtaposed as a real 
three-dimensional character against the flat stereotype of Savanna Sal—which strongly recalls 
the sort of mammy-stereotyping in figures like Aunt Jemima—then this immediately is 
complicated by the description of her as a “mammy-sized cookie jar of a woman.”  Clearly the 
relationship between cartoonish stereotypes and the “actual” characters of Negrophobia is more 
complicated than any simple polarity.  This is manifestly not the sort of work that sets up a 
stereotype with the conceit of using it to highlight the gritty realism of the three-dimensional 
characters themselves.  The Maid and Savanna Sal are perhaps best understood as floating 
together in the same sort of dreamy soup in which Bubbles Brazil exists alongside the multiple 
cartoonish depictions of teenage white girls. 
 James’ description of the Maid continues: “Her nappy bleached-blond Afro is a crown a 
spiky thorns matted with sweat and splashed with splots of Day-Glo colors.  Her face and arms 
are splotched with leaflike patches of missing melanin.  The twirl of brown and pink stripes on 
her left arm resembles the markings of a tiger’s coat.  A pair of mascara lobster claws wing her 
eyes” (8-9).  As she talks on the phone, reciting the familiar comic litany of mammy-wisdom 
regarding the dangers of “some young whyte gal’s pussy” (9) to black men, Bubbles enters the 
kitchen, eating the chocolate Elijah-Muhammad-figurines from the first chapter (10).  When the 
Maid asks her about the make-up on her face, Bubbles defends the “war paint” (10) as a 
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necessary defense against the “jigaboos” who populate her school––the Maid point outs that she 
has been kicked out of the “fancy private schools” her parents initially sent her to, spent some 
time in a “crazy house fo’ rich dope fiends,” and now she is “jus’ gon’ hafta put up wid dem 
niggas” (11).  Their ensuing argument highlights the essential problematic of Bubbles’ deeply 
imprinted and overtly hypocritical racism: 
Bubbles wrinkles her nose. 
 
BUBBLES 
But they’re gross and they spit! 
 
A half-eaten nigger baby spits from her mouth. 
 
MAID 
Spit back at ’em. 
 
BUBBLES 
But you don’t know what it’s like!  Girls yank my hair and guys yank my 
tits!  That place is a fucking Monkey House! 
 
She eats another nigger baby. 
 
BUBBLES 
Jigaboos! (11-12) 
 
The two argue the merits of Bubbles’ plain racism against the Maid’s understanding of blacks as 
“hostages misplaced in time, captives of a racist hist’ry ’n’ a oppressed peepus dissolvin’ in 
d’stomach acids of whyte amerika” (12), until Bubbles reveals she got the idea for her figure-
eight “war paint” from one of the maid’s own books, at which point the Maid attacks her: “The 
Maid springs for Bubbles’ throat, her fingers curled and clutching.  As her mandarin-curled 
fingernails near Bubble’ throbbing jugular, she freezes.  She stands eerily immobile” (14).  What 
happens next is not entirely clear.  Apparently Bubbles’ “war paint” has worked, defending her 
from the Maid’s attack, to which the Maid responds by going into a convulsive seizure-like 
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trance:  
The Maid slithers into a convulsive snake dance, foams at the mouth, and tears off 
her clothes.  Sweat clings to the hairs of her armpits.  Fish-eyed pancakes are 
slung Frisbee-style across the kitchen.  Bruce Lee’s kung fu cat cries mingle with 
James Brown’s R&B funk shrieks.  The Maid mindlessly misquotes lines from 
Gone With the Wind (“Ah knows all ’bout birfin’ babies, Miz Scarlet.  Jus’ fetch 
me dat dusty coat hanga ober dere!”).  Twirling across the floor in a daze, the 
maid cackles and then collapses into a heap.  Her tongue lolls from her mouth. 
(15). 
 
Then the Maid commands Bubbles to wash her face, and Bubbles immediately complies.  She 
“leaps to her feet and dashes from the kitchen.  The Maid laughs long and loud” (15), ostensibly 
having effectively countered Bubbles’ amateur attempt at Voodoo with something much more 
powerful. 
 In the next scene-chapter, as Bubbles rides the subway and is ranted at by a crazy black 
Wino, the nature of the Maid’s spell is revealed: “Bubbles tries to ignore the Wino, but as the 
Maid’s counterspell begins to take effect, exposing Bubbles to her Negrophobic predicament, she 
grows fearful, her body appearing to wilt smaller and smaller in size” (15).  Things quickly grow 
worse for Bubbles.  Soon, “DOMESTICS, FACTORY WORKERS, STREET HUSTLERS, 
JUNKIE TRANSVESTITES, and other SLUM DWELLERS of increasing strangeness board the 
subway car and converge on Bubbles from all sides” (19).  The scene ends with Bubbles, 
cringing and hiding in a corner, listening to a conversation between two “ILL-TEMPERED 
YOUNG NEGROS” about sexual exploits with white women––“I was pullin’ fistfuls o’ blond 
pussy hair out o’ my crotch!” (21)––and other talking points equally unsettling for Bubbles––
“Gunnin’ the Great White Bitch!  I swore the total annihilation of the entire whyte race and 
anything left over with the faintest trace of that demon hunkie scent” (22). 
 The next scene-chapter takes us to Bubble’s high school, where a pan across the faces of 
the students and a voice-over from Bubbles delineates the total nature of her negrophobia: 
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BUBBLES 
(v.o.) 
My high school was overridden with niggas.  Not the slow-witted, 
slow-shufflin’, eyeball-rollin’, flapjack-flippin’ niggas in the 
brownstones off Central Park West.  Or the upwardly mobile, 
paper-bag-colored Klingon niggas of the bougie boogahood.  But 
nigger niggas––the nightmarish kind! 
 
Mindless angel-dusted darkies slobbering insane single syllables, 
flicking switchblades and flashing straightrazors.  Hip-hoppity 
jungle bunnies in brightly colored clothes, carrying large, loud 
radios we white wits call “Spadios,” who drank bubbling purple 
carbonates and ate fried pork rinds and bag after bag of dehydrated 
potato slices caked with orange dust.  Crotch-clawin’ niggas who 
talked Deputy Dawg and shot dope.  Saucer-lipped ragoons who 
called me the “Ozark Mountain She-Devil” and asked to feel my 
lunch money.  Percussive porch monkeys who fart with their faces 
to a heavy-metal beat.   
 
These were the kind of niggas my daddy warned me about.  The 
kind of niggas my daddy said would whisk me off to the Isle of 
Unrestrained Negroes far, far away, and turn me into a coal-black 
pickaninny with a nappy ribbon top and white button eyes if I 
wasn’t a good girl and didn’t do as daddy said. 
 
At the close of the Ku Klux Cartoon Coon Show in the classroom, stop on 
Bubbles seated at her desk. (25) 
 
It is at this last moment, when the scene directions retrospectively cast the voice-over we have 
been reading/hearing as part of a “Ku Klux Cartoon Coon Show,” that the specific formal fact of 
this closet-film is brought to the fore.  Previous to Bubbles racist tirade of a voiceover, we have 
not had any description of the long panning shot that suggests that the images either seem to 
corroborate or conflict with Bubbles’ description, except the vague, “each face a frightening 
caricature of the grotesque” (25), which could go either way.  In other words, it is not clear that 
we are necessarily supposed to imagine that over Bubbles’ narration we are to see “nigger 
niggas––the nightmarish kind!” as opposed to either other stereotypes or even just a typical 
diverse body of mostly nonwhite students.  The relationship between Bubbles’ description and 
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the visual image we are supposed to imagine the film to be simultaneously projecting is 
uncertain, until the narration tells us that what we have been experiencing is a “Ku Klux Cartoon 
Coon Show.”  At this point, it seems that we should have more-or-less taken for granted that the 
slow pan of the students was indeed depicting Bubbles’ racist litany with a more or less 
confirming precision.  Not only is the sort of dreamlike diegetic world here thrown into some 
measure of ambiguity––is this world in Bubbles’ mind?  Are we to take it as at all realistic?  Is 
this movie animated?  Are we supposed to be immersed in a dreamlike stew of purely allegorical 
signifiers?—but also our relationship to the text and the unconjured film are likewise difficult to 
pin down.  If we cannot help but visualize Bubbles’ narration as a consequence of our reading 
this work, as opposed to viewing it, then it complicates things immensely that our task is to 
simultaneously visualize the film the text purports to reference as well.  Because of the unique 
form of the closet film, that is, we have to read Negrophobia as simultaneously a novel and a 
film.  In this moment, for example, we as readers have to be able to dialectically suspend 
multiple options about whether the visual image corresponds with or juxtaposes against the 
voice-over narration.  We have to be able to project ourselves into the role of potential spectator 
of the film of Negrophobia, where the relationship between what we are seeing and hearing is at 
times (like this one), ambiguous.  We are at once reader, spectator, and imagined filmmaker.  It 
is precisely this singular mode of reading that is actualized by the closet film form, in which the 
reader is forced to account for multiply and simultaneously nested levels of fictions within 
fictions on a formal level (as opposed to, say, framed tales, mise en abyme, or other modes of 
narrative involution that occur primarily at the level of content). 
 In this case, what is so densely packed together is on the one hand a rendering of all the 
unconscious racist fears regarding African Americans, and on the other our personal imbrication 
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in the way the closet film text constructs this rendering.  Because we are forced to both imagine 
Donald Goines Senior High as Bubbles describes it and simultaneously suspend the question of 
whether the film visually represents the students in the exact same way until the narration seems 
to confirm this fact, we have to be able to conjure multiple versions of our own unconscious 
racist fears.  That is, we have to imagine exactly what Bubbles describes, what other racist 
versions of stereotypical black classrooms would look like (via Bubbles’ denials of various other 
kinds of “niggas”), and what we might expect an actual urban New York classroom to look like.  
In this way, with great economy the reader is forced to take the measure of his or her own 
negrophobia, lining differently variously racist versions of imagined black youths against each 
other along various axes of different levels of fiction, fiction with fiction, and reality.   
 As we learn more about Donald Goines Senior High, it quickly becomes clear that we are 
far from any conceit of accurate portrayal of urban education.  It is a surrealistic nightmarish 
feverdream of unconscious fears and desires.  The compound is guarded by a machine-gun tower 
replete with “barbed wire, a cyclone fence, and a pack of slavering Doberman pinschers” (25), 
and the physical space seems to corroborate Bubbles’ racist description of the students who 
populate its halls, marking the text not as one in which a racist character will be shown to 
overcome that racism, but one in which a whole racist dreamscape is conjured and subsequently 
unraveled: 
The corridor’s column of lockers is a dazzle of wildstyle designs: multicolored 
sprays of Vaughn Bodé nymphs entangled inside gnarled, Eschersque girders who 
fellate duck-billed home boys with floating thought balloons of musical notations 
and fried chicken parts above their heads.  Huge posters of Marcus Garvey, 
Malcolm X, and Bob Marley are wheat-pasted all along the hall.  Black, red, and 
green sewer steam billows from a manhole cover sunk into the floor.  The front 
end of a car with a drinking fountain built into its toothy chrome grill projects 
from a wall.  Iron grates are pulled across the doors.  Sections of the wall are 
crumbling, and bricks are strewn about the floor.  Neon BAR, PAWN SHOP, 
JESUS SAVES, and HOT PORK CHOPS AND COLD BEER signs flash in 
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distracting sequence.  
 
Throngs of students congest the corridor smoking resinous Rasta spliffs; inhaling 
in brown paper bags sticky with airplane glue; snorting smack from tiny, waxed-
paper sacks; drinking pints of Wild Irish Rose; sucking tubes of crack; fighting 
with razors; firing pistols; dry humping each other against lockers; hawking stolen 
goods; miscarrying half-formed fetuses; singing gospel; and wailing the blues. 
(26) 
 
A 200-POUND BLACK MUSLIM hawks bean-pie until he and a number of others are 
massacred by machine-gun fire, “All in disgusting Dawn of the Dead detail” (27), and the scene 
ends with a long fight-sequence in which the “apparently, invulnerable” (28) Bubbles is accosted 
by AUNT JEMIMA’S FLAPJACK NINJA-KILLERS FROM HELL (28-35) in the girl’s 
bathroom.  Exhausted, in the next short sequence, a chapter with two brief scenes, she returns to 
her brownstone and smokes a joint in the bath, where she passes out (36-37). 
 From there we cut abruptly to the White Womb Theater, where a naked Bubbles is 
incased on stage in some kind of bizarre white gel-like afterbirth and a witch doctor removes a 
white rabbit from between her thighs (38).  Bubbles looks into the audience, which is comprised 
of an extremely long list of black characters ranging from James Baldwin, Rosa Parks and 
Richard Pryor to Aunt Jemima and Uncle Ben.  Muhammad Ali and Cassius Clay.  Shirley 
Temple is there, “in pickaninny blackface” (39).  A list of some fifty black entertainers, cartoon 
characters, musicians, filmmakers, and political figures.  We crossfade into a forest where a 
flute-playing Satyr with a “sable skin” seduces Bubbles with his “massive dick” (41), until he 
disappears and the dream––if that is what this is––turns nightmarish: “Tarred lynching victims 
hang from the trees.  Corpses protrude from the ground in grotesque poses.  A WOMAN with 
her stomach slashed drags a rotted fetus on the end of an uncoiled umbilical cord.  A face in the 
clay.  An arm.  A severed hand.  The SHADOWS OF HOODED MEN prowl amid the woods’ 
other shadows” (42).  It is as if, thanks to the Maid’s “counterspell,” Bubbles can no longer rest 
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in the comfort of her negrophobia.  The historical materiality of that very racism manifests itself 
in her subconscious––in the White Womb Theater of her mind.  Finally, Bubbles awakes with a 
gasp to find the bathtub filled with blood. 
 In a candlelit ritual, Bubbles sits on her bed, a figure-eight painted on her face in 
menstrual blood, trimming her heart-shaped pubic hair.  The scene directions are explicitly 
focused on her vagina: “dissolve to a close-up of Bubbles’ cunt” (45), for example, or “Tilt up 
the moist pout of her vulva” (45).  In a voice, over, she relates herself to “the little girl in Night of 
the Living Dead” and asks, “Why do I want to eat my parents?” (45).  She answers herself, “To 
puke them up, of course!” (45).  The theme of consumption and regurgitation is vital to 
Negrophobia, in which the primary objective of the (anti-)cursive text is to evoke for the 
purposes of purging interiorized racist ideologies.  In these explicit and outright disgusting 
scenes, we might say, the reader/audience is literally consuming the racist inheritance of the past 
along with Bubbles, who wants to “eat [her] parents.”  It is only in the scenes that follow that, 
with Bubbles, we might begin to “puke them up.”  For it is at this precise moment, where 
Bubbles lolls in bed and “zazens in the radiance of candlelight,” musing on the desire to 
consume and puke up her parents, that the Maid suddenly bursts into the room, blowing out the 
candles and felling the mirrors.  She is brandishing a pair of cutting shears and a tube of KY 
personal lubricant.  Dragging through the melted wax and broken glass up into the attic, she 
explains what she plans to do to her:  
MAID 
First, ah’s gwine cut d’locks off’n y’haid! 
… 
Den ah’s gwine grine hembane ’n’ bellydonna berries wif some o’ 
dat good rasta reefa dem nappy-haided niggas sell down at 
d’candy sto’ ’n’ mix it up wif d’K-Y! 
… 
Den ah’s gwine glop d’K-Y Juju jelly-jam down ’round y’titties ’n’ 
  
186 
up ‘twixt y’ass––arubbin ’n’ apokin’ till it melts into y’pores ’n’ 
gits down into y’blood! ’N’ whilst yo’ ass be doin’ d’freakie-deekie 
on d’bellydonna, ah’mo roll d’res’ o’ dat rasta reefa into a big 
spliff, slap on some zootin’ Calloway sides, ’n’ blow dat spliff lak 
ahs a howg-ridin’ hophead in Harlem!  Hah! (46-47) 
 
The closet film form lends itself uniquely towards constructing this scene.  On one hand, in an 
actual film, we likely would not need to have the Maid to explain in dialog what she could also 
show us by doing.  But since we are reading as well as in some sense also seeing this movie, 
rendering her dialog in thick dialect offers an additional layer of resistance that slows down our 
processing of the information.  And it does so while also maintaining the strictly filmic valence 
of the rendering of black dialect.  Pivotally, this black dialect is not just what the character we 
imagine says; it is also overtly a script for a (hypothetical) actor to recite.  The closet film, in 
other words, is a form in which character is always also actor.  Even more so than with 
playscripts, this sort of filmic text wears its multiple ontological valences on its sleeve.  Partly, 
this is because we imagine actual imagined realities to be much more similar to films than to 
plays.  So when we read the Maid’s dialogue here, we have at least three levels of fictive reality 
working: (1) an imagined film world; (2) an imagined film that could be produced from this text; 
(3) the textual reality of the novel itself––that is, the imagined reality produced by reading the 
novel, rather than the case with (1), which is the imagined reality produced by imagining the film 
that is not present but is always being referenced obliquely.  Negrophobia capitalizes on this 
multiplicity by rendering similar events multiple times in several ways.  Here, the Maid says 
what she is about to do.  And then we get her doing it.   
 Immediately after she tells Bubbles her plan, she begins to carry it out.  We get a more 
detailed scene of her cutting Bubbles’ hair (49-50), and preparing the hallucinogenic Voodoo 
mixture of marijuana, belladonna, henbane, and KY jelly (50-51), all rendered in stage directions 
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with occasional interjections by the Maid.  Bubbles remains silent.  The stage directions are 
extremely blunt, offering straightforward descriptions rather than establishing tone or creating 
the extreme affects (like shock and disgust) that pervade much of the text elsewhere: 
The Maid drops her shears.  She falls to her knees and unloads the contents of 
her apron’s front pockets on the floor: mortar, pestle, K-Y tube, a branch of 
belladonna, henbane, and a compressed square of marijuana buds.  White noise 
issues from the boom box’s speakers. 
… 
The Maid plucks berries from the belladonna branch, crumbling henbane in her 
first, and unravels buds from the reefer square. 
… 
She tosses the herbs into the mortar’s bowl and grinds them down with her 
pestle. (50) 
 
This sort of matter-of-fact repetition reinforces the multiple formal techniques active in the 
unique closet film form here, and the reader is afforded the opportunity to more fully 
comprehend the scene through varying perspectives, understanding its multiple levels of fiction 
separately.  It is as if we are being guided through multiple understandings of the complex 
multiplicity of fictive realities generated by the form here.   
 Notably, in this scene the characterization of the Maid remains tied to her stereotypical 
baggage, her role as Aunt Jemima-like food preparer.  Again, the specific form of the closet film 
offers a unique mode of economically communicating this information.  As the Maid begins 
mixing the concoction, after dipping her fingers into Bubbles’ vagina, she “puts her menses-
tipped fingers in her mouth.  Her fevered grin spreads like buckwheat batter plopped into a hot 
buttered skillet” (51).  The simile that links the Maid to the network of racist imageries on 
display so far throughout the novel and which appear frequently as Mammy-figuration on food 
items, especially breakfast items like pancakes (Aunt Jemima) and grits (recall Savanna Sal from 
the opening), is of course specifically literary.  A similar effect is of course conceivable on film, 
in what would likely register as a cheesily outdated modernist technique: cutting away from the 
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Maid’s smile to an actual skillet of buckwheat pancakes to create the impression of a visual 
simile.  The closet film, on the other hand, gets to have it both ways.  Prose lends itself better to 
this particular kind of simile, economically tying together the Maid’s cartoonish stereotypical 
aesthetic with the visceral imagery of the pancakes in the skillet.  The finely crafted alliteration 
of big breathy ‘b’s and ‘p’s and fricative ‘t’s here makes our mouths (or our cognitive renderings 
of mouth movements) form the same sorts of pops as hot butter itself.  The onomatopoeia of 
‘plopped’ helps render the movement of the spreading batter all the more vividly.  The imagery 
is haunting and evocative, and is rendered quickly and effectively by the simile in prose, where 
its corresponding filmic technique would register as either the clunky transposition of the 
metaphor-shot, or be lost altogether if we simply understood the stage direction as establishing 
tone and not directly translatable into the film.  And yet, since this is after all a stage direction in 
a script, and not simply prose in a novel, the reader must also grapple with the directorial 
problem of how to film this sticky passage.  Since we are additionally imagining a film going on 
here, we have to consider how this particular simile would have to be translated, or produced, in 
cinema.  The text achieves the literary efficacy of the prose simile while also putting into our 
heads the explicitly filmic ‘shot’ of the pancakes as well.  For, after all, is not the primary effect 
of the closet film form to place us in the role of filmmaker?  Do we not have to imagine how we 
would shoot this, who we would cast, where we might make cuts?  Is it only because of my own 
personal experience with film that I read it this way, or is there a deeper truth here that the closet 
film form gives the reader the opportunity for an imagined experiencing in directing this film in 
the same sense––yet much more intensely perhaps––that attracts Eisenstein to early Disney 
animations (see Chapter Two)?  After all, audiences do not read scripts.  Filmmakers read 
scripts.  The closet film, in appropriating the process of reading the script and handing it to the 
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audience, precisely makes filmmakers of us all.  Eisenstein’s ultimate fantasy for early Disney 
animations was due to their ability to let him project himself into the role of the creator, to be a 
reader and a maker all at once.  It is this experience which the closet film form can provide and 
which excellent little descriptions like James’ regarding the Maid’s grin here executes to its 
fullest potential.   
 As the Maid disrobes herself and mounts and begins grinding Bubbles’ body, “pube to 
pube,” the action suddenly cuts, via “Spin-wipe,” to “EXT. Cotton field of Old South––Day” 
where “Toothless OLD COONS strum Happy Nigger Banjo Tunes for dancing PICKANINNIES 
slapping hambone on their knees and thighs” (52).  We “Reverse spin-wipe” back to the 
Brownstone, where Bubbles is screaming and the Maid collapses on the floor.  As the 
hallucinogenic Voodoo craziness intensifies, the stage directions become consequentially 
abstract: 
Her head, arms, hands, legs, and feet move with an independence of their own.  
They begin to talk, change shape, and emit sounds: Music.  Radio white noise.  
Reptile skin.  A bird’s head.  A cat with a coat of flames.  TV commercials.  
Radio white noise. The BERNHARD GOETZ confession mixed to hip-hop rap 
rhythms.  Pentecostal tent-house shouts.  Police sirens.  MALCOLM X speeches.  
Harlem bar talk.  The bark of heroin pitchmen.  The assassination of JOHN F. 
KENNEDY cross-edited with the Amos and Andy radio show.  And the recurrent 
image of a YOUNG BLACK BOY repeating the phrase, ‘Yo, man!  You got five 
dollars?  Yo, man!  You got five dollars?’ answered with gunfire.  (52) 
 
Here the narration begins to lose its grasp on the pretense of a (farcically) production-oriented 
screenplay.  It is not clear whether “A bird’s head” suggests that the Maid’s head transforms into 
a bird’s head, or that we should cut to an insert of an actual bird’s head, or something else 
altogether.  The rest of the description bears the same multiplicity of potential relations to the 
Maid’s body.  Is it her body itself that (via what we can safely assume would have to be some 
kind of animation) changes into these things?  If her limbs “begin to talk” and “emit sounds,” 
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what exactly is the mechanism through which they produce the following list of sounds?  And 
are they all just sounds, or is the film we have to imagine here also cutting to visual clips of 
things?  Take, for example, Kennedy’s assassination (much more commonly associated with its 
striking visual imagery than sounds) or the “recurrent image” (my emphasis) of the young black 
boy being shot (ostensibly by Bernhard Goetz, the famous “Subway Vigilante” who shot four 
young black men in a New York City subway in December of 1984; he alleged the youths tried 
to mug him, but they claimed to have been merely panhandling; Goetz was acquitted of all 
charges except one for unlawful possession of a concealed handgun, though he later lost a civil 
case to one of the young men who was rendered paraplegic).  But even as it becomes more 
difficult to treat this as a screenplay, the repeated use of all-caps lettering (a standard script 
device used to help directors, production managers, etc. keep track of what actors, major props, 
etc. will be needed in a given scene) and references to specifically filmic techniques, such as 
cross-cutting, keep the fact of this text’s relation to a nonexistent film in the forefront.  It also 
seems notable that at this moment when realism seems all but totally abandoned, and the film 
stretches the limits of filmable––if surrealistic––images, that here we get several of the most 
direct and concretely political intertextual references.  There are no references to cartoonish 
stereotypes at this point.  Rather, when it becomes unclear what is even happening in regards to 
the Maid’s morphing body, when the film seems to reflect the beginning of the psychotropic 
drug trip that the Maid and Bubbles are going to begin together, the primary references here 
reflect the real history of violence, a hodgepodge of historical assassinations and attempted 
assassinations.   
 But the Maid is overcome by the high and collapses on the floor in a psychedelic 
freakout, while Bubbles, who has much experience with hallucinogens, keeps her cool and 
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manages to escape (54-59).  Bubbles then breaks into a paint factory where she stumbles into a 
hallucinogenic dreamworld rabbit hole (60-64), and there begins her odyssey through a series of 
increasingly manic and terrifying adventures in a Technicolor world of racism made manifest.  In 
“The Cave of the Flaming Tar Babies” (65-70) she encounters dark dwarfish Licorice Men 
taunting and beating a captured Doughboy, one of the “pale spherical fellows pictured on the 
cylindrical packages located in the supermarket’s frozen food department” (67), who is then 
cooked by a flaming tar baby (69).  Bubbles unceremoniously throws a lit match into the cavern, 
where the Licorice Men have been farting so much that “their asses flare in jets of blue flame” 
(70).  She escapes into the “Church of Uncle H. Rap Remus” (73), where Remus preaches to a 
“mob of Leopard Men” about, for example, how the Whyte Man has a death wish because his 
head is full not of brains but of turds, and how he, the Whyte Man, was created by Idi Amin 
Dada “so Black People could take advantage of [him]” (77).  Then Remus and the Leopard Men 
perform a kind of baptism on Bubbles, whom they mistake for one of their own since Bubble’s 
skin is coated in dark pigments.  Remus says, slipping for the first time into southern dialect, 
“We gwine wash dis wayward chile!  We gwine slap d’whyte man’s stains from her soul!  An’ 
den she be ready for Dada!” (81).  Remus dunks her into a pool and smacks her hard three times 
on the head, and with each smack a “WORM––fat, black, and flat-headed––arcs from her 
mouth” and “wiggles across the water” (82).  But, of course, this washes away the paint on her 
skin.  As the mob prepares to violently gang-fist her, Bubbles begins to vomit worms “in great 
cresting waves” (84).  Ostensibly, Remus has deeply underestimated the extent to which the 
whyte man has stained Bubble’s soul.  The worms attack Remus with “gnashing, nightmare 
teeth” and chew through his eyes, eventually leaving only “a writhing chalk-white skeleton” 
(85), during which the stage directions offer, “SFX: The wet, thrusting sound of a vigorous cock 
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slish-sloshing a bubbling cunt filtered through an electronic wind tunnel” (85).  But Bubbles 
does not seem to have totally expelled the dark worms within her.  After Remus is defeated, and 
even as the worms devour the Leopard Men, pustules appear all over Bubbles’ body out of which 
emerge “Big-lipped, cotton-topped, and broad-nostriled HEADS.” Two of these 
“BURRHEADS” replace her nipples and tell each other a racist joke.  Then “Bubbles’ wounds 
mysteriously heal.  And her color returns to normal” (86).   
 In this section, James uses the particular formal potentialities of the closet film to 
systematically confuse the line between character and image, between individual and stereotype.  
Before we get any direct references to present characters (signified in screenplays by all-caps), 
we get a lengthy set descriptions that culminate in “An enormous poster of a bug-eyed black man 
in a stovepipe hat and star-spangled red, white, and blue striped suit” (73) that hangs above the 
stage.  The poster, which reads, “UNCLE SAMBO WANTS YOU!” figures the caricature 
offering his exposed, pantless buttocks in a “coquettish pose.”  Then we get the following stage 
direction: “Below the poster, UNCLE H. RAP REMUS, an arthritic old Negro dressed in green 
paramilitary fatigues, with gnarled gray dreads flopping on each side of his otherwise bald head, 
holds a luger P.08 to Uncle Sambo’s wooly skill” (73).  At this point, no doubt, there is some 
confusion about what is supposed to be going on, but the clear implication is that Remus is 
aiming his gun at the poster.  Unlike Uncle Sambo, or his poster, Remus’s character is 
introduced in typical screenplay format: his name in capital letters accompanied by a brief visual 
description.  But only a few moments later, “Uncle H. Rap Remus pulls the Luger’s trigger and 
Uncle Sambo’s head explodes in a geyser of blood, bone, and burr.  His corpse flops to the floor 
and is kicked from the stage” (74).  At this point, it becomes clear we are to understand Uncle 
Sambo as having been physically present in at least the same way Uncle H. Rap Remus is.  But 
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the line between understanding the physical presence and materiality of characters and their two-
dimensional representations is considerably blurred.  Taking the ambiguity of the previous 
section one step further––in which cartoon characters depicted on the packaging of frozen food 
items are manifested as fully present characters––here the line between racist propagandistic 
political posters and the characters populating Bubbles’ bizarre wonderland is eclipsed entirely in 
ambiguity.  It is never clear exactly what level of reality we are in, and not just because Bubbles 
is hallucinating.  Quite literally the number of dimensions at play here is set on shifting terrain, 
and characters that seem to be fleshed out along with ones that are clearly animated mingle 
seamlessly with stereotypes and abstract concepts. 
 The next section of the novel involves a film within the closet film.  Bubbles makes her 
way into the sewers and into the 42nd Street Multiplex Grindhouse in Times Square, where she 
watches “The Rock-Horror-Negro Show” (88-112).  The movie, a tortured parody of racist 
Disney films and Nazi propaganda, replete with a showstopping number of Walt himself orating 
a racist invective parody of Martin Luther King Jr.’s famous ‘I Have a Dream’ speech (“I wished 
upon a star / That one day the contents of this nation would be judged by its lack of characters of 
color,” etc.).  This entire section is extremely shocking, offensive, and in very poor taste.  Walt 
Disney’s speech is preceded, for example, by the rotting corpse of Malcolm X appearing in the 
flesh to give a prologue discouraging the consumption of pork (89-91).  Then Zombie Elvis gives 
an extremely gross and graphic blowjob to the Zombie Master (101-103), and from there we cut 
to The Disney Magic Hall, where representations of Mickey Mouse as variously Big Brother, 
Hitler, and Christ preside over a parade that includes “MECHANICAL ZOOT-SUITED 
CROWS,” a “YARMULKED MYNAH BIRD,” and “festive crowds of crucifix-worshipping, 
corn-dog-chewing, CAUCASIANS who look and act like an extended family of inbred 
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Appalachian mutants gathered for a Fourth of July Picnic” (106-107). A “surfer-blond JESUS 
with plastic, flickering eyes” shows up and “swaps jokes with the HOLY GHOST” (107). But a 
giant nose on the side of Sleeping Beauty Castle controlled by the Zombie Master’s voodoo 
powers (104-105) covers the entire scene in green slimy snot, and then the zombies attack and 
kill Jesus and everyone else (108-109). The Zombie Master declares, “It is time to end Disney’s 
reign of whyte-supremacist terror!” (110).  He and Zombie Elvis try to kill Disney with a stake to 
the heart, but they are stunned to see Disney is actually animatronic himself. The Zombie 
Master: “He just’ a puppet in his own mad design!” (110). The film ends with Elvis Zombie 
doing a rock-and-roll number that sends his limbs flying “straight into the lens of the camera” 
(112). 
 Back in the Grindhouse, with the film over Bubbles tries to sneak out when she overhears 
two fried-chicken-eating Black Muppets (“BUPPETS”) discussing plans to “beam up on the 
rock, go to Central Park, an’ rape us some whyte women!” (113), filming this and thereby 
winning the Palm D’Or (114-115), and then getting shot by a “SHADOW” they panhandle to, in 
the manner of Bernhard Goetz (115-116), and then the SHADOW starts shooting Buppets 
indiscriminately, and it turns into a musical number, and he sings and dances about white 
supremacy on their corpses, and the text here becomes oddly punctuated with excerpts that a 
footnote tells us are from “The videotaped confession of a noted subway gunman,” ostensibly 
Goetz, and then he blows himself and the whole theater up with dynamite (117-119).  Bubbles 
escapes the carnage (120-121) only to be eaten by “A FIVE-HUNDRED-FOOT-TALL 
CYBORG” that is ejaculating all over Times Square (122).  Inside, Bubbles encounters 
TALKING DREADS, an alien controlling the cyborg who has her read the story of “Lil’ Black 
Zambo,” (123-124), which we get the complete text of (124-130).  This is the misunderstood 
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representation of the alien’s first attempt to communicate with our world.  It is basically Little 
Black Sambo with heavy parodic emphasis on black stereotyping.  For example:  
Zambo’s pappy, Tambo, who liked to drink cheap coconut wine, ran off long 
before Zambo was born, so Zambo and his mammy were very, very poor.  They 
didn’t give out welfare checks in the Jungle.  The Jungle was uncivilized.  Or at 
least that’s what Zambo’s mammy, Mambo, said.  ‘When we gwine git civilized 
so I can git on d’welfare?’ (125).   
 
Etc.  Now TALKING DREADS wants to take over our world, and he reveals his “ULTIMATE 
PLAN FOR THE DEGENERATE WHYTE MAN” (125), which leads to an extended depiction 
of the Norman Rockwell-esque town of Garvey’s Corner, which it is then revealed is actually “a 
mock town where blacks are trained to look, act, and think like ordinary law-abiding white 
citizens in order to undermine all the rights and freedoms American society has to offer the white 
race without the slightest detection!” (139).  Talåking Dreads explains that blacks impersonating 
whites become invisible, and “As invisibles, our work becomes the subliminal work of sorcerers.  
We must steal into the last sanctuary, the sanctuary of dreams, and attack that portion of the 
brain that understands not words, but images.  We must burrow into the blind spots of 
personality, chanting the black incantations of our otherworldly ancestors, and change the 
signposts of slumber...” (141-142).  In other words, an ironic parody of this novel itself. 
 We cut to inside Bubble’s brain, where it gets a little more abstract.  There is “an ovoid 
HEAD” in there, and a “jodhpured JOCKEY” who then leads an “ARMY OF COON-FACED 
LAWN ORNAMENTS” down a street (142).  At this point a bizarre exterior document is 
inserted, a parodic pamphlet about civil defense, in which white people are cautioned against 
exploding negroes (143-144).  It vaguely recalls the other weird total narrative interruption on 
page seventy-two where we get a snippet of The Untold Tales of Uncle Remus in which Miss 
Sally walks in on Remus sodomizing her grandson. 
  
196 
 Then we go back into Bubbles’ Brain again.  In a voice over, she tells us, “I sank deeper 
and deeper into the maelstrom of my own mind, whirling in a vortex of improbable visions until, 
finally, I was transported to the scene of a forgotten childhood game” (148).  Inside the “circle of 
revolving NEGRO FACES” we get “a nymphetic NINE-YEAR-OLD, nude, with dusty peach-
colored skin, demonic lynxlike eyes, and a froth of dazzling blond curls.  She lounges in blissful 
languor on a rumple of blankets spread across a heart-shaped bed” (148).  As if playing with how 
far the text can transgress the line into (legal) unfilmability, James goes on: “The Nymphet's 
crimson-tipped fingers furiously flick the rose-tinted crease of her hairless, hymen-sealed 
pudenda” (149).  This transports Bubbles, in memory, to “Times Square movie houses” where as 
a kid she would sneak out to watch Blaxploitation films (150-155), and she comes to the 
realization: “Laughing at niggers is our first great national pastime” (155), and that this must 
have lead to her blackface masturbation orgies. 
 At this point the stage is set for the final climax of the film, which pushes the boundaries 
of “shock literature” even further than Burroughs, and constitutes the single most profane scene 
in the novel, one which likely could not be legally represented in any visual medium.   
INT.--Upper Westside Brownstone--Living Room--Day. 
 
A naked, SHIRLEY TEMPLE-CURLED LITTLE GIRL in blackface shouts to a 
group of naked, blackface PREPUBESCENTS. 
 
SHIRLEY TEMPLE-CURLED LITTLE GIRL 
Hey everybody!  Throw yo’ ass in the air like  
you don't care! And do THE UNCLE REMUS! 
 
The LITTLE GIRLS’ wiry black limps (sic) twitch in a spastic combination of 
camp sixties dance steps, as they bump behinds with a lewd, rude, and crude 
attitude. (155-156) 
 
In voice over, Bubbles explains that though they were the ones physically doing these things, “in 
our minds, we weren’t the culprits...It was those black children from the welfare projects! They 
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did it! ... They smoked the reefer!  They stole the booze!  It was niggers!  Not us!  Niggers!  It 
was niggers poking their greasy, fried-chicken-pickin’ fingers into our wet, underaged pussies!  
Not us!  Niggers!” (157).  Then:  
The Shirley Temple-Curled Little Girl straddles the Scarlet Nymphet and rubs the 
glistening halves of her painted black ass in the Scarlet Nymphet's ecstatic face.  
Her rectum dilates... And a moist, corn-studded turd spills from her ruffled hole.  
The turd slides into the Scarlet Nymphet’s puckered mouth, smearing across her 
lips soft and fudgy.  James Brown grins and sweats on the TV set (157-158).   
 
End scene.  Bubbles regains consciousness in the Cyborg’s Image chamber, where she pukes up 
a Vomitoid monster: “A swell of VOMIT cascades from her mouth in a fan of Day-Glo 
fluorescence.  It scuttles into a corner—green and crab-legged with round, tentacled eyes” (159).  
Though we should note that just before that she was masturbating to this fantasy: “Bubbles rubs 
her clitoris in agitation as she regains consciousness” (159).  The Cyborg vanishes and drops 
Bubbles into the Harlem River, where she has to flee the CORPSE OF A PIMP, then the 
CORPSE OF A WELFARE MOTHER, the undead sewage-watery graveyard of black 
stereotypes: CHEFS, CRACKHEADS, B-BOYS, etc. (160-162), and finally “A pork-bellied 
WHITE MAN in traditional Quaker wear” that she has to escape from (162-163).  But as the 
Quaker foams and dissolves into the water, leaving only a pair of eyes, Bubbles recognizes them: 
“Familiar psychotic eyes in a familiar black face.  The familiar black face of the family Maid” 
(163).   
Back in her Brownstone, Bubbles is absorbed by her mirror and burrowed into by a snake 
and excreted; she becomes disembodied (165-168).  At dawn, Bubbles sees herself in a United 
Colors of Benetton ad in Vogue, but the face in the mirror is “cinnamon-colored” (169).  The 
CREAM OF WHEAT CHEF appears and offers her a bowl: “Close-up on Bubbles’ face.  There 
is no face.  It’s been replaced by a silken mesh of shadows.  Freeze-frame Cream of Wheat Chef.  
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As the credits roll over the freeze-framed image, offscreen sounds are heard.  A crowd roars in 
an outdoor stadium.” (170).  An announcer announces Louis Armstrong to toot out the national 
anthem.  He starts, but then stops, resentful of a lifetime of being denied this honor and then 
being forced to do it in death.  “The Cream of Wheat Chef’s mouth forms Louis Armstrong’s last 
words” which are of course, “French-kiss my black New Orleans Ass.  DEEP.” (171).  Finally: 
“The camera pulls back.  The Cream of Wheat Chef turns around, bends over, and drops his 
trousers.  His ashen black ass is whitewashed with the words: ‘THE END’ ” (171). 
 This open-ended ending can of course be understood as refusing to engage in a reductive 
identity politics, as a gesture towards the dialectical suspension of all questions regarding the 
novel’s place in late capitalism, etc., as Murray suggests.  But the one thing this does not fully 
account for is the insistence of the cinematic metaphor to the very end, the dogged determination 
of the closet film form even as anything approaching character and plot unravel.  The disruption 
of Bubble’s teleological arc—or any other novelistic narrative measure—leaves us with the pure 
signification of cinematic joke.  The final sequence involves the total enmeshment of the 
representation of historical figures (Armstrong) with animated caricature (Cream of Wheat 
Chef), the latter ventriloquizing the former in an ambiguous manner than continues the novel’s 
relentless imbrication of various ontological levels of representation.  Perhaps what is most 
notably dialectically suspended here, in other words, is not so much the novel’s politics of racial 
representation (though it certainly is), so much as the novel’s representational mode altogether at 
the level of its very signification, the way we see what we read and read here what we see.  This 
more profound open-endedness, a formal open-endedness, helps to contextualize the novel’s 
potential for success along the axis of James’s own stated intention: a satire which will make us 
laugh and puke.  Does it succeed, in other words, as a kind of curse analogous to a Voodoo spell, 
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that produces tangible effects in us, or is Negrophobia’s gesture towards this end merely another 
ironic joke akin to the injunction to “kiss my black ass” that ends the film?   
 Rather than engage the problematics of reader response and reception history that 
necessarily dog a definite answer to such a question, I want to close this chapter by gesturing 
merely to a few points about the implications simply of the question itself.  For one thing, we 
could not even begin to raise this question, to ask about the way the novel’s specific form 
invokes film-worlds, without first locating this text within the closet film subgenre of the novel.  
A developed reading novel-as-spell in the specific context of Negrophobia, in other words, relies 
on our reading its uniquely screenplay properties, since the worlds it conjures straddle the 
boundaries between filmic, literary, and televisual.  If we want to grapple with the most 
generative questions this novel raises, we must therefore conceive of it as closet film first.  And 
these are indeed provocative questions, because James’s closet-film-as-Voodoo-curse offers a 
potential, if unlikely, model of how subversive literature might do real political work: satire plus 
tangible effect.  It is this effect, which we might dub the gross-out quotient of the novel, that we 
cannot even begin to measure until we theorize the closet film.  Once we do so, we can 
understand this novel as playfully unworking––a la Agamben’s désoeuvrement––of not only 
cinema but of racism itself.   
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CHAPTER FOUR 
BADASS LITERATURE & THE GOLDEN AGE OF CLOSET FILM? 
 
 At this point it should be quite clear that the canon of closet films proper is rather limited 
in comparison to Quimby Melton’s much more general and inclusive category, “closet 
screenplay.”  The screenplay, nobody disputes, has not gained the kind of popular attraction or 
literary acknowledgment as the playscript, and writers have largely not felt compelled to utilize 
this form in the same way that poets have appropriated dramatic form.  Indeed, Darius James’ 
Negrophobia (see Chapter Three) is potentially the only fully realized instance of this genre.  
When I met with James at a bar in New Haven and asked him about it, he could not think of 
many other specific examples, except possibly William Burroughs’ Last Words of Dutch Schultz 
and a few stories by Terry Southern (from Red Dirt Marijuana––there are some very dramatic 
short stories in there, but nothing in screenplay formatting).  James expressed that he himself was 
simply trying to push boundaries and play with questions of genre and media, but that the 
publishing industry more-or-less keeps that sort of formal experimentation in check––it is too 
risky, economically.  Nevertheless, many novels (Infinite Jest, Hard-Boiled Wonderland and the 
End of the World, The Raw Shark Texts) appear at the genre’s fringes, partaking of the closet 
film––exploring its energies and potentialities, testing the limits of visual and cinematic 
referentiality within the confines of the literary text.  But finally, in the last two decades, several 
novels have been published by a new generation of authors that can be described as “partial 
closet films.”  These are novels which contain sections written in closet film format.  This 
chapter will look at three such partial closet films.  Adam Thorpe’s first novel Ulverton (1992) is 
comprised of a series of individual sections connected only by a geographic thread: they take 
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place in the fictional small town of Ulverton, but each chapter takes a different literary genre, 
casts a different set of characters, and is set in a different historical period.  Most notably for our 
purposes, the final section of the novel appears in the form of a post-production script for a 
television documentary shot in the town.  David Flusfeder’s A Film By Spencer Ludwig (2010) 
contains several scenes in which screenplay formatting is interspersed throughout the otherwise 
prose fiction narrative.  Though there is less of a focus on the closet film form than in Thorpe’s 
work, the narrative itself focuses throughout on films and the production of films.  The diegetic 
world of the whole novel is thus saturated with filmic metaphor, and the intrusion of scriptic 
formatting, though it only occurs in a few instances, is correspondingly more meaningful for the 
novel as a whole than in Thorpe’s text, where the screenplay forms a historiographic coda that 
does little more than offer a cynical afterthought about the ways contemporary media erase and 
trivialize the past.  Finally, the chapter will turn to a longer and more focused unpacking of Mark 
Leyner’s The Tetherballs of Bougainville (1998), a novel broken into two sections, the first a 
prose fiction description of a young man with one day to write a screenplay for a prestigious 
award his literary agent has already secured for him, and the second the screenplay itself, a vastly 
unfilmable script that in a very loose sense picks up where the chronology of events in the first 
section left off. 
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Ulverton: The Partial Closet (Post-Production) Script 
 Not much has been written about Ulverton, and less about the closet film component in 
its final chapter.  Martin Puchner, however, mentions the novel in an article focusing on new 
conceptions of ekphrasis in contemporary literature.  He analyzes Thorpe as well as Samuel 
Beckett as producing examples of what he calls “Textual Cinema and Cinematic Text.”  But 
perhaps the very vagueness of this title bespeaks precisely the idiosyncratic formal device of the 
closet film that Puchner’s article expressly overlooks.  Ulverton, he says,  
…participates in the tradition of the cinematic novel, however, not by trying to 
introduce the camera and its visuality into forms of narrative representation, but 
by using the film’s own textual apparatus as a literary form: the last chapter is 
written entirely as a shooting script for a film, and includes dialogue, camera 
angles, frames, and sound track. This chapter thus does not attempt to replicate 
the experience of watching a film, but recycles the textual surplus of the cinema, 
otherwise seen only as the textual means to a cinematic end, to become a proper 
literary form (np). 
 
Puchner is correct to eloquently describe this chapter as a recycling of “the textual surplus of 
cinema.”  But he is right for the wrong reasons.  One pivotal detail that Puchner has completely 
missed is that Thorpe does not in fact present the chapter as a “shooting script,” but rather a 
“post-production script.”  Though the difference does not amount to much at first glance on the 
page, it certainly bespeaks a different relationship between the text and the material production 
of the potential film in question.  A shooting script is, indeed, a “textual means to a cinematic 
end,” but a post-production script is a textual rendering of a pre-existing film, used here in the 
service of a documentary, possibly for editing, sound-mixing, and other post-production 
requirements.  It is not a blueprint for a dramatic film, but specifically a textual rendering of the 
whole film as it has been produced.  It is thus a different kind of “textual surplus,” one drawn 
not from the surplus of discarded materials that went into a (fictional) cinematic production, but 
a more radical surplus—an excess even—in which the cinematic thing has been translated after 
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the fact into a readable thing.  In overlooking the specificity of the form of closet film Thorpe 
utilizes here, Puchner effectively writes off the whole potential of a closet film form, cementing 
the genre’s position as a kind of quirk in the  world of all texts vaguely cinematic and all films 
vaguely textual.  Turning his attention instead to Thorpe’s second novel, Still, Puchner asserts, 
“Unlike the dramatic form, the film script has not achieved the degree of canonization that would 
allow for a corresponding closet screenplay, or film text.”  Ironically, what Puchner eclipses here 
is precisely his own role in rendering the screenplay uncanonizable by overlooking the specific 
details which would make it interesting enough to do so. 
 There is, to be fair, an additional reason why I suspect Puchner might have overlooked 
Ulverton and move on to Thorpe’s other works, which contain thematic and contextual filmic 
elements but which are not rendered formally as screenplays.  Ulverton is, to put it bluntly, fairly 
boring.  Puchner makes a poor formal excuse for overlooking it, but I suspect he might simply 
have not gotten through it.  He may have had little to say about it, that is, less because of the 
failure of previous critics to recognize the screenplay as a literary form, than because the novel 
simply is not very compelling.  We might thus add to our growing list of reasons why there are 
not more closet films that those few which do exist are sometimes long, experimental, and even 
arguably pretentious.  We shall see more of the same with David Flusfeder’s A Film By Spencer 
Ludwig.  But, on the other hand, the closet films by Darius James and Mark Leyner are so 
manically absurdist and referentially hyperbolic that they are apt to lose audiences for the 
opposite reason.  One fundamentally odd question about the closet film then, is why the form has 
seemed to lend itself to one of two mutually exclusive camps: on the one hand there are closet 
films that seek to wildly and outrageously push the boundaries of the filmable and stretch the  
ontological flexibility of literary form.  On the other hand, there are closet films whose very 
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mundanity raises questions about the redundancy of scriptic form in literature we always already 
read as cinematic anyway. 
 And that is also the first crucial reason why it matters that Thorpe’s text presents itself as 
a post-production script instead of a shooting script.  It is not just a surplus: it is a radically 
superfluous excess.  And it has to be: the point is that this fictional documentary is itself boring 
and redundant.  Ultimately, the satirical bent here is that contemporary culture disregards history, 
and that our historical television documentaries duplicate this disregard by being boring––so 
that, finally, Thorpe’s final chapter can duplicate this procedure again.  A logic of redundant 
reduplication pervades the whole novel, as cycles of history repeat themselves in new forms, 
culminating in a literary form that is itself an excessive reduplication of a tedious historical 
documentary.  It is no coincidence then, that this final of twelve chapters, running from pages 
309-382, is by far the longest in the novel, a needlessly stretched-out and self-exhausting 
chronicle of “A YEAR IN THE LIFE” of an altogether boring real estate developer.  Here, at the 
end of a novel which experiments with eleven other literary forms (epistolary, journal, sermon, 
monologue, etc.), is the end of literary experimentation, literature replicating the very medium 
that has effectively replaced it.   
 This leads to the second crucial reason why it matters that this is a “post-production” 
script: it is full of completely inane technical details.  Unlike a regular script, which is often 
designed to entice and titillate producers and executives who have the power to control whether 
the thing actually gets made, the post-production script has no such burden of having to be 
enjoyable to read.  Thorpe’s document is correspondingly unenjoyably saturated with minutiae 
explicating the details of literally every individual shot of the film, whether a “close-up” or “mid-
s” or “long-s,” every “wipe,” “pan,” and “pickup,” every music cue, fade in and out, etc.  And 
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yet, there is literally none of the evocative tonal context supplied in the stage directions of a 
shooting script.  Furthermore, the layout, in which setting, dialogue, and extradiegetic sound are 
listed in three parallel columns, does not lend itself to ease of reading.  While a shooting script 
can be effectively read, just like a playscript, this document is clearly not designed to be read 
through like a literary text, but rather consulted for information relating to specific scenes.  To 
use a popular analogy from new media theory, its aesthetic is more database than it is narrative.  
Beginning from the initial description of the film’s opening, narrative readability is minimized 
while descriptive technical information is foregrounded: 
GENERIC TITLE SEQUENCE 
TITLE ON SCREEN: 
‘A YEAR IN THE LIFE’ 
 
EXT. DAY:     DAWN CHORUS 
WIDE-SHOT TUMULUS WITH SUN 
RISING BEHIND IT 
LONG-SHOT ROOKS CIRCLING 
TREES 
 
WIPE 
LONG-S ROAD THRU DOWNS: 
DISTANT CAR APPROACHING 
 
MID-S THRU SIDE WINDOW:  POP MUSIC – 
TRACKING ON PASSING    CAR RADIO 
COUNTRYSIDE (311) 
 
And that is about as literary as it gets, the idyllic pastoral and nostalgic scenery of Ulverton 
evoked in the sentimental opening sequence.  What quickly transpires for the reader is likely––it 
was in my case at least––that s/he will begin to ignore all of the technical details and sift through 
for the literary content.  But this gets frustrating as early as the next page, when we meet the 
protagonist, the subject of the documentary here, Clive: 
MID-S CAR APPROACHING DOWN 
FARM TRACK 
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CLOSE-UP CLIVE IN CAR 
PULLING ON HAND-BRAKE   MUSIC FAINT 
MID-S CLIVE GETTING OUT 
OF CAR 
PULL BACK TO LONG-S AS CLIVE  
WALKS TO FIELD SITE: FARM,  
HILLS ETC. IN BACKGROUND (312). 
 
It is as if, in satirizing boring BBC documentaries that portray boring and unlikeable philistines 
like Clive, Thorpe has focused on pointing out that the experience of working in the post-
production offices of the project was almost certainly even more boring than just watching the 
thing. 
 Each of the novel’s chapters take place in Ulverton during a different time period, 
starting in 1650 and advancing a few decades or so each chapter, moving slowly through history 
to the present.  The final chapter, titled “HERE” and dated 1988, clearly presents itself as the 
terminus where the movement of this history-dredging novel has finally arrived: this is us, this is 
where we are now: here.  The documentary itself mostly involves the bureaucracy of zoning 
rights in rural England, and is, we must imagine, considerably boring.  It is not until about 
halfway through (357-359) that the main obstacle presents itself: the body of an unknown soldier 
is discovered at Clive’s construction site.  Unsympathetic Clive has no care about the body or its 
historical import and only worries about his development investment.  It is immediately clear to 
us from specific details (the body dates from Cromwell’s time, he was killed by a spade to the 
head, etc.) that this is the body of the soldier killed in the novel’s first chapter, though this is of 
course lost on the curren’t chapter’s characters, more than three centuries later.  Adam Thorpe 
himself makes a cameo appearance amongst a group of fascinated locals (360).  Eventually, the 
deal falls apart, Clive loses a lot of money, and Thorpe decides to write a collection of stories 
about shepherds, which, ostensibly, might be the initial seed of the very novel we are reading. 
  
207 
The narrative is thus relatively pedestrian and boring.  But, at the same time, Thorpe’s inventive 
appropriation of post-production screenplay form serves as a unique satirical apparatus.  
 
 
 
 
 
A Film By Spencer Ludwig: A (Partial) Closet Film by David Flusfeder 
 
 David Flusfeder’s A Film By Spencer Ludwig (2010) is a novel very much about the 
(im)potentiality of cinema.  Spencer is a washed up avant-garde filmmaker who, amidst a life 
and career in steep decay, has to take care of his dying senile father.  The two end up on an 
unlikely road trip to a film festival in Atlantic City.  All the while Spencer muses about this 
narrative being a film: he constantly cinematizes the world around him.  Consequently, A Film 
By Spencer Ludwig is first and foremost a novel about film production, or, in this case, the lack 
thereof.  But secondarily, it itself a kind of literary representation or translation of a doubly 
impotential film: the film of the title of the novel, the one that does not, even in the fictive world 
of the novel, exist as an actual movie.  Rather, it is evoked constantly as a changing nebulous 
thing in the protagonist’s mind.  It is a film, we might suggest, in between the lines of this novel.  
This is potential cinema at its most ephemeral and intriguing (formally speaking).  And 
occasionally, this inchoate film emerges in the narrative––or, we might say, penetrates into the 
narrative, in the form of the intrusion of screenplay formatting.   
 But the novel references cinema in multiple ways.  Each chapter has an image at the top 
of the first page.  Chapter Six, for example, has an image with blacked out bars that clearly make 
it seem like a widescreen film still.  And the novel announces its own cinematic referentiality in 
its opening line: “Spencer Ludwig, film-maker, arrives at his father’s apartment somewhat out of 
sorts" (1).  The present tense here evokes the language of film treatments and screenplays, and 
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details are literaly framed as hypothetical stage directions: “If he had a camera with him, he 
would use it––extreme close-up: the carpet, his sneakers, the apartment door” (1).  Thus, while 
the format is not itself rendered as a screenplay, the language not only of film but specifically the 
language of the screenplay itself is referenced within the literary narrative.  As the novel 
continues, Spencer’s if-this-were-a-film musings increase in frequency, and the space between 
the imagined diegetic world of the novel and Spencer’s imagined film version of those events 
threatens to collapse.  The result is a kind of indirect closet film, a closet film collapsed into a 
novel.  In a move of almost vertiginous spectrality, Flusfeder with this novel seems to reference 
and build off a literary subgenre that does not, in practical terms, exist.   
 The first mode in which film exerts itself as the leitmotif of the novel is through the body 
of imaginary films referenced as having been made by its protagonist.  Spencer Ludwig’s oeuvre 
is thus very much akin, modally, to that of James Incandenza in Infinite Jest: it is a body of film 
works which do not exist.  Spencer references one of his own films, going to the Short Beach 
Film Festival, called Robert W's Last Walk (10).  Oddly, though both the festival and film appear 
to be fictitious, a six-minute clip of the film seems to exist on YouTube, of uncertain origin.  The 
extent to which potential films can be actually made outside of their original (literary) context is 
an excellent question (see Introduction).  Later in the novel we get a list of Spencer’s films that 
have won awards at festivals: “Trudy Tuesday, History of the Tango, The Late George Reid, The 
Captain’s Grief, Sonata for Piano and Violence, Robert W’s Last Walk” (60).  While thus clearly 
not as developed as the filmography of James Incandenza, the same sort of ontological and 
media-related questions are raised here.  What are we to make of these films?  Spencer 
meanwhile is more preoccupied with his next film: “Recently, between jobs... he has been 
gathering autobiographical footage to use in a speculative future film, in which he supposes that 
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images ripped away from context (physical, emotional) will be montaged with stock footage, 
crowd scenes, moments of intimacy or war” (14).  In some sense, this “speculative” and 
“autobiographical” future film is fulfilled by the novel itself. 
 At least, hypothetically.  Because throughout A Film by Spencer Ludwig, Spencer 
ruminates about the potentiality of the events of the novel as if they were themselves this next 
film of his.  For example: “If this were an independent film, the sort that juries on competitions 
favour (and even Spencer’s own difficult slow movements of anguish and observation have been 
rewarded with prizes), then it would turn into a road movie, father and son driving down an 
American highway with the sound of the radio and his father’s oxygen tank for company” (25).  
Which is exactly what the film does, for a while at least, fulfilling many of the generic conceits 
of the “road movie,” Spencer and his father in increasingly absurd situations and 
misunderstandings as they travel to and involve themselves in the Short Beach Film Festival.  
Once they get on the road, Spencer muses, “If he were to make this journey into a film, Spencer 
would resist the too-obvious irony of the self-professed Garden State being a jumble of pylons 
and factory chimneys and desperate stunted occasional trees trying to make their leafless lives 
between iron bridges and parks” (39-40).  Later, finding something in “real life” pretentious, he 
suggests, “This would be edited straight out of the movie.  Spencer’s films have been accused of 
many things, but pomposity is not one of them” (60).  And finally, about halfway through the 
book, Spencer realizes this narrative has seemed to become the very “road movie” he predicted it 
would be if it were an “independent film:”   
Spencer has been wondering how this might end.  If it were a comedy, then it 
should end up with marriage, he and his father hook up with two hookers, find a 
wedding chapel, one of these casinos must have one, trying to ape Las Vegas as a 
destination resort, walk up the aisle, giving each other away, to blushing brides 
innocent again.  If it were a tragedy, then death is the only solution.  But this is 
neither, and both.  It is, he supposes, a road movie. (118) 
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Throughout the novel, and especially in Chapter Eight (141-159), the if-this-were-a-film motif 
reflexively underscores how much this narrative is indeed actually like a movie, though that 
similarity is mostly in a vague way, having to do more with genre conceits than with actual 
filmic form.   
 Even some of the instances of actual closet film operate in this indirect and vague way 
that undermines their very closet-film-ness.  As early as page two, we seem to get dialogue in 
script format: 
HUNTER 
I guess that's pretty lame. (2) 
 
However, this is not a rendering of dialogue spoken in the novel.  It is a representation of a 
screenplay that exists within that diegetic (literary) world.  Spencer, avoiding his visit to his 
father’s apartment, has gone to a café, where he sees a young lady working on a screenplay on 
her laptop.  But for the most part, the novel does not depart from standard prose formatting.  But 
much later in the novel, without any warning or context, Chapter Seven opens in a kind of 
screenplay format: 
 
EXT. ATLANTIC CITY BOARDWALK—DAY 
 
SPENCER LUDWIG stands on the beach.  JIMMY LUDWIG sits huddled in an 
electric wheelchair. 
 SPENCER turns and walks back towards his father.  JIMMY presses a 
button and whizzes forward, just before his son gets to him. 
 
JIMMY LUDWIG 
Move it, Charlie. 
 
Again, SPENCER is about to reach his father, when JIMMY again goes 
forward. 
SPENCER stands.  He lifts his arms and lets them fall again. 
In the sky, SEAGULLS swoop and caw and rise. 
Extreme close-up: JIMMY LUDWIG’S face, gleeful. 
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SPENCER takes a step forward.  JIMMY spurts forward again.  
SPENCER stops.  JIMMY stops. (129) 
 
 
This is a fascinating approximation of screenplay form that differs from other examples 
of the form we’ve seen appearing in literature.  I’ve never personally encountered a screenplay in 
which the slug line was centered, for example.  Here, it seems to have been appropriated as a 
kind of chapter sub-heading.  There are a number of other eccentricities that mark this text as 
departing from more typical screenplay formatting.  In the first paragraph the Ludwigs’ names 
appear as full names, suggesting we have not yet met these characters.  At the same time, that 
would typically suggest we should expect character descriptions (i.e., early forties, squat, 
disheveled), which are absent.  Each new paragraph is indented, like in prose fiction, not double-
spaced, like in a script.  At the same time, writing out “Extreme close-up” instead of the typical 
script abbreviation, “ECU,” marks this as an appropriation of screenplay form explicitly for an 
audience unfamiliar with screenplay conceits.  This places us in us an ambiguous space.  
Flusfeder has borrowed basically a screenplay format here, but has not transitioned wholesale 
into a situation as if this were a screenplay itself.   
However, all in all, though the novel continues in pseudo-screenplay formatting for 
another two pages (129-130), there isn’t much notable here except for the very fact of this oddity 
itself.  Unlike Darius James’ Negrophobia, Flusfeder’s text does not go out of its way to 
capitalize, play with, or build on the unique possibilities of the closet film form.  Rather, the 
insertion of this brief segue into screenplay formatting simply serves to close the distance 
between the novel and Spencer’s imagined film within that novel.  At the level of formal play, 
nothing particularly remarkable is happening other than the very fact of partial screenplay 
inclusion.  There is another small section in Chapter Nine, where Spencer goes to a cheque-
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cashing business and cashes the cheque his father wrote him for too much money, at which point 
the text goes into screenplay format for another two pages (166-168).  But ultimately, while the 
text is loudly calling attention to its own scriptedness, it is not doing much besides that stark 
referentiality.  A Film by Spencer Ludwig is potentially an intriguing novel as a moving father-
son narrative, but its mobilization of the closet film form is little more than an eccentric quirk.  
Part of the reason for this, I suspect, is the absence of a true field of reference.  Closet Film here 
seems like a move this text can execute simply because it is so rarely done.  This novel seems to 
ask: why not have scriptic form intrude?  It does not ask, as Negrophobia does so thoroughly: 
what can be done with scriptic form in the novel?   
 
 
 
 
The Screenplay Within/As the Novel:  
 
One recent novel that comes much closer to James’ work in terms of its thorough 
exploration of the possibilities of the closet film form is Mark Leyner’s The Tetherballs of 
Bougainville (1997).  The novel, which is divided into two parts, one prose, the other a 
screenplay written by the protagonist of the first prose section, explores in a series of 
increasingly absurd ways the limits of the textual representation of cinema.  By pushing every 
conceivable boundary to farcical extremes, Tetherballs goes about as far as any novel has in 
terms of establishing the limits of closet film.  Part One, titled “The Vivisection of Mighty 
Mouse,” is a satirical romp through an alternate reality New Jersey penal system via a manic pop 
cultural referentiality, sort of Jonathan Swift meets Bret Easton Ellis except way, way more 
tongue-in-cheek.  The narrative takes place over just a few hours.  Impossibly precocious 
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thirteen-year-old Mark Leyner is attending the execution by lethal injection of his father, Joel 
Leyner, when he gets a phone call from his ICM agent that he has won a prestigious 
screenwriting award for a script he subsequently needs to write by tomorrow.  Mark is anxious 
for the lengthy execution procedures to be over with so he can write the script, and meanwhile 
muses and waxes poetic on everything from tetherball to a video game called Gianni Isotope to 
his growing sexual desire for the prison warden in charge of the execution.  But unfortunately, 
due probably to his father’s incredibly well-built-up tolerance to drugs, the lethal injection fails 
and his father is “resentenced to State Discretionary Execution” (69).  This means, explains the 
warden, that his father will be free to go, but that at any time for the rest of his life the state of 
New Jersey reserves the right to execute him in any way that might like, at any time, in any 
place, with total leeway for possible collateral damage and civilian casualties (69-70).  The rabbi 
on hand suggests, “ ‘It’s a very postmodern sentencing structure’ ” (71), but Mark himself thinks 
it “seems like normal life… isn’t everyone basically sentenced to New Jersey State Discretionary 
Execution from, like, the moment he’s born?” (71).14  We then get the full text of a lengthy 
prison pamphlet about NJSDE, outlining the randomization system, what to expect in terms of 
being ostracized from your community, etc. (71-90), the second half of which is a tangential 
segue concerning “renowned signage copyrighter Leonard Gutman” (84), who after being 
sentenced to NJSDE, coincidentally had a heart attack on the same day his ticket came up for his 
execution.  His family then filed a wrong death lawsuit against the hospital, “claiming that it was 
[his real doctor] Cuozzo’s genuine gross negligence and not the feigned gross negligence of the 
                                                
14 It is certainly worth mentioning that Mark’s father’s sentence is strikingly similar to the situation of the homo 
sacer, the figure from ancient Roman law that is not executed, but who can be killed by other citizens freely with no 
charges being brought against them.  This figure is of course the subject of Giorgio Agamben’s Homo Sacer, as a 
paradigmatic figure of modern sovereignty and the normalization of the state of exception.  Though both Leyner’s 
novel and Agamben’s philosophical study focus on the counter-intuitive ontological status of such a figure, my 
current project emphasizes the specifical formal conceits of the Leyner’s closet film.  Suffice it to say that such 
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NJSDE agents that resulted in Gutman’s death” (88).  So you get an idea of the flavor of the zany 
satire here. 
Mark “is beginning to feel really pressed time-wise” (92), which is understandable given 
the temporal oddities of this novel, including passages like this: 
 ‘You like Arnold Schoenberg’s Suite for Piano, opus 25?’ the rabbi asks 
my father. 
‘How’s it go?’  
The rabbi hums the entire fourteen-minute composition. 
“Nuh-uh,” Dad says. (98) 
 
 Whether we imagine this to be character-Mark’s hyperbole or author-Mark’s wry humor, 
the conceit of anti-realism begins to prepare us for what we find in Mark’s award-winning 
screenplay in Part Two: The Vivisection of Mighty Mouse Jr., in which he takes the warden’s 
advice on what to write.  At the end of Part One, while Mark performs cunnilingus on the warden 
at great length, she suggests he simply “ ‘write down everything that happened and just put it in 
screenplay form’ ” (108).  The section ends with Mark musing ontologically that “at the moment 
we die… we become screenwriters, which is why your life flashes before your eyes in the form 
of a storyboard” (108), followed by a rant about the eccentricities of the SkriptMentor 
screenplay-formatting software program he’s going to use to write his script, such as detailed 
series of prompts asking for penis size and specifications every time a male character is involved 
in a sex scene, and prompting the writer “every two pages or five minutes” about the “requisite 
Springsteen dirge?” (109-111).   
The Vivisection of Mighty Mouse Jr. is an odd screenplay.  On one hand it is partly 
contextualized as a work within the diegetic world of the novel as portrayed in Part One.  
However, its inclusion as an equal and separate part, as well as its length (it is the longer of the 
                                                                                                                                                       
philosophically relevant connections between closet films and Agambenenian thought offer fertile ground for further 
study. 
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two sections in terms of page-count), render it a sort of semi-autonomy from the previous prose 
section that calls into question our default assumption that a script as a chapter of a novel must 
be a textual element from within that novel.  It is doubly confirmed by the way that the 
screenplay distinctly seems to continue the narrative begun in the first section of the novel, rather 
than to, as Mark suggested he would do after the warden came up with the idea, simply 
reproduce in screenplay form what had already transpired.  Part Two picks up more-or-less 
linearly where the plot of Part One left off.  It is almost as if the warden suggests that Mark 
imagine the formal idiosyncrasy of the closet film as nothing more than a different way of saying 
the same thing (different form, say essential content), but Mark (both character and author) 
seems to go in a different direction, exploring the way the form itself constructs that content.  
Which is to say that the form itself of The Vivisection of Mighty Mouse Jr. is very peculiar.  
Even more so than was the case in James’ Negrophobia, where the text’s primary unfilmability 
was driven by the politically charged nature of its content and technical difficulties were 
secondary, Leyner pushes formal elements so that this script approaches the boundaries of what 
is conceivably and technically filmable, rather than merely politically or legally filmable.   
A number of elements render The Vivisection of Mighty Mouse Jr. impractical as an 
actual shooting script, which is what it purports to be (unlike the conceit of the post-production 
script in Ulverton, the unexplained scriptic inclusions within the prose in A Film by Spencer 
Ludwig, or even the way that Negrophobia announces itself as a novel, an urban parable, etc.).  
For example, there are no scene numbers, a pointed choice given that early practioners of the 
form marked their works as closet filmic most notably by means of numbered sections (see 
Chapters One and Two, especially for discussion of works by Akutagawa and Fondane 
respectively).  While some descriptions are painfully over-detailed and the screenplay contains 
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vast explanatory notes (see, for example, the two-page description of the drug known as “gravy”, 
120-1), others are astonishingly vague: “A SERIES OF ANGLES” (115) on the first page being 
a good example.  But more often there are “unnecessary” details and explanations that serve 
more as (literary) witty asides than as production notes for any “actual” film version of this text.  
In a half-page long parenthetical detailing the manner in which the WARDEN is supposed to 
deliver the line, “Hmmm… I think we can do a little better than that” (117), Mark notes, “It’s 
worth doing hundreds of takes to achieve the finely nuanced delivery that this line requires” 
(117).  Later, Mark includes a “CASTING NOTE: If that actor playing the role of MARK is 
incapable of achieving some of the foregoing ophthalmic effects, a stuntman may be required for 
this particular shot” (121).  After Mark details a “PULL-BACK SHOT––using fiberoptic 
endoscope” (138) that tracks through the WARDEN’s esophagus and out her mouth, he includes 
a page of parentheticals detailing how to achieve such a shot by using diazepam to relax the 
actress, derailing into a tangent about Michele Pfeiffer’s duodenum double on My Angel’s Bitter 
Kiss and finally suggesting that “If, in the course of the pull-back shot, any polyps are found, 
they might as well be removed, since you’re in there anyway” (138), followed by a description of 
methods for removing polyps.   
The Vivisection of Mighty Mouse Jr. also contains a number of unthinkably long, boring, 
and/or repetitive shots.  When the WARDEN asks MARK to choose between what’s in her left 
hand and right, MARK’s eyes dart between her two clenched fists and the “oscillating pan 
continues for seven minutes” (116).  When they move from the WARDEN’s office into an 
adjacent locked room (a space of five feet), while listening to Donna Summer’s “MacArthur 
Park” (dance mix), the stage directions dictate that the tracking shot “should be slowed down as 
much as possible to accommodate the FULL LENGTH of the SONG” (118), followed by the 
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commentary: “In addition to super slow motion, intercut long shots, detail shots, retracking dolly 
shots, high angles, wide angles, reverse angles, freeze frames, canted frames––whatever is 
necessary to stretch this five-second walk into an eight-and-a-half-minute shot coextensive with 
the sound track” (118).  As MARK begins to trip on the “gravy” superdrug, we get an impossibly 
long voice-over, including suggestions on the “coolest videos to watch when you’re high,” 
Mark’s “idea for a television series about a wandering samurai-errant-like tetherball player,” and 
being in a Kenneth Cole commercial where he and a group of diplomats negotiate a hostage 
release of Michael Eisner and Joe Roth from “Amish fanatics who are trying to stop Disney from 
producing a Paul Verhoeven-Joe Eszterhas erotic thriller about ‘bundling.’ ” (122-128), all 
ostensibly over a silent moment on Mark’s face as the drugs kick in.  This seemingly too-long 
voice-over harkens back to the closet drama form, in which one of the frequent conceits is long 
monologues, inappropriate for the stage and derived more out of epic poetry (see, perhaps most 
notably, Milton’s Samson Agonistes).   
But this is taken to a much greater extreme in the section featuring Mark reading a film 
review he wrote for a previous film of his he never made.  Mark tells the Warden, “It’s not an 
imaginary movie review.  It’s a review of an imaginary movie” (180), and he explains that while 
he likes film and theory, “the actual screenwriting seems so tedious, so superfluous.  I’m not into 
praxis.  I’m more a dialectician of absence.  Writing per se always struck me as terribly vulgar.  
To actually commit an idea to paper is a desecration of that idea, a corruption of the mind.  It’s 
not laziness.  Heavens no.  It’s simply that I’m loathe to violate the Mallarméan purity of the 
blank page” (181).  This, we might posit, surmises the entire theory of potential cinema: writing 
a screenplay that collapses in on itself in a dialectic of absence in which cinema itself is a 
signifier that is both everywhere and nowhere.  Then, over a dissolve to a “SOFT-FOCUS 
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MEDIUM-SHOT of MARK at the window” (183) which Mark suggests should be “definitely 
THE SHOT to use for commercials, print ads, billboards, posters, Web site, and licensed 
merchandise” (184), Mark reads the entire length of the review (184-237).  About half of the 
screenplay or a quarter of the whole novel (in terms of page count), is taken up by this single 
shot with Mark’s lengthy review of an imaginary film.  The name of the film is The Tetherballs 
of Bougainville.  The title of the novel itself thus takes its name from the imaginary film 
referenced at length within the screenplay (“The Vivisection of Mighty Mouse Jr.”) that forms 
half its narrative.15 
It is hard to say, in a novel where the thirteen-year old protagonist carves an impossible 
litany of Satanic aphorisms into his arm with a shard of broken glass (165), which scene pushes 
the limits of plausibility the most.  And can we really emphasize the unfilmability of certain 
scenes in a novel where the prose section itself contained a scene in which a rabbi hums 
continuous for fourteen minutes?  In other words, is Leyner’s playful send-up of what can be 
potentially filmed complicated by its status within a distinctly unrealistic novel?  If this 
screenplay exists in an absurdist satirical world, does that undermine its ability to satirize 
realistic technical film constraints?  On the one hand, insofar as the whole thing seems so groan-
inducingly silly, yes.  But on the other hand, Leyner pulls off doing some very interesting things 
with form here, and he’s working in a genre (closet film) that did not, until now, exist.  Before 
turning to Tetherballs’ eponymous film review of an imaginary film within a screenplay within a 
novel, I want to look very closely at a scene that plays absurdly with the formal possibilities of 
scriptic form within the literary.  It begins when Mark and the Warden, tripping on gravy, finally 
get matter-of-factly down to it: “Now the notorious and achingly beautiful CUNNILINGUS 
                                                
15 The Vivesection of Mighty Mouse Jr. is also, throughout, hyperallusive of other films, extant or not, besides The 
Tetherballs of Bouganville (123-6, 161, 176, 185, 188-189, 196, 211).   
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SCENE” (171).  I should pause here to point out something that might seem obvious: the use of 
all-caps.  Typically, all-caps are used in scripts to draw different production entities’ eyes 
towards key characters, props or actions that require planning and forethought to execute.  You 
need to know what characters and what props you need in a scene.  You need to know what sort 
of complicated camera moves might be necessitated by different kinds of actions.  Not all 
screenplays use all-caps, and certainly not for the same reasons, but they are not commonly used 
for emphasis, and certainly not for humor.  Leyner’s appropriation of screenplay format here in 
the context of a novel thus capitalizes on the familiar all-caps technique but recontextualized in 
the literary.  At the microformal level, a specific and original kind of comedy is achieved by 
appropriating and recontextualizing one genre’s specific technical elements into another.   
The line is of course also funny because of the absurdity of describing this grotesque 
scene as “achingly beautiful,” a phrase derived from the discourse of film reviews.  There are 
multiple levels of irony at play, the foremost being that the script seems to presume the actual 
existence of the potential film for which it ostensibly serves as a production document.  But on a 
metafictive level, there is an irony regarding the future-notoriety of this particular scene in the 
novel.  In other words, there is an ironic play on the extent to which it is character Mark Leyner 
or author Mark Leyner claiming this scene as “notorious.”  Mark explains, “The scene is 
notorious because of its extraordinary length––over three and a half hours” (171), and “The 
scene’s aching beauty derives primarily from the fact that for over three and a half hours, 
MARK’s face never leaves the vulva of the WARDEN, no matter what she is doing” (172).  The 
descriptions of what this looks like, the Warden doing paperwork and dealing with a prison riot 
all while Mark continues with varying levels of inexperienced success to perform cunnilingus, 
grow increasingly absurd, reaching a point where Mark “actually dons her in-line skates so his 
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feet can roll across the floor, an arm around each of her thighs, his mouth pinioned to her 
genitals” (172).   
Mark defends the artful tone of the scene at length, but then in a perhaps surprising turn 
of events, he offers a “Pledge of Integrity” (173), suggesting he will “remove the scene in its 
entirety” if it’s the only thing keeping the award-selection committee from granting him the 
prize, and following this up with a long series of suggestions on financing the project, possibility 
reserving the cunnilingus scene as an exclusive for the “deluxe letterbox director’s-cut laser 
disc” and/or a “Hard-Core Mix, which would be just the CUNNILINGUS SCENE” (174).  The 
context of this scene is thus somewhat ambiguous, and we are asked as readers to imagine 
several film versions of the script in multiple media formats and cuts, expanding our options 
about how we think about what we’re reading in a way I think would be fair to call refreshingly 
innovative.  Because it is a script, we can imagine the production of the film just as readily as we 
can imagine the many potential films itself.  How would you film this?  How would you cast it?  
What would it be like to be a part of that film crew?  And what would it be like to watch this at a 
theater versus at home, as part of a longer cut or as part of the Hard-Core Mix?  And yet, 
simultaneously, we also read this as a novel, and there are specifically literary moves at work 
here as well.  Mark writes, “There are only two substantive exchanges of dialogue in the 
CUNNILINGUS SCENE” (175).  The first is a very quick rehash of the longer scene from Part 
One (107-108): “In one, after MARK peeks at his Tag Heuer and whines about how he won’t be 
able to get to the library in time to plagiarize a screenplay, the WARDEN advises him to concoct 
a script ‘out of this,’ suggesting that, as soon as he gets home, he type out everything that 
happened—i.e., everything that’s transpired between the two of them in the WARDEN’s 
office—and simply reformat it into a screenplay” (175).  Mark then offers a lengthy explanation 
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which plunges us into a Möbius-strip spiral of self-reflexivity:  
I’ve decided not to incorporate this dialogue into the screenplay.  This colloquy 
between the WARDEN and MARK in which they discuss how to turn their 
encounter into a screenplay is essentially an ad hoc story conference and putting a 
story conference into this movie just seems to ‘inside Hollywood,’ too 
‘fashionably self-reflexive,’ for me.  (175) 
 
This passage brings into full focus the depth of metafictive and ironic layering that Leyner 
deploys in this screenplay.  Aside from the obvious preterition of “not” including the story 
conference by saying he is “not” going to do so, because it would, self-reflexively, be too “self-
reflexive,” this dialogue has already been included in the novel itself, in the earlier prose section 
which pointed out—as this scene reiterates—could be simply reformatted into a screenplay, 
which of course it could not, since Leyner is in this very passage using specifically screenplay-
derived devices to achieve a related but separate series of literary effects.  The other exchange of 
dialogue in the cunnilingus scene is basically a long monologue of the Warden’s in which she 
expostulates on fitness tapes (176-179). 
 One of the elements set up here, that will take full form in the film review that follows, is 
the ontological instability of the matryoshka -doll structure of the multiple frames of narration 
here.  Ultimately, this instability comes to a fore in the several moments where information or 
events ostensibly occurring in the main narrative or screenplay appear in the film review, which 
by all reasonable estimation must have been written long before.  If Mark is reading his film 
review of The Tetherballs of Bougainville to the Warden (in the screenplay “The Vivisection of 
Mighty Mouse JR.), which Mark wrote immediately following the events in the main prose 
narrative, then that film review should not be able to include information such as, “The 
Tetherballs of Bougainville was written, directed, and edited by 13-year-old Mark Leyner, whose 
only previous credit is as musical director of a video of the abortive execution attempt of his 
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father, entitled ‘I feel shitty.’” (184-185).  In fact, the plot of Tetherballs is “an autobiographical 
account of the year that follows the sentencing of Leyner’s father, Joel, to New Jersey State 
Discretionary Execution (NJSDE)” (185).  That is an impossible plot for an imaginary film Mark 
ostensibly came up with and wrote a fifty-page review about prior to the autobiographical events 
it dramatizes.  In case this “impossibility” does not trip up the casual reader, Leyner takes it even 
further when the film review itself quickly details the plot of the entire novel from the very 
beginning all the way through to the actual event of Mark reading the review out loud to the 
Warden: 
‘Then he [my father] had to tell me this whole long story about turning a brunette 
without a cranium into a blonde, and then they tried to execute him and then he 
didn’t die, and then I had to go talk to the prison doctor, and then he was 
resentenced to NJSDE, and then they had to explain what NJSDE was, and then 
we had to pick a song to go with the video, and then we had to say good-bye all 
over again, and then I got high with the warden, and then I had sex with the 
warden, then I read my talismanic movie review to the warden.  It was just one 
thing after another.’ (191) 
 
This impossible structure turns the whole thing inside out.  One immediate effect is that the 
conceit of the realism of each textual artifact existing in one diegetic reality is rendered 
irrelevant, freeing us to treat the screenplay, for example, as we probably already have, as an 
individual text free of the constraints of being part of or within a novel.  “The Vivisection of 
Mighty Mouse Jr.” is its own unique thing: a closet film. 
 A second interesting point here is Leyner’s description of the movie review as 
“talismanic,” as if it were a kind of engraved object meant to ward off evil or produce some 
magical effect in the world.  It is my contention that it is this gesture towards magical creation 
that links Leyner’s closet film most directly to James’ Negrophobia, more so than the obvious 
similarities in style and motif: grotesquery, hallucinatory drug trips, hysterical absurdism, 
shocking sex and violence, etc.  In both texts, the thing the closet film does is gesture (in some 
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kind of almost magical way) outside the text, aimed at generating some kind of occult effect in 
the real world.  The unworking of the actual film text, to return to Agambenian terminology, 
offers a playful prophanation of film form within the literary.  But where for James that effect 
concerned using the invocation of the cinematic unconscious as a mechanism for dealing with 
the ingrained cartoonish stereotypes of internalized racist discourse, for Leyner the object of 
critique is much more vague, something more like the absurd hyperconsumerist capitalist system 
that produces such insane and self-contradicting social structures and political entities that 
something like the New Jersey State Discretionary Execution only barely reads as satire at all.  
Closet film form offers a unique and powerful way to summon multiple modes of reading 
multiple ontological structures at once.   
 Ironically, perhaps the best metafictive metaphor for this phenomenon comes not from a 
closet film at all, but from the work of Thomas Pynchon.  That is to say, Pynchon has, across 
several works, developed a theory of the way fiction itself can and should operate to create an 
effect outside itself that is perhaps describable as precisely “talismanic.”  This metaphor for 
literature-as-talisman is perhaps most fully developed in Mason & Dixon (1997), a historical 
novel about the astronomers Charles Mason and Jeremiah Dixon who drew what would later 
come to be known as the Mason-Dixon line.  The novel, which is in some ways a madcap romp 
through a history of mid-eighteenth-century science (and pseudo-science), delves deeply into the 
minor histories of major figures and the asides of technological progression.  One of these, 
principally, is the early form of the modern electric battery, described as a series of stacked 
plates of alternating electrical charge, which appears notably in Benjamin Franklin’s Leyden-Jar 
(294), and also describes the body of Felipe, the possibly-sentient Surinamese Electric Eel (431-
2).  As Dixon reminds us, “‘alternating Layers of different Substances are ever a Sign of the 
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intention to Accumulate Force,–– not necessarily Electrical, neither,––’” (599).  The 
accumulation and amplification of thermodynamic force as a metaphor for socio-political action 
has been important to Pynchon since at least 1984, when he published a brief essay titled, “Is it 
OK to be a Luddite?” in which he argues that Ned Ludd, the romanticized leader of an eighteenth 
century movement of British weavers, was likely not the “technophobic crazy” he has been made 
out to be, but rather a “dedicated Badass” (43). He asserts,  
There is a long folk history of this figure, the Badass. He is usually male, and 
while sometime earning the quizzical tolerance of women, is almost universally 
admired by men for two basic virtues: he is Bad, and he is Big. Bad meaning not 
morally evil, necessarily, more like able to work mischief on a large scale. What 
is important here is the amplifying of scale, the multiplication of effect. (43-44) 
 
This amplification of force, which is accomplished by Badasses such as “the djinn, the golem, 
the hulk, the superhero” (44), is also realized, Pynchon argues, by novels, which have a “Luddite 
value” inasmuch as they operate “through literary means which are nocturnal and deal in 
disguise, to deny the machine” (45).  Mason & Dixon’s depiction of the early form of the modern 
battery as a stack of inversely charged plates precisely models how something like a work of 
literature might be able to amplify its scale, multiply its effect.  
 Felipe, the electrical eel (also known as a torpedo), is an excellent figure for what we 
might call an element of “Badass Literature,” or literature with a high “Luddite 
value.”  Gershom, George Washington’s black Jewish slave, explains that 
‘the Torpedo, five-sixths of whose Length is taken up with these Electrical Plates, 
the Principle of all these structures,–– which is, that you must stack a great many 
of them, one immediately upon the next, if you wish to produce any effect large 
enough to be useful in, let alone noticed by, the World.–– Aye, Dixon, well might 
you wag your Head,–– wag away, may it circulate some sense.  For what possible 
use a single plate, Lead or Gold, buried in the Earth, is, is beyond me.’ (286) 
  
Dixon responds, “‘Why may not these Plates collectively form a Tellurick Leyden-Pile?  If not 
for storing quantities of simple Electrick Force, then to hold smaller charges, easily shap’d into 
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invisible symbols’” (286).  Later, Professor Voam says of Felipe: “of particular interest being 
those of the Disks which are Stack’d lengthwise along most of his over-all length, each Disk 
being a kind of Electrickal Plate, whose summ’d Effect is to charge his Head in a Positive, as his 
Tail in a Negative Sense” (432).  Mason & Dixon is itself structured in just this way.  For as 
much as its narrative tunnels wormlike through established boundaries of Enlightenment 
ideology, it is also a thoroughly orthogonal and binary novel.  In addition to the inevitable 
characteristics––the black ink on white pages, the stacking of facing sheets, etc.—the novel is 
structured not only around two main characters who variously double and mirror each other, but 
also by a ferociously ordered principle of regular chapter-lengths.  Each is about ten pages long, 
with very few digressing from this scheme: the book’s 78 chapters are constituted by 773 
pages.  Moreover, the novel follows two fairly stable characters across a more-or-less linear story 
whose plot structure parallels The Autobiography of Benjamin Franklin—the ultimate proponent 
of all things right-angled and binary—in that both texts focus on the mid-eighteenth-century until 
the 1760s, from the perspective of the 1780s, while the 1770s, the period of the American 
revolution, are simply elided altogether.  The novel’s historiography is thus not only tangled and 
nebulous, but also orthogonal, and at no individual point are these terms ever fully 
reconciled.  Mason & Dixon’s historiography thus always resides in the space between 
orthogonal and wormlike.  It is therefore perhaps Felípe who most accurately presents a sort of 
total mise en abyme microcosm of Mason & Dixon itself, a novel inclined towards both the 
subterranean and wormlike on the one hand, and the orthogonal and binary stacking that 
amplifies force on the other.  The shape of historiography imagined in this novel, in other words, 
is both the “great disorderly Tangle of Lines” suggested by the image of the worm and of the 
“Terrestrial Sign of Draco,” but also the grid-like sandwiching and stacking of plates in the 
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proto-battery––just like an electric eel. 
 With Felipe, and by extension Mason & Dixon itself, Pynchon articulates a talismanic 
conception of the novel that gestures towards the kind of thinking that Darius James and Mark 
Leyner are able to capitalize upon and do even more thoroughly by using closet film form.  In 
both Tetherballs and Negrophobia, closet film form quite literally “amplifies the effect” of the 
literary text by pointing outside itself towards not only the imaginary filmic product but also the 
imaginary production of that filmic end-product.  The end goal, in both cases, is a kind of 
“Luddite value” insofar as both texts are attempting very clearly to “deny the machine.”  
Ultimately, then, what closet film does is, in Pynchon’s terms, “Badass,” working through 
martial and nocturnal means to effect mischief on a large scale.  Or, to put it another way, closet 
film is uniquely capable of effects outside of the text itself through its virtuosic playfulness, in 
Agamben’s sense, the extent to which the cinematic machine is held at bay and denied by the 
strategic closetedness that nocturnally disguises its extra-textual political amplification.   
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CONCLUSION  
 
REALISM AS POTENTIAL CINEMA 
 
 
 I now would like to offer something a bit different that demonstrates the way that 
potential cinema already informs the way we read novels.  By analyzing the somewhat fallacious 
formulation, typical in literary criticism, that positions a given piece of literature on a continuum 
between Realism on the one hand, and something like metafiction, antirealism, or anti-
illusionism on the other, we can see that what we might call a mimetic imperative eclipses the 
actual phenomenological processes that we typically undergo while reading.  In other words, 
when we attempt “Realist” readings, we are really doing something else.  It is my contention that 
what we are actually doing, given the shift in not only the novel itself but in the way we read the 
novel in the age of cinema, when the structural machinations of film and video media have 
determined a kind of imaginary cinema of the mind,—what we are actually doing when we say 
we are reading realistically is reading potential cinema. 
 The first essential point to establish then is that no matter how we think and talk and 
theorize about how we read fiction, we tend to implicitly privilege a very old model of Realism 
as the default, the norm.  Some critics have been outspoken about this being a good thing, and 
others have been quick to say it’s a bad thing, but the latter have not been very persuasive in 
arguing against the position that it is a real thing in the first place.  For example, Dan Schwarz, in 
his essay, “A Humanistic Ethics of Reading” (2001), celebrates what he perceives as a revival of 
humanistic hermeneutics now that “the high tide of rhetorical deconstruction [has] receded” (3).  
Schwarz outlines several key premises shared by this new wave of critics, among which he 
argues “A literary text imitates a world that precedes the text, and the critic should recapture that 
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world primarily by formal analysis of the text, although knowledge of the historical context and 
author is often important” (3).  Clearly for Schwarz a simplistic model of Literary Realism is to 
be privileged above all else.  And he makes an excellent point about the potential universality of 
this thinking: “Who among us would be teaching and studying literature had we not learned to 
read mimetically?” (13).  I think that latter point is probably right, but I would place extra stress 
where Schwarz does not: on the learned aspect of that mode of reading.  What Schwarz makes a 
strong case here for is the extent to which the default impulse to read mimetically is shared by a 
larger number of academics than only the self-described proponents of humanist hermeneutics.  
For even if those against whom Schwarz polemicizes are quite critical of a superficial mode of 
literary analysis which favors author-centric criticism and ignores almost across the board the 
developments in literary theory since the New Critics, surely even they must admit that we have 
all been taught at one point or another to read that way, and that moreover we like to read that 
way even after being re-taught to reject that kind of reading.  One essential problem that we are 
still grappling with, in other words, is that despite a widespread rejection of the kind of literary 
criticism that Schwarz values, whether from deconstructionist camps or those (as we shall see 
shortly) that favor antirealist, metafictive-privileging readings, we cannot seem to shake 
humanistic Realism as the essential default norm of how we read in the first place.  We can be 
for it, or against it, but it remains. 
This becomes most clear when we look at the best theorists talking about instances in 
which Realism is challenged or punctured by metafiction, anti-illusionism, or self-reflexivity, 
etc.  Even in these cases, critics tend to explicitly or implicitly value Realism as the primary 
mode of reading, and think of metafiction as a secondary function of what constitutes narrative.  
In other words, the metafictive (or anti-illusionistic, or self-reflexive) is almost always defined 
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against something.  It is no coincidence that every term for it bears some sort of prefix that 
designates its special or exceptional relationship to a more originary norm.  Metafiction, or anti-
illusionistic fiction, is specifically defined against a conception of just plain old fiction.  But the 
“just plain old” euphemism here isn’t innocent.  Realist fiction, in the implicit understanding of 
more literary theory than it may at first appear obviously, is taken as simply fiction.  Monika 
Fludernik, for example, in her Towards a ‘Natural’ Narratology (1996), arguably one of the 
most important works of narratology in the last fifteen years, more-or-less explicitly upholds the 
primacy of Realism over what she calls “anti-illusionistic techniques” (273), and she lists four 
categories “in which narratives disrupt their expected realistic frames” (273, my emphasis).  But, 
she argues, even in the most extreme cases of narratives that go out of their way to disrupt 
“expected realistic frames,” such as Christine Brooke-Rose’s experiment novels Out (1964) and 
Such (1966), Realism remains the dominant paradigm for reading: “Yet even these radical texts 
do not completely disrupt the process of narrativization; they merely dilute constants of mimetic 
conceptualization to the point where realist frames become tenuous and are reduced to the 
notions of malleable or inconstant character, setting and event outlines” (273).  And she echoes 
James Phelan’s injunction (more on him below) to “preserve mimeticism” when she argues, “By 
recuperating such texts, by narrativizing them, readers enforce a minimal holistic (cognitive) 
story shape on what is threatening to become unreadable, unshapeable textual fluidity” (274).  If 
the Realism end of the spectrum asymptotically approaches the Real, then the metafictive 
literally approaches, in Fludernik’s term, the “unreadable.”  This model, in which texts simply 
exist somewhere between reality and unreadability, is precisely what I can’t quite get behind.  It 
is quite a jarring claim, actually, that suggests the sheer readability of a text should be pinioned 
onto an axis determined by the mimeticism of that text, as if metafictive works were somehow 
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less communicative, less readable than realistic ones, as if mimetic narrative story were the only 
criterion for legibility. 
 In Fludernik’s more recent work that takes up questions specifically related to 
metafiction, “Metanarrative and Metafictional Commentary: From Metadiscursivity to  
Metanarration and Metafiction” (2003), Fludernik at first appears more accepting of a model that 
attempts to put metafiction on equal footing with Realism, as equally constitutive components of 
fiction, rather than one in which metafiction is simply halfway towards literal unreadability.  She 
praises Ansgar Nunning’s  
flexible scalar model according to which narrative mimesis can tend either towards 
the pole of narrational or towards the pole of diegetic (plot) illusionism.  In other 
words, the realistic illusionism produced by the (traditional) novel can consist in 
the evocation of a communicational scenario (a narrator talking to the narratee), in 
the portrayal of a fictional world, or in the combination of both types of illusion 
(as, for instance, in the authorial novel; compare Fielding's Tom Jones). (3) 
 
Certain devices that we might call metafictive16 are more aptly considered as themselves 
functions of illusionism, albeit of a different mode than the diegetic source.  But the actual effect 
here, it seems to me, is again (like in Fludernik’s earlier work) to render metanarration, if not 
metafiction, as merely a subset of realism.  The emphasis, in each case, is on how the mimesis 
and illusionism are constitutive of fiction, and that rather than understanding ways this is broken 
or disrupted, we should imagine ways something else (such as the relationship between the 
author and the reader) is itself represented mimetically.   
 If the privileging of the mimetic mode of reading is more-or-less explicit in Fludernik, it 
is often implicit in works that purport to uphold metafiction as somehow more important, 
                                                
16 Both Nunning and Fludernik are interested in redefining such terms.  Fludernik suggests that “the term metafiction 
has been used rather loosely and randomly in English critical prose to refer to all sorts of techniques that explicitly 
or implicitly 'break' what is called the mimetic illusion generated by fictional narrative.  Metafiction, in short, 
frequently includes anti-realistic devices, parody, mise-en-abyme, just anything that is not 'realist' (in the caricature 
sense of a verisimilar fictional representation of a fictional world that looks much like our real world)” (11). 
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dominant, or constitutive than realism, such as another foundational text: Patricia Waugh’s 
Metafiction: The Theory and Practice of Self-Conscious Fiction (1984), which has set the tone 
for much of the theorizing on the term (“metafiction”) for the last several decades.  At first, 
Waugh seems to privilege metafiction as the definitional or constitutive element of the novel: 
“What I hope to establish during the course of this book is that metafiction is a tendency or 
function inherent in all novels… By studying metafiction, one is, in effect, studying that which 
gives the novel its identity” (4, italics Waugh’s).  Later in the introduction, she expands and 
clarifies this definition: “Metafiction is not so much a sub-genre of the novel as a tendency 
within the novel which operates through exaggeration of the tensions and oppositions inherent in 
all novels: of frame and frame-break, of technique and counter-technique, of construction and 
deconstruction of illusion” (14, italics Waugh’s).  The suggestion that metafiction “gives the 
novel its identity” is a compelling one, but it is already undercut by the language Waugh uses to 
describe it: metafiction is a tendency within the novel which functions through the exaggeration 
of something already within the novel, the tensions and oppositions inherent in them, which are 
more originary than metafiction, which we can only understand as a mechanism of manipulating, 
exaggerating, what is already there.  Waugh thus provocatively suggests that metafiction might 
be the very thing of the novel, that which “gives the novel its identity,” but simultaneously seems 
to implicitly understand metafiction as a secondary function of (Realist) fiction. 
 Something similar happens in Wenche Ommundsen’s work, which sets out from the get-
go ostensibly to critique exactly the false opposition I’m talking about here: 
Throughout this book it will be argued that the perceived and to my view 
misleading opposition between reflexivity and reality, or between metafiction and 
realism, may have come about through the construction of metafiction itself as a 
genre or category seemingly distinct from 'ordinary' fiction.  Reflexivity, I will 
suggest, is best understood as a dimension present in all literary texts and central 
to all literary analysis; a function which by analysing literary processes enables us 
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to understand the processes by which we read the world as a text. (4) 
 
I am of course on board with Ommundsen’s critique of the “misleading” opposition between 
realism and metafiction, but she is still defining “metafiction” as “a dimension” of fiction, which 
leaves room to conceptualize realism as the other dimension.  This, implicitly, seems to be the 
case when she argues, “The violation of narrative levels—variously referred to as ‘metalepsis’, 
‘tangled hierarchies’ or ‘strange loops’ (see Genette, 1980; McHale, 1987; Hofstadter, 1980) —
works to destabilise the fictional illusion, calling attention to its fabricated nature” (8-9).  But to 
understand metafiction as fiction “calling attention to” itself presumes we have already assumed 
that fiction is a thing, outside of and prior to metafiction, that can be called attention to, and that 
that thing that fiction is one in which metalepsis should not occur.  To make this much clearer: 
Ommundsen says metafiction destabilizes fictional illusion, which suggests that it was precisely 
fictional illusion (or mimesis or Realism or whatever you want to call it) that was there in the 
first place, the originary truth of the text just waiting to be acted upon (in this case 
“destabilized”) by metafiction.  In other words, her specific language obscures the implicit set of 
assumptions that undergird it: that fiction is naturally realistic and that metafiction is something 
that breaks or disrupts mimetic illusionism.  The fact that Ommundsen suggests metafiction is 
“present” in all literature, but only “central” in “literary analysis,” is, I think, telling of this 
implicit privileging: it is as if metafiction is always there, but it is only a function of a certain 
mode of literary analysis that it can be read.  Ommundsen does, however, go farther than most in 
her suggestion that “a purely mimetic reading of fiction [is] an impossibility: the one thing a 
literary reading of fiction cannot do is imitate or reflect the world through a mirror-like, self-
effacing medium” (24, italics Ommundsen’s).  It remains unclear to what extent, however, 
Ommundsen thinks that “a purely mimetic reading” is impossible only because it needs also (and 
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potentially secondarily) metafictive readings, or whether, in her model, metafictional readings 
might really be prior to or trump mimetic ones.   
 Let us now turn in more detail to one particular case of how this kind of privileging of the 
mimetic imperative plays itself out in a very good piece of narratological theory: James Phelan’s 
Living to Tell about It: A Rhetoric and Ethics of Character Narration (2005).  I do this to show 
how an excellent work of criticism necessarily encounters significant limitations by accepting (in 
this case explicitly, but most do implicitly) that Realism is, always has been, and should continue 
to be the default way we first approach a text.  Phelan posits as a given our “default interest in 
preserving the mimetic” (26), on the grounds that of “other readers,” “many” tend to want to 
exhibit an “impulse to preserve the mimetic” in their attempts to find “a plausible, naturalistic 
rationale” for the synthetic components of narration (25).  But simply accepting the essential and 
unchanging truth of the mimetic imperative, rather than questioning the political, philosophical, 
and aesthetic grounds that have determined this mode of reading over hundreds of years, limits 
Phelan’s readings in a few problematic ways.  His focus at this particular moment in the book, 
for example, is on Sandra Cisneros’ short story “Barbie-Q,” and the way that readers tend to 
want to preserve the mimetic by explaining (rationally, naturalistically) what he calls this story’s 
synthetic component of “redundant telling.”  That is, the story appears to be narrated by one 
character to another character who ostensibly already should know it all.  The whole narrative, 
which is in some sense clearly also being told for our benefit as readers, is therefore “redundant.”  
But understanding the story as an instance of “redundant telling” only makes sense if you have 
already assumed it should be mimetic.  It is not redundant at all if we first understand it as a 
narrative being told to us, if we privilege, that is, the relationship between reader and text instead 
of narrator and narrattee.  Only if we first imagine that what we’re doing here is eavesdropping 
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on a mimetic world does a problem of redundancy arise at all. 
 This problematic is reflected throughout Living to Tell about It in what I read as Phelan’s 
anxiety about narrative sloppiness.  That is, in pointing out narrative inconsistencies (which are 
of course only inconsistencies if you presuppose that the narrative should be consistent in a 
realistic, naturalistic sense), Phelan is often careful to defensively assert that artistic 
craftsmanship, and not contrived sloppiness, accounts for narratives’ complicated things that 
need to be explained.  Phelan calls these inconsistencies “curious phenomena” and opens his 
book with a list of them (2-4).  A prime example comes from Kazuo Ishiguro’s novel The 
Remains of the Day, where often much of the structure of the narration does not seem to 
rationally add up.  For example, at one point Phelan points out: “What is curious here is that this 
present-tense justification does not jibe with Stevens’ later admission that he had very personal 
motives for his inquiry, yet the discrepancy does not mark Stevens as a deliberately deceptive 
narrator or Ishiguro as a sloppy craftsman” (3).  But why not?  What would be the difference 
between sloppy contrivance and this sort of discrepancy or “curious phenomena”?  Is it just that 
we don't want to admit that this sort of sloppiness might itself be formally constitutive of 
character narration?  What if narrative is constituted (in a more fundamental way than it is by 
mimeticism) by paradox, sloppiness, irrationality, and messiness? 
 Quite simply, the narrative structure of The Remains of the Day doesn’t make sense.  Not 
in the naturalistic, realistic sense that Phelan (and many, many others) want it to.  One conceit we 
are apparently supposed to entertain in reading the novel is that Stevens, as both character and 
narrator, is not entirely aware of his being emotionally closed-off.  In other words, he is reliably 
unreliable: part of the process of reading this novel is to identify the cracks in his narration and 
read between the lines in order to glimpse the characters’ true interiority.  That is, if we read 
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maintaining our default impulse to preserve the mimetic.  But when we do this, we get 
irreconcilable inconsistencies: “curious phenomena,” in Phelan’s terms.  Some of these are safely 
reconciled by complicated rationalizations.  Others not so much.  Take, for example, this scene 
between Stevens and Mr. Cardinal (a minor character), in which what we are clearly to glean is 
that Stevens is more upset than he will himself admit, having just now learned that his father has 
had a stroke: 
 ‘When I was young, I used to keep all sorts of tropical fish in a tank.  
Quite a little aquarium it was.  I say, Stevens, are you all right?’ 
 I smiled again. ‘Quite all right, thank you, sir.’ 
 ‘As you so rightly pointed out, I really should come back here in the 
spring.  Darlington Hall must be rather lovely then.  The last time I was here, I 
think it was winter then too.  I say, Stevens, are you sure you’re all right there?’ 
 ‘Perfectly all right, thank you, sir.’ 
 ‘Not feeling unwell, are you?’ 
 ‘Not at all, sir.  Please excuse me.’ (105) 
 
Here Stevens-as-character is only partially aware of the extent of his emotional anguish, and 
Stevens-as-narrator is somehow more aware, if ambiguously so.  Stevens never tells us: “I was 
really upset, but because of my professional duty as a butler in a great house I could not express 
it.”  Instead, we piece this together obliquely, by the injunctions of what others say to him.  This 
narrative strategy is most obvious when a moment later Lord Darlington himself confronts 
Stevens: 
I felt something touch my elbow and turned to find Lord Darlington. 
 ‘Stevens, are you all right?’ 
 ‘Yes, sir.  Perfectly.’ 
 ‘You look as though you’re crying.’ 
 I laughed and taking out a handkerchief, quickly wiped my face. ‘I’m very 
sorry, sir.  The strains of a hard day.’ 
 ‘Yes, it’s been hard work.’ (105) 
 
Now then, it seems pretty clear here that despite character-Stevens not being able to express his 
inner suffering, someone, whether narrator-Stevens or Ishiguro himself, seems hell-bent on us 
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understanding that Stevens is, indeed, crying.  But to imagine that narrator-Stevens has decided 
to inform us, his readers, in this somewhat oblique way seems inconsistent with what we know 
about him as a character.  Indeed, who does that?  It does not seem realistically plausible that a 
person telling something to someone would do so by means of reporting dialogue in which their 
interior emotional condition is revealed by what is said to him by others despite himself.  To 
imagine the revelation of Stevens’ pain here as a function of his intention as narrator thus greatly 
strains plausibility.  Now here is the real kicker: this feature of understanding a character’s 
emotional interiority by means of reading between the lines is a specific conceit of narrative 
textual fiction, in particular the novel.  It does not then make sense to imagine Stevens as a 
naturalistic representation of a real human being here.  What is happening in this scene is clearly 
textual, and, frankly, too obvious.  This moment is clearly contrived, and no entity within the text 
(not character-Stevens nor narrator-Stevens) is able to account for it.  What recourse do we have 
here except to say that clearly Ishiguro himself is responsible for this apparent sloppiness?  This 
contrivance?  But, we should remind ourselves, it’s only sloppy and contrived if we presume we 
should be reading mimetically.  If we try to read this as Realism, it does not, simply put, make 
coherent logical sense.  Which explains Phelan’s problem here: he wants to read mimetically, but 
he also wants it to make sense, because he likes this novel and does not want to admit it might be 
sloppy, its moves clunky and contrived.  His inability to have both explains his defensive 
posturing in his assertion that such “curious phenomena” do “not mark Stevens as a deliberately 
deceptive narrator or Ishiguro as a sloppy craftsman” (3).  And it is this same problematic which 
leads him to make the similarly anxious claim about Cisneros: “In sum, it is not possible to 
account adequately for the redundant telling as a mimetic strategy, but that impossibility is a sign 
not of Cisneros's flawed construction but of her ingenuity” (29).  Phelan’s problem then is not so 
  
237 
much that he takes the mimetic imperative for granted, but that there is a mimetic imperative at 
all.   
 This problem––trying to read texts as Realistic (because that’s the default/normal/only 
way to do it) when that is not necessarily the best way to read them––is most apparent in 
Phelan’s reading of Nabokov’s Lolita in one of the book’s later chapters.  Phelan makes the 
claim that in Lolita, the “parody, satire, and metafiction” as well as the “intertextuality” are 
layers that “support rather than undermine the realist layer, serving largely to characterize 
Humbert and his situation.  Consequently,” Phelan asserts, “in this chapter, I will attend 
primarily to the realist layer because that is where the relation between technique and ethics is 
most vexed” (99).  I think it is safe to say that what we might call the “mimetic default” becomes 
something more like a “mimetic imperative” when a novel like Lolita is read as an example of 
plainly Realist fiction.17  Here, metafiction is relegated to a set of trappings, clever tricks that are 
seen in relation to the primarily Realist nature of the narrative itself.  Indeed, the metafictive 
elements of the novel are, for Phelan, contained within Humbert’s own intentionality: they 
characterize him.  In Phelan’s reading, Humbert becomes another character-narrator, who, just 
like Stevens in The Remains of the Day, is reliable in his own unreliability.  Lolita becomes “the 
story of Humbert's struggle to tell” the “story of his relationship with Dolores” (101), which we 
as readers are able to glean much from because his “control over the effects of his narration has 
significant limits” (107).  In other words, we know much more than Humbert, and we are 
supposed to see in the gaps of his narration the true story beneath.   
 For example, Phelan says, “Humbert is totally oblivious to the way his narration of his 
marriage to Valeria makes her look like a long-suffering saint and him like a cruel egotist” (107).  
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But does it?  And even if it does, how do we know Humbert doesn't know that?  We do not, and 
we can not, know that.  Narrator-Humbert has, after all, explicitly told us, from his position at the 
end of the events that transpire in the course of the novel to character-Humbert, that he has been 
explicitly reconstructing an image of his former self for our benefit: “Fortunately, my story has 
reached a point where I can cease insulting poor Charlotte for the sake of retrospective 
verisimilitude” (71).  It is this “retrospective verisimilitude” that Phelan entirely overlooks in his 
central thesis regarding the novel, that "Humbert, through the very act of telling his story, the 
effort of perceiving and reperceiving himself and Dolores, is changing his relation to the story as 
well as to himself, to Dolores, and to his audience” (120, italics Phelan’s), and that “[w]hile he 
started out self-absorbed and focused on his own defense, he ends up far more concerned about 
Dolores than himself” (129).  Though attractive in some sense, this reading is ultimately 
overconfident in its appraisal of Humbert’s lack of control over his own narrative–– that is, in its 
framing of Humbert as precisely the sort of reliably unreliable narrator as Ishiguro’s Stevens.  In 
the end, this reading seems more motivated by Phelan’s own desire to show the potential benefits 
of telling and narrating, and of solidifying his theoretical narratological framework than it does a 
careful analysis of the tremendous complications in the narrative slipperiness of Nabokov’s most 
puzzling text. 
 How then, do we get ourselves out of this bind?  It may at first seem frivolous and too-
easy, but one answer might be to simply posit potential cinema as a replacement for the anterior 
reality that Schwarz claims is de facto referenced by all texts as the essential, imperative Realism 
at their core.  Instead of the Real, instead of the mind of the author, what works mime in their 
mimesis is a film that exists potentially in the mind of the reader.  This is, in other words, a 
                                                                                                                                                       
17 We should note that Phelan is by no means alone in this.  Leland de la Durantaye’s recent eloquent defense of 
Lolita’s ethics, Style is Matter: the Moral Art of Vladimir Nabokov (2007) relies entirely on reading the novel as 
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clever way of weaving together humanist Realism with Reader Response theory while excusing 
ourselves from the poststructuralist critiques of both.  And it presents, in a more sweeping sense, 
another form of potential cinema than the ones I’ve laid out through this dissertation (closet film) 
and in its Introduction (cinematic notional ekphrasis and weirdly filmic novels).  It is therefore 
fitting that we conclude with a fourth mode of potential cinema.  Let’s take, as our case study, 
the same short passage of Ishiguro’s discussed above: 
 ‘When I was young, I used to keep all sorts of tropical fish in a tank.  
Quite a little aquarium it was.  I say, Stevens, are you all right?’ 
 I smiled again. ‘Quite all right, thank you, sir.’ 
 ‘As you so rightly pointed out, I really should come back here in the 
spring.  Darlington Hall must be rather lovely then.  The last time I was here, I 
think it was winter then too.  I say, Stevens, are you sure you’re all right there?’ 
 ‘Perfectly all right, thank you, sir.’ 
 ‘Not feeling unwell, are you?’ 
 ‘Not at all, sir.  Please excuse me.’ (105) 
 
If we are driven (by impulse, by default, or by imperative) to read this mimetically, then it 
collapses into sloppy contrivance (which, by a certain thinking, would making Ishiguro a bad 
writer, which I don’t think he is).  If we read it purely as metafictive, it doesn’t seem to offer up 
much.  But if we read this as if it were a kind of potential film, if we let the narrational “I” here 
slip away from Stevens-as-character and transform into the hypothetically interiorized camera 
we all have in our minds as a function of the growth and dominance of visual media in the late-
twentieth-century infoscape, then the scene plays beautifully.  “I” see Stevens crying, and maybe 
I even identify with him, and feel his pain.  If we let the film play, we avoid all the problems 
with Realism not making sense.  The next question then, is how we begin to do literary critical 
studies of the potential film evoked by this novel, rather than the novel itself.   
 
                                                                                                                                                       
plain-and-simple Realism with a capital ‘R.’ 
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